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
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STUDIES  
IN  
THEOLOGIC DEFINITION  
UNDERLYING THE  
APOSTLES' AND NICENE  
CREEDS

BY  
FREDERIC PALMER



NEW YORK  
E. P. DUTTON AND COMPANY  
31 WEST TWENTY-THIRD STREET  
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TO

M. T. P.

WHO HAS INTERPRETED AND GLORIFIED THE  
PROBLEM OF PROBLEMS,  
THAT OF PERSONALITY,  
THESE STUDIES IN PERSONALITY ARE  
DEDICATED.



## PREFACE.

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IT is perhaps useless to specify those for whom a book is designed, since such specification will not guide it into their hands, nor secure it from those of others; but it may indicate the point of view from which the book is intended to be read. In these Studies I have had in mind especially those persons who have felt a difference between the tone of the thought in which they find themselves and that to which they have been accustomed by experience or tradition. This difference is making itself felt widely in the world to-day; in some cases with suspicion and fear, in others with welcome. But what it is that has changed our outlook and made us unable to dwell quietly where we or our grandfathers formerly dwelt, we do not quite see.

I have endeavored in these Studies to point out what this difference is, and to justify the con-

viction which many persons feel—which I am thankful to feel—that this characteristic tone of the thought of our time is not antagonistic to that of former times, but is a fulfilment of it. It is those, then, who, consciously or unawares, are seeking a mediator—a mode of thinking which shall reveal the inheritance of the past and claim the gifts of the present and adjust itself to the future—it is such for whom these Studies are primarily intended.

CHRIST CHURCH RECTORY,  
ANDOVER, MASS.

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## A HYMN OF PRAYER.

FATHER, I fain would keep mine eyes  
From selfish dimness free,  
That not one ray from out Thy skies  
Might shine unseen by me.

Father, I would mine ear might keep  
Undefended by earth's noise,  
That I, like Samuel, even in sleep  
Might hear and heed Thy voice.

O Father, might my timid heart  
Beat with Thy knowledge strong,  
That I, with an unerring art,  
Might sever right from wrong!

I know not, sometimes, whether 'tis  
An angel speaks to me,  
Or if some power from the abyss  
Is tearing me from Thee;

Yet of these voices which dismay  
I know one is divine;  
I know there surely is a way  
To tell which one is Thine.

The power to hear, the power to know,  
O Father, give me these;  
And let my soul to largeness grow  
By strong and sure degrees.

Then shall I have a holy strength,  
And walk erect and free,  
Till earth and heaven shall mean at length  
One life, lived all in Thee.



## STUDIES IN THEOLOGIC DEFINITION.

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### CHAPTER I.

#### THE POINT OF VIEW.

IT forms an epoch in the life of a child when he discovers for the first time that things are not what he had always supposed them to be; when he learns that food has to be paid for, and clothes do not come as a matter of course, and other families are not like his own; that his parents have weaknesses, and that he himself does not fill a prominent place in the world at large. And it marks a similar epoch for an older person when he discovers that the scaffolding which supported his intellectual or religious life is supporting it no longer. The painful question comes, Which has failed? Are the suppositions on which he has hitherto leaned still valid, and must he crowd back his later developments into conformity with them? Or is it that he has grown mature and

discovered not only that they are false, but they always were false? Have they been all along deceitful shams, while he has been supposing them infallibly authoritative?

That is the bitter question which is perplexing many an earnest mind in regard to the formulæ and practices of its early religious training. A dilemma seems thrust upon it. It must give the lie either to its revered teachers in the past or to its deepest present convictions. And consequently we have the sad sight of persons adopting both these courses. Those who choose the one horn of the dilemma endeavor to repress all doubts and to be as they have been. "The Bible, the creeds, the church, all my religious training—these must be true. I am bound to be surer of them than of anything else. I must bring myself into conformity with them, no matter at what cost. 'It is written'—that is all I need to know." And so the mistakenly conscientious mind tries to fit itself to its Procrustean bed, and in so doing becomes crippled for life. On the other hand, those who choose the other horn of the dilemma identify the formulæ and practices of religion which they have been taught with religion itself. "That is religion, is it? You say so, and you ought to know. Then religion is not for me. I must go through life without it, and count myself its opponent."

Everywhere we see these two saddening results of the spirit of earnestness, called to judge its surroundings in the light of its own development. But sometimes the awakened soul hears with surprise of a third course. "Do not accept the dilemma," the encouraging voice says to it. "The scaffolding which has hitherto supported your life is not rotten; it is only inadequate. And that very inadequacy testifies that it has been doing its legitimate work. Scaffolding is meant not to be permanent, but to support the building until it can stand of itself. Then the purpose of the scaffolding is accomplished, and it loses itself in the finished structure. The ideas which you brought from childhood you have very properly outgrown. In every other department of life you have recognized them as necessary steps to a larger development. But in religion you have been assuming that these were ultimate—religion's complete and only form. Your childish conception of God was material and narrow; but it was all you were then capable of. Do not suppose that is all there is in the idea of God. *'Élargissez Dieu.'* Take your maturer thought and bring it to your earlier standards. You will find it throwing new light on them, and they in turn on it. You will find that what they meant to express is in reality the basis underlying these same maturer conceptions you have now come to

hold; while your earlier conceptions will be seen to be not necessarily false, but only inadequate."

That is always the duty of the young man or the young age—to translate the forms of a past life into forms of a present life. It is sometimes supposed that this need is peculiar to the present period of the world's history; that we are living in what is called a time of transition. This is undoubtedly the case. But it is also true that every age since the world began has been an age of transition. The time when the son could step calmly and unquestioningly into the handed-down beliefs of his father has been always present; the process never, to the nobly ambitious soul, lawfully possible. The danger is always great that there may be a breach between childhood and manhood, between the world's present and its past. But the true method of transition was set forth by Christ in those words which were the text of His Sermon on the Mount and of His whole endeavor: "Think not that I am come to destroy the law, or the prophets: I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil." Revolution—"to lay the old world low to clear the new world's way"—is the method of the zealous reformer whose time and range of vision and faith are limited. Fulfilment—the discernment of the true aim of the past and its readjustment to the new conditions—this is the divine method.

As soon as we set about this task of translation two difficulties face us in the creeds in which the belief of the past has embodied itself—one difficulty arising from the nature of creeds, and one from the subject-matter with which they deal. These difficulties are not confined to the two or three great historic symbols, but exist in case of every creed. The first difficulty in the way of every mediator who would be honest is to discover the conditions of legitimate relationship between past and present; or, to express it more specifically, to discover what constitutes unity of belief with others. To profess the same form of words is of course valueless as a warrant of real union. The words may be uttered and a totally different meaning attached to them; or the phraseology may be rejected and still the very truths which it was originally designed to express may be held. What certainty is there that any creed shall be that bond of union among many men of the same time, or among men of different times, which it was intended to be?

There certainly is no warrant that it will catch thieves, that it will detect or prevent the dishonesty of those who from interested motives claim to hold it when in reality they do not. No Inquisition can do this, and the object of a creed is not to fence a church from intentional intrusion. In the opinion of many, a creed is like a business-

contract, where the terms have one definite meaning clearly understood by all parties, and where, if any party attempts to vary the meaning, he may properly be arrested for breach of agreement. Any one who should allege in excuse for non-fulfilment of a contract that by dollars he did not mean dollars, but dimes, would be sent out of court with damages and derision. It is this view which led to the framing of such creeds as the Athanasian and the Westminster Assembly's Shorter Catechism—symbols which are designed to be philosophically exact statements of doctrine and to exclude diversity of opinion. But it is impossible that any creed should be a contract of this sort. The fundamental condition of a contract is wanting in case of a creed: the terms have not a definite and uniform meaning, but meanings which vary in every age. And this difference cannot be prevented. The word "God" has a somewhat different meaning for every person. The attempts of ecclesiastical councils to keep definitions the same, form one of the melancholy chapters in church history. If it is exact similarity in the results of an intellectual process that is to constitute unity among believers, unity is impossible.

But there is another view of creeds; and that is, to regard them not as attempting scientific accuracy of definition, but as approximate ex-

pressions of the truths of which they treat. In this view, the meaning which the framers of a creed had in mind and designed to express, rather than the expression which they actually gave to their meaning, will be the creed's true self. It is not only the case that words change their significance, but subsidiary ideas, inserted because they were supposed essential to some main idea, are seen by the maturer mind of a later time to be not essential to the central thought, or even not compatible with it. Thus the existence of the soul hereafter was regarded in the early Christian centuries as necessarily implying the existence of the body. Soul without body was inconceivable; or, if conceivable, a pagan conception. The body must therefore not be burned, but carefully buried, so that it might be raised and rejoin the soul. What this belief aimed to express was the preservation hereafter of personal identity. But with a larger thought of personality the existence of this particular body is seen to be not essential to the future existence of the soul. The soul will embody itself in a manner befitting its new conditions, but not by means of the dust into which the material body has been resolved. That will never be raised from its grave, except to form part of some new material organism. Am I, then, through my larger knowledge precluded from uniting myself to those of

former generations who believed in the future existence of the soul? If I hold the essential belief which they held, though I no longer hold to the clothing of the belief, subsidiary and non-essential; if I too mean and believe the very thing which they meant to express in their creed—the preservation after death of personal identity—then I may with entire honesty join with them in saying, “I believe in the resurrection of the body.”

This is not playing fast and loose with words. It is treating them with respect and honesty, for it is endeavoring to discover just what they mean. And it is the method by which we arrive everywhere at community of understanding. Not what did the man say, not what did he think he meant, but what did he really mean—it is that that is the first element in determining community with him. To some persons it seems that truthfulness requires an explanation of the sense attached to the old phraseology every time it is used, or else that it be not used at all. Truthfulness certainly does require that every one who has a right to know should understand the principle of usage adopted. But this once understood, to give an exegesis on every occasion would be as unwisely scrupulous as to explain one's shades of feeling every time he said, “Glad to see you!” or “Good-by.” As for the other alternative—to

abandon the old phraseology altogether—that would mean an abandonment of the attempt to secure fellowship with others, and make it necessary that every man should have a church to himself. For if I cannot unite with another unless my belief is identically the same as his, then, since there is no authority to decide whether the two beliefs are thus identical, I must either be illogical and take with me some select companions, regardless of consistency, or I must go my solitary way and stand by myself in the strictest individualism. If I adopt this theory, a new creed becomes necessary, not only for every generation, but for every individual.

But after we have decided what legitimately constitutes unity of belief with others, and how this community may be economically and truthfully expressed, there still remains a difficulty as to the subject-matter with which the creeds deal. Have they any real subject-matter? That is, have the doctrines with which theology is concerned a basis of objective fact beneath them, existing absolutely and in the nature of things; or are they conventional understandings of fictitious facts? Popular theology presents a mass of conflicting opinions; have they any real standard of appeal? Or may one legitimately take whatever he prefers, with the conviction that it has as good a ground of existence as any other?

Any one who remembers bumping his head when a child will recall the surprised sense of something independent of himself brought home to him by the bump. Cushions yielded to impress; most objects could be pulled or torn; parents' commands, even, could on occasion be stretched by teasings or tears. But this floor which gave the bump showed no responsiveness whatever to personal touch; there was the hard fact of existence independent and absolute. The universe was composed not only of the "I"; here was evidently a "not-I" obtruding itself, or if not obtruding, not duly withdrawing when stumbled upon. This, then, was what they meant by a fact; and how wonderful was this thing, a fact! —something existing by itself, regardless of my wish or knowledge; something I cannot condition, but only accept and adapt myself to.

The acquaintance with absolute existence which that bump conveyed was bought cheaply. It revealed to the child that in order to come into relation with this seemingly alien existence, the more he set himself humbly to apprehend the exact facts, and the less he mingled his fancies with them, the better for him. And what the bump did for the child the study of natural science has been doing for the last generation. We have been gaining an increased respect for a fact; we have been deepening the meaning of the word

"know." If fact and thing have an absolute existence, if they are what they are independent of me, then my knowledge of them must be conditioned by them, not by myself; there is an objective truth about them, and not merely my subjective belief.

We hear at times—we heard more frequently two or three generations ago—the doctrines, ritual, or functions of the churches spoken of as priestcraft, and religion as a matter of invention: it happened to be invented in this way; it might just as well have been in that; if those who have it in charge should decide to change it and make it consist in something different, they could do so—there is nothing in the nature of the case to prevent. Those who have caught a glimpse of "the great massy strengths of abstraction" on which religion is based have doubtless smiled at hearing this; it seems to them so very absurd. But while smiling, they have been saddened to think that what, as they believe, they know to be so absolute in its nature should be so profoundly misunderstood. They hold that knowledge in the province of religion is possible; and if any one replies that absolute knowledge is everywhere impossible, that there is no such thing as real knowledge of any kind, then they answer that that position is suicide, since to know that there is no knowledge is itself knowledge.

And those who hold this ground deny that the theologian, in making claim to knowledge, is necessarily more dogmatic or arrogant than the geologist, the psychologist, the mathematician, or any other investigator of the universe. There are, it is held, certain absolute facts in the department of theology, as in the department of geology—facts not invented, but only discovered; facts which cannot be changed a hair's-breadth by any theological speculations or ecclesiastical councils, such as theologians are supposed to use in producing their manufactured article, religion.

It is the conviction that such knowledge is possible that is at the foundation of these Studies; the conviction that every one of the main doctrines of theology is but a statement in systematic form of some aspect of necessary thought, and that any doctrine or institution which has not this necessary basis becomes thereby an ecclesiastical conventionality—something which may be desirably established by agreement in this form or in that, but which is not essential to intellectual or spiritual sanity. When we speak of a thing as necessary we mean that it is the condition of existence of something else. So when we regard a theologic doctrine as having a necessary basis we mean that this particular thought is so related to the universe that if it were other than it is, the universe would not be

the self-consistent whole we believe it to be. If, as I drop my pen, it should fall a single inch upward, not merely my expectation, not merely the material world, but the whole universe would fall in ruins; for the law of gravitation is, so far as I know, essential to the existence of the universe. If I am asked what assurance there is that the universe is in fact such as I conceive it to be, I can only answer that while I cannot demonstrate that two and two do not make five, I am compelled to assume that they are four in order to avoid intellectual suicide and preserve my sense of self-identity.

In every department of life with which ordinary men have much to do the existence of absolute facts is recognized as a matter of course. No mathematician is accused of inventing the multiplication-table; no geologist is told that the rocks are merely what he makes them to be. In all the departments of physical science the popular mind understands correctly the nature of the investigator's task. Certain facts exist in the nature of things; it is the business of the student of science to discover what these are and to investigate their relations.

Here, then, is our claim for theology: that it is just as truly a science as are the so-called natural sciences. The data of mathematics are what they are, we say, in the very nature of things, because

they cannot be conceived otherwise. Just so the data of theology have the same inherently necessary character. They are involved in the nature of man and of the universe to which he belongs. Without them he cannot fully understand himself and his surroundings. And they can be really conceived in only one way. The reason why not all men see them in this one and the same way, or why there is any question about them, is because the province of spiritual life is more difficult to penetrate and more obscure than the province of flowers or rocks, and yet is one with which all men are so directly concerned that everybody thinks he understands it and has his theory about it.

What are these data of theology, these inherently necessary facts lying at the bottom of the constitution of every man, which cannot be conceived as absent if one would understand himself completely? We believe we find them expressed in those algebraic formulæ of theology, the so-called Apostles' and Nicene creeds. Strip off the historic dress in which they are there presented, and we see these inherently necessary facts in their ultimate condition: that there is a personal force at the basis of the universe, who is the ground of existence of the known and the unknown, who is self-limiting, and whose nature is yet incomplete without the existence of other

beings; that this personal force, which we call God, has a human side, which once in the world's history was manifested completely in a being who authentically represented God under human conditions; that all that is best in the life of the world or of man is not only similar to the divine, but is God Himself, directly and spiritually present; that all those in whom is this Spirit of God will be bound essentially and organically to one another as well as to Him; that the power which draws men away from God is less strong than that which draws them to Him; that death does not affect the continuity of personal identity, but that spiritual life enables its possessor to share with God complete independence of the conditions of time and place. Or, to exhibit the data multiplied more plainly by the factor of necessary existence, we believe in God because we find His existence involved in our own. We believe in the Trinity—the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost—because a God without such complexity of essence would be no God, but merely an unintelligible blank. We believe in the incarnation because, since God's Spirit is continually embodying itself in various degrees in men, it must inevitably happen that at some time it would embody itself as completely as is possible under the conditions of humanity; and because the historic evidence, examined in detail, seems to us to de-

mand the conclusion that Jesus of Nazareth was an authentic representative of God under human conditions. We believe in a spiritual church, which is “the blessed company of all faithful people”; and since every spirit must embody itself,\* we believe in an outward and visible organization, which is a partial representative of this “communion of saints.” We believe that repentance draws the sinner toward God, because by that fact he ceases to be a sinner. We believe in the preservation of personal identity after death, because personality, though it may be extinguished from within itself, is independent of time and place.

Ultimate data are one thing; men’s opinions about them are another. Deductions, inferences, historical embodiments, developments—these are all matters in which testimony and logic and metaphysics are concerned. How shall we arrive at a knowledge of our ultimate facts in theology, and how distinguish them from men’s opinions about them? Just as we do in other matters—by the consensus of trained minds. The organs of the human body, with their constituent ele-

\* In connection with the necessity to spirit of material embodiment—a necessity resting on the law that matter is but a mode of mind, since to a spiritual being essence and form are inseparable—note the desire of the demons, according to Jewish tradition (*Luke viii. 31, 32*), not to be sent out “into the abyss” and left homeless, but to be allowed to enter into swine.

ments and functions, are discovered and attested by the consensus of opinion of anatomists and physiologists. And so the ultimate facts of spiritual life have been discovered and attested by the consensus of religious minds, by what has been called the Christian consciousness, working *semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*.

It may be said, "But this abolishes revelation; religion is surely revealed by God." Yes, but this *is* revelation—God's voice speaking through the best thought of men. That thought, in being human, is not necessarily non-divine. It is God's own thought, spoken out and revealed through human channels. It is the divine word embodied in flesh. For as we no longer attempt to distinguish between the impulse that leads men to turn toward God and the promptings of the Holy Spirit, between "Christ in you" and "Christ the hope of glory," so we can draw no sharp distinction between the human mind discovering truth and the divine mind imparting revelation.

It is this conviction of the ultimate unity of the best in man with the divine which alone can justify the attempt to establish on reasonable grounds belief in the existence of God, or to prove the authenticity of any utterances purporting to come from Him. If this conviction were unfounded, the undertaking would be—what in fact it always seems to the zealous ecclesiastical

partizan—a dethronement of God by subjecting Him to the certification of an external standard. But if the reason to which the proof appeals is God Himself, then the standard is no external one, but is contained in the organic unity of His own being; then the demonstration of reasonable grounds for the divine existence and utterances is the establishment of the kingdom of Him whose right it is to come and reign.

It is the belief that this is the case which is at the basis of these Studies. They do not profess to embrace all the departments of systematic theology. They are mainly in those five departments which are summed up in the Apostles' and Nicene creeds, namely: the existence and nature of God, the incarnation, salvation, the church, and immortality. And they are Studies in Definition because it is chiefly in definition or the lack of it that fallacies in argument lurk and misunderstandings between friendly opponents are born. Perhaps the person who should do most good to-day in turning the hearts of the fathers who are inside the churches to the children who are outside them, and the hearts of the children to the fathers, would be a modern Socrates, who should go up and down the land asking every one who ventured to utter an opinion, "What do you mean by that?" Loosely thought-out opinions, held and defended with the pertinacity due to

self-respect, often build formidable barriers between those who long to be at one. In nine cases out of ten the Socratic question would reveal the hollowness of the opposing barriers and establish the joyful treaty, "Why, if that is what you mean, I quite agree with you." And in the tenth case an immense advantage would be gained in clearing away the underbrush between the opposing camps, so that each antagonist could see just where the other stood.

It would be easy to multiply names of men in almost every age who have appealed from some arbitrary externalism established in a position of authority in religion's temple to the tribunal of the intrinsic necessity of the case. It was to this power of the eternal fact that Moses looked for the indorsement of his message. When asked for his authority he was to say that "I Am" had sent him. We find church fathers and hunted heretics basing themselves on those necessities of thought inherent in the nature of things which we have been claiming as the foundation of a reasonable faith.

"They came on that which is, and caught  
The deep pulsations of the world."\*

\* "Sanctas apostoli esse paginas confitemur, non ab aliud, nisi quia rationi, pietati, fidei congruentes erudiant nos."—JULIAN OF ECLANUM. (Cf. Neander's "Church History" [Torrey], vol. ii., p. 614, note 1.)

"Ἡν μέν δὲ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ κυρίου παρουσίας εἰς δικαιοσύνην Ἐλλησιν ἀναγκαῖα φιλοσοφία, νῦν δὲ χρησίμη πρὸς θεοσέβειαν γίνεται,

It is the same idea which appears in the primitive Greek mind in the dim conception of a mighty Necessity behind the gods themselves, to which even they must bow; \* the thought which we catch here and there in the early Greek theology, as the theologian points to the inevitability of his doctrine; † the note which gives to Greek tragedy its unique and character-

*προπαιδεία τις ούσα τοις τὴν πίστιν δι’ ἀποδείξεως καρπονυμένοις.*  
 . . . Πάντων μὲν γὰρ αἴτιος τῶν καλῶν ὁ θεός, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν κατὰ προηγόνυμενον ὡς τῆς τε διαθήκης τῆς παλαιᾶς καὶ τῆς νέας, τῶν δὲ κατ’ ἐπακολούθημα ὡς τῆς φιλοσοφίας. Ταχα δὲ καὶ προηγονυμένως τοις Ἑλλησιν ἔδοθη τότε πρὸν ἡ τὸν κύριον καλέσας καὶ τοὺς Ἑλληνας, ἐπαιδαγωγεῖ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὴ τοὺς Ἑλληνας ὡς ὁ νόμος τοὺς Ἐβραίους εἰς Χριστόν. Προπαρασκευάζει τοίνυν ἡ φιλοσοφία προοδοποιοῦσα τὸν ὑπὸ Χριστὸν τελειούμενον.”—CLEM. ALEX., “Strom.” Book I., chap. v., sec. 28.

\* “Αλλ’ ἡτοι θάνατον μὲν ὁμοῖον ὄνδε Θεοί περ  
 Καὶ φίλῳ ἀνδρὶ δίνανται ἀλαλκέμεν, ὁππότε κεν δή  
 Μοῖρ’ ὅλοῃ καθέλησι τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο.”  
 HOM., “Od.” iii., 236–239.

“Τὴν πεπρωμένην Μοίραν ἀδίνατα ἔστι ἀποφνγέειν καὶ θεῷ.”  
 HEROD., i., 91.

“Δράσαντι γάρ τοι καὶ παθεῖν ὄφείλεται.”  
 AESCH., “Fragm.” 267 (362).

“Τὸν δρῶντα γάρ τι καὶ παθεῖν ὄφείλεται.”  
 SOPH., “Fragm.” 210.

† “Δαιμονίη, μή μοί τι λίτην ἀκαχίζεο θυμῷ.  
 Οὐ γάρ τίς μ' ὑπὲρ αἰσαν ἀνήρ “Αἰδι προϊάψει.”  
 Μοίραν δ' οὖν τινά φημι πεφυγμένον ἔμμεναι ἀνδρῶν,  
 Οὐ κακόν, οὐδὲ μέν ἐσθλόν, ἐπὶ την τα πρῶτα γένηται.”  
 HOM., “Il.” vi., 486–490.

istic tone—the sound of the majestic tread of onward-marching fate.\* And in our Lord's words, “Ought not [οὐχὶ ἔδει] the Christ to have suffered these things, and to enter into His glory?” (St. Luke xxiv. 26); and in the words of the Epistle to the Hebrews, “It behooved [ώφειλεν] Him in all things to be made like unto His brethren” (Heb. ii. 17)—in these expressions we find the verbs pregnant with a profound significance. They point out to us that the steps of the Incarnation were not arbitrary—events which happened in this way, but might just as well have happened in that—but that they were all necessary in the nature of the case. They point to that underlying consciousness, ever present in the mind of Jesus, of a foreordained plan to which He must inevitably conform—a plan which had, however, so completely passed from an outwardly imposed

\* “Φεῦ, φεῦ, κακὸν αἰνον ἀτηρᾶς τύχας ἀκορέστον.  
Ιὴν ἦ, διὰ Διὸς παναιτίον πανεργέτα.  
Τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται;  
Τί τῶνδ' οὐ Θεόκρατόν ἐστιν;

· · · · · · ·

“Ονείδος ἥκει τόδ' ἀντ' ὄνείδους.  
Δύνσμαχα δ' ἐστὶ κρίναται.  
Φέρει φέροντ', ἐκτίνει δ' ὁ καὶ νων.  
Μίμνετ δὲ μίμνοντος ἐν θρονῷ Διὸς  
Παθεῖν τὸν ἔρζαντα. Θέσμιον γάρ.  
Τίς ἀν γονὰν ἀραῖον ἐκβάλοι δόμων;  
Κεκόλληται γένος πρὸς ἄτα.”

AESCH., “Agam.,” 1484-1560.

necessity to an inward choice that all His movements have the appearance of the freest, most unhampered action. And yet the necessity appeared at times and showed how great its constraining force was: “I have a baptism to be baptized with; and how am I straitened till it be accomplished!” (St. Luke xii. 50); “The Son of Man must suffer many things, and be rejected of the elders and chief priests and scribes, and be slain, and be raised the third day” (St. Luke ix. 22). Just as God is the unity of perfect freedom and absolute necessity, so to Christ there was no division between His own will and that inevitable path which was marked out for Him by the will of His Father; for, as He Himself said, “I and the Father are one.”

To point out this necessary basis in case of the chief doctrines of religion, to show them as systematic statements of facts which are involved in the nature of things, to reveal in theology this thought of inherent necessity traveling in the greatness of its strength—this is the aim of these Studies.

## THE SEER.

I PASSED where cheap-built houses stood  
With garden-plots before them,  
All in a row, while here and there  
A tree or two hung o'er them.

I heard a sound, and heard again  
The tones of satisfaction,  
And looked around, but still could not  
Unravel the transaction.

At length I spied a little child,  
Who on the grass was seated,  
Who simply said, "Hullo!" and then  
Her greeting she repeated.

I passed unseen; it was not I  
She had in contemplation,  
But to the universe at large  
She made her observation.

Blest child! I thought, to whom mere life,  
Apart from all employment,  
Is strange enough and rich enough  
To furnish large enjoyment.

The air, the sunshine, grass and trees,  
And every living creature—  
Thou talk'st in freedom with them all,  
For thou art one with Nature.

Or didst thou greet great Life itself,  
And feel dim adumbrations  
Of thought and passion, joy and death,  
In all their variations?

I left the place; but still my eyes  
With Nature's soul were meeting,  
And still the sky, the grass and trees,  
Gave back the childish greeting.

## CHAPTER II.

### THE BEING AND CHARACTER OF GOD.

ONE who has grasped the thought of necessary existence can never come to the consideration of the existence of God without a feeling of exultation that we may know so much about it. The popular impression, it is true, is that we can know nothing about it—that it is all a matter of guess, or “faith,” as scientific men are contemptuously willing to allow theologians to call it. But faith is not credulity, nor intellectual levity.\* There is mystery here, but it is the mystery of light, not of darkness; not that we cannot see to penetrate the region in which God dwells, but that penetrating it, we find light more and brighter pouring itself in upon us, till we stop in awe at seeing that full of impenetrable brightness and depth which we had fancied to be dull and limited. We find there is knowledge of God which is joyfully plain and gloriously necessary, the

\* Although it has a tendency to degenerate into these, as Celsus noted in his time in criticizing the *κονφότης τῶν Χριστιανῶν*.

certainty of which seems bound up with that of our own existence.\*

The subject of the being and character of God is one around which from the earliest times controversies have raged, and around which they are still raging. Into such controversies these Studies are for the most part forbidden, by the necessity of brevity, from entering. Their aim must be merely to give results. If they assume or ignore weighty points still at issue, I can but hope this will be ascribed not altogether to the serene confidence of ignorance nor to the assertiveness of narrow dogmatism, but to the limitations inevitable in an attempt to state great thoughts briefly.

We recognize that every starting-point is disputed. And yet, as we wish to make a start from somewhere, we will assume that I, the individual, exist, and that what is necessary to my existence, to my intellectual sanity, to my understanding of myself, has also a real existence. We will assume that two and two not merely seem to

\* "One of the many superstitions which, in our science, are practised with the idea of the infinite, owing to its importance being very much overestimated, is the notion that the infinitude of God makes any adequate idea of Him impossible. But is it not a matter of indifference to the mathematician, in his idea of the line, whether the length of that line is limited or whether it stretches on into the infinite?"—RICHARD ROTHE, "Still Hours," p. 99.

me four, but that they really are four—no more and no less. And if any one says there may be a world somewhere where they make three or five, we will grant that we cannot demonstrate the contrary; only we cannot conceive it; and in order to avoid intellectual suicide we are compelled to assume that this thought which is necessary for me has an absolute, real existence.

But the fourness of two and two is true not only for me, but for you and for every human being. It is true not only here, but in the remotest corner of the world, of the universe. It is not only true now, but it was true at the beginning of creation and before, and it will continue to be true to the end of time and after. It is not a material thing; it is thought, omnipresent and eternal. But what is thought? It does not exist of itself. It inevitably implies a thinking mind. And just as a book through every page and letter implies an author, so we must believe that the thought which is in every part of the universe, and independent of time, implies a Mind that is omnipresent and eternal.

If mathematics, then, involves thought that is universal, we seem through it to catch a glimpse of a universal Mind. And it is not number only that contains this fruitful, prophetic germ. All those fundamental ideas which constitute what we may call the bones of thought prophesy also

of their divine Original. The ideas of likeness, of identity, possibility, negation, causation—we might have started with any of these and have arrived at this same conclusion, of the existence of a universal Mind as necessary to explain universal thought; or, to express it differently, the ultimate unity of Thought and Being. Existence involves thought; not your or my particular thought, but a universal and absolute Thought. All thought involves existence; not that my present thought has necessarily an objective reality, but that underlying it are elements of universal Thought which necessarily imply an absolute Mind.

If a thing may prophesy authentically of what is beyond itself through what is implied in itself, there should be many instances of this; it should be the case not only in regard to the existence of God. And so we look around in the world at large for indications of this law; and we see that there is no railroad without a station, no fence without a field beyond. There cannot be an under side without an upper side; no part without a whole. Every arc implies a complete circle, just as a shadow implies the light, sin holiness, the world of evil the kingdom of heaven, the finite thought the infinite Mind.

Assuming, then, that this universal Mind exists, it will be eternal and omnipresent—that is, inde-

pendent of time and space, for such is the nature of necessary thought; and it will be self-conscious and intelligent, for such is the nature of mind. It will also be the *conditio sine qua non* of all things; since, as thought is involved in all existence, everything must depend for its existence upon this ultimate Thought.

Students of physical science are endeavoring to establish the law that motion, heat, light, sound, matter itself, are all forms of force; that they can be converted into one another or into the ultimate force lying behind them all. But this force must be either material or personal; that is, it must be caused by something other than itself, or it must be itself its own cause. If it has a cause outside itself and, like itself, physical, then this in turn must have a cause, and so on in endless retrogression. To hold that physical force accounts for all in the world one must hold to an infinite series of worlds, one before the other; a series without beginning or end. Is such a series conceivable? I can conceive of change that is self-originated. I see it every time I raise my hand or think a thought. And if all the changes in the world were such as this, the universe would become intelligible, for then the underlying force would be the cause of all change and would be also the cause of itself; the universe would be-

come an infinite organism. But then this underlying force must be personal; for that which has its cause without itself is a thing, while that which has its cause within itself is a person. And personality implies consciousness, intelligence, and will. And so I am brought to the same conclusion again—that all dependent being necessarily refers itself back to an independent Being who is self-originating; that all things in existence are but different modes of self-expression of an infinite and eternal Force. Just as my friend's clothes are full of his personality; just as his figure and walk and the turn of his head and the glance of his eye, though not a word is uttered, are all expressions of himself; so, if this view is correct, the universe in all its parts is the direct expression of that self-originating Being we call God.

The thought of a God of whom all that we knew was that He existed necessarily and had unlimited power, would be terrible. One side of our nature—the moral side—would be left not only unsatisfied but outraged by such a Being. Is there in God anything corresponding to what we mean by obligation, by goodness? Certainly this seems involved in the idea of personality. When I say of a thing that it is thus and so I also imply that it is not something different; “is

not" is inseparably bound up with "is." But in many cases I do not merely say, "It is not," and think no further. The thought inevitably comes to me, "It is not, but it ought to be." I happen to notice that the lamp is not lighted, and I instantly think, "I wonder why. It ought to be lighted." As I engage my new clerk I ask his former employer, "But is he honest?" and immediately add to myself, "One ought not to be obliged to ask such a question." Is this idea of oughtness a necessary or an accidental one? Is it essential to my complete understanding of myself as a human being; or is it merely something which happens to be found in me and in some other people, the result of heredity, approval, and education, but which the complete, the ideal man would be without? We will not ask whether any man was ever found without it, for this would at once compel us to set out on a search among Digger Indians and native Australians. But leaving this to travelers and followers of the experimental method, we will boldly assert our idealistic conviction that the idea of oughtness in some form—not as my conscience utters it, nor yours, but as the simple conception of what "ought" means—is just as truly a part of the human constitution as is the idea of number. And because, on our hypothesis, that cannot be an essential characteristic of the finite mind which is not also charac-

teristic of the Infinite,\* the infinite Mind, on which all others depend, must itself have this idea of oughtness. Do we say "have"? We should rather say "be." For with men, indeed, to have an idea in mind is one thing; to have it completely embodied in nature or character is another. But God, since with Him thought and being are one, if He have the idea of oughtness, must be moral; that is, this principle must permeate every part of His being. For any excepted, non-moral region in Him, into which the idea of oughtness did not penetrate, would constitute a self-contradiction in the divine nature, which would be inconceivable. All that God thinks or wills or does must be in harmony with the moral element in His nature. And this self-unity or wholeness we call freedom from sin, purity, holiness.

We found that the only way to make the universe intelligible is to think of it as the expression of a personal Being. And with this thought in mind we look around us in wonder to see all things proclaiming themselves as utterances of the divine nature; to see an infinite series of

\* "Gott ist das was Er ist; ich was ich durch Ihn bin.

Doch kennst du einen wohl, so kennst du mich und Ihn."

JOH. ANGELUS SILESIUS,  
"Der Cherubinische Wandersmann,"  
Book I., 212.

self-expressions flowing forth from God from all eternity. But since for everything that God does there must be a reason, and since this reason must be not arbitrary, but founded in the very nature of His being, we must believe that it is His very nature, it is necessary for His own self-completion, that He should be continually pouring Himself thus into the world of nature and of men. We furnish an element—we may say it reverently—necessary to the divine satisfaction; we may say it wonderingly, to the divine completion. But to find another necessary to one's own completion is to love. That is a definition which every young heart just making the world-old, ever-new discovery gladly bears witness to. The whole range of human passion, from the mad jealousy that distortedly claims one special person as its exclusive possession to the noble act of sacrifice in which life is proudly laid down to purchase honor or happiness for a loved one—it all testifies that the essence of love is to find another necessary to one's completeness.

This infinite outpouring by God of Himself bears witness, then, to an eternal need in the divine nature. And this need for self-expression has as its complement the need of a return by the universe to its Creator. It is the great law of action and reaction; there is no give without a get. As everything is most like God when

it is at its best, by being at its best it renders to its Creator its return. In case of man this must involve an intelligent and free tribute. "All Thy works shall praise Thee, and Thy saints shall bless Thee." And so giving with all his parts, man in turn finds his own completion, the condition in which, as Christ expressed it, "All Mine are Thine, and Thine are Mine."

The evidence we have been considering for the existence of a Being intelligent, righteous, loving, as the ground of the universe, may not, as we have recognized, seem conclusive to those who hold that physical force is a sufficient explanation of all things; that thought does not imply a thinking mind; and that the existence of a sense of oughtness in us is not essential and does not imply its like in God. But unless one holds these premises—and in our view they would involve intellectual suicide—the conclusion seems unavoidable that in the thinker's very denial of the evidence, in his existence itself, there is implied the existence of a Being intelligent, righteous, loving.

Persons to whom the enjoyment of their beliefs is more precious than the accuracy of them, are apt to regard an attempt to certify the knowledge of God as useless, if not irreverent. But to the earnest mind, ambitious and loyal in its thinking, and wandering perplexed in ways of conscien-

tious doubt; to the believing mind, eager to justify to its understanding what its heart long has felt; to all who know that one of the two pillars supporting life's temple is thought, and who wish its foundations to be sure and immovable—to all such the evidence for a belief in God must have a deep, a precious, at times an agonizingly precious, value. To justify the grounds of belief to thought, however, is one thing; to hold a belief so profoundly and easily that it shall furnish food for common needs is another. We realize the existence of God for emotional purposes far less by an attempt at constructive analysis than when we stand awed under the wintry stars, which with their calm glitter have looked down on all the fleeting generations of mortal men; when we listen to the perpetual advance and recession of the waves, sounding on the shore ever the same since the first dawn of creation; when we watch the current of progress in human history, now rising, now falling, but steadily broadening and deepening in its onward flow; or when we feel the sharp pang of injustice or of bitter loss, as the tortured soul cries out, "Surely there is a God, for there must be!"

These are precious steps in our acquaintance with God—these moments when we realize with vivid feeling the existence of something Absolute and Eternal. They are not demonstrative, but

they are creative—creative of insight, of reverence, of joy, of purpose. And it is the first step in the mature conception of God when we apprehend the existence of an Absolute, a Something which has existed everywhere and through all time, above human and material conditions, and controlling them. This idea may come to the mind through a recognition of the reign of law in the world of nature; or the perception that there is an absolute standard of truth, so that one has not a right to every opinion he may choose to hold; or an absolute community of human interests, so that there is no such thing as property to which the proprietor has an undivided right, in any other than a legal sense; or an absolute ideal of conduct, so that one may not and cannot act solely with reference to himself. In many such ways, apart from theologic dogma, the existence of a God makes itself felt. But however it may come into the mind, it is of the first importance for intellectual, social, and moral sanity that it should in some form be there—this conception of law and a loyal obedience to it. It is the grand lesson which Puritanism aimed to teach, the lesson of the Old Testament: “The fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom.” It is the lesson for learning which the Hebrew nation stands rightfully preëminent in the world’s history: “Thy God is thy glory.”

There is, it is true, many a man who acknowledges the reign of law who can see no trace of a personal God behind it. We shall in the next chapter consider more fully this question of the relation of abstract qualities to personality. But we may here anticipate sufficiently to venture the assertion that law without personality is as inconceivable as a person existing without law. Take a great or even a good man and study him, and see how law is interwoven with every part of his personality; and not only this, but how law itself in him becomes personal. His time is not free; it is minutely filled with engagements. His opinions are not arbitrary; they are bound by the strictest rules of logical thinking. If you know the conditions in which he is placed, you can predict beforehand what he will do. It is your proud boast of him that he is always on the side of the right; that he champions what ought to be supported, and hates every false and evil thing. And what is all this but saying that he is filled with law, conformed to an ordering force behind him, which gives him the power and attractive charm he has? And yet there is no sign of external compulsion. It all has the air of the freest, most unconstrained action; and it has the right to its appearance, because the man is free. He has taken law up into himself and made it his own. “Thou shalt” has become “I will.”

Law is seen in him to be essentially personal, and personality and law to be inseparable.

What we thus find true of the image of God is true also of God Himself. Law is not a force which runs the universe apart from God. The laws of nature are not agents created at the beginning, intrusted with powers, and then sent on their independent way. They are simply God acting. Every time a leaf falls, God is willing it to fall. Every time the blood pulsates through the veins, it is God that directly drives it. He is literally covering Himself with light as with a garment, walking upon the wings of the wind, making the winds His messengers and the flaming fire His minister. In every atom of the universe law is the expression of personality.

We have been trying to point out for feeling the path we had previously indicated for thought; trying to realize imaginatively the existence of the Absolute and its personal nature. But if we take so much of God and no more as provision for our common emotional needs, what have we gained? The old pagan idea of a mighty God confronts us, all-powerful, and under no restraint except that of His own pleasure—the image which has driven many a man away from religion in fear or disgust. But this would not be the case if the All-great were the All-loving too. My uttermost demand would be met if I believed that, just as the stream

of thought by which I live is part of the divine Thought, so my soul's highest function—love—is also a revelation in me of the nature of God. All that is best in human life centers around love; those who have known happy families do not need poets to tell them that. But shall a human soul find its highest self through loving, shall it pour itself out in glad suffering and proud devotion to those it loves, and shall it evolve all this from itself, while God, its Creator, knows nothing of it? If my heart can beat with this noble, joyful passion, must not a heart beat in Him too? “He that planted the ear, shall He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not see?” If I am great, must not He be greater? Must not His love be deeper, stronger, mightier to give and save than mine? Is that which constitutes the harmony and the glory of life wholly of the earth, earthy? Then the song implies no music in its composer. Then the arc does not prophesy of the circle, nor the circumference of the center.

If our ultimate term in the universe, whatever we may call it—Force, the Absolute, God—is not organic, is not the source and type of personality, it is something of too little importance to trouble ourselves about. But if, on the other hand, the universe is an infinite organism, then this ultimate term must be a Being in whom our thought and

love and joy may find their source, type, justification, and development. Then when the mind kindles with the glow of a new truth, it is no private invention, but the discovery of some aspect of the infinite Thought. Then that love between man and woman which has been ever the world's ecstasy is founded on the essence of the divine nature and is a part of the current of the divine life. When my heart thrills at the noble words or manly deeds that reveal lofty character, it is no accident unbased on eternal plans that stirs me, but it is a part of reality, a partial incarnation of that infinite Character which the whole creation is groaning and travailing to express.

## MANCHESTER SHORE.

THOU ceaseless murmur of the unquiet sea,  
Sounding forever on this rocky coast,  
These ancient rocks, for all their age can boast,  
Are but of yesterday compared to thee!  
They knew the early world, when men were not,  
And huge sea-monsters swam in silence by;  
They knew earth's mighty powers, which gradually  
Welded them and upreared them in this spot.  
But thou art still the same as when thy roar  
Upon creation's primal stillness burst,  
And God's own hand ordained thee at the first,  
And morning stars sang forth with awful power.  
God heard thy voice when first a voice hadst thou.  
I stand upon the shore and hear thee now!

## CHAPTER III.

### THE TRINITY.

THE doctrine of the Trinity is often supposed to have a wholly scholastic interest and to be of no practical value. And yet, unless it has help to furnish, unless it is capable of affording comfort or stimulus, or a wider outlook upon the world, or a deeper knowledge of universal spiritual facts, no place could be claimed for it as a doctrine of religion. It might even then be true, but it would be no part of religious belief, any more than the fact that there are spots in the sun. For every doctrine of theology must have an ethical value. And so, unless the belief in God as triune tends to make men better, it could claim no place in a theological system—so essential to theology is that element, practical worth for righteousness, which has often been supposed to be absent from it altogether.

This practical character, however, will often be less immediately apparent in case of a doctrine of theology than in one of science. The fact that

arsenic in minute quantities is a medicine and in large quantities a poison is one whose importance can be readily recognized. But as we go from material things to immaterial the facts become less easy to ascertain, and their relations more complex, and their value more difficult to assess exactly; until, when we come to the nature of the most complex being in the universe, we shall find that the ethical value of the truth about it is difficult to express in a word, or to weigh precisely. But those who think they discern a triune nature in God have felt that they gained through this belief an immense increase in the enrichment of life, an interpretation of history, a key to the world of nature, an assurance of the possibility of union between God and man, a plain line of approach. They have regarded it as even furnishing a condition essential to any knowledge of God.

It is in every case statement rather than detailed demonstration which these Studies aim at. To state intelligibly the doctrine of the Trinity, so that some of its intrinsic reasonableness may be seen, may rightly come within the province of Definition. Moreover, a complete statement of the doctrine would be a demonstration of it; since all necessary truth refers for evidence not to some external tribunal, but to its own self-consistency.

All branches of study embracing metaphysics have a difficulty to meet in regard to their terminology. Anatomy finds at its service a vocabulary sufficiently wide and exact. But psychology not only has to grope for its data, but it finds them far more complicated with one another; and because of this complexity, words can describe them less exactly. This difficulty is at its greatest in dealing with the being of God. All the terms which we apply to Him are primarily descriptive of human nature, and the difference in their meaning when applied to God must be carefully ascertained and borne in mind. Thus, when we say that the Lord is a jealous God, we have to distinguish between the petty fear which is quick to discover an infringement of its fancied rights, and that noble intolerance of disloyalty which must exist in the very nature of exalted love, wherever service is due by the bond of right itself.

This difficulty with terms is especially the case in regard to the triune nature of God; especially the case in regard to the word "person." It is asserted that there are three persons in the God-head; and this at once calls to mind the conception of three distinct embodiments of being. And yet such a doctrine—which, if it were possible to conceive, would be tritheism—Trinitarian theology has always repudiated. It has declared

that by “person,” as applied to God, it did not mean body; it did not mean separate individuality; it certainly did not mean that in the Trinity there are three independent wills, three distinct egos. The creeds were first written in Greek; when they came to be translated into Latin, the word *persona* was the best substitute that could be found for the original word, which in its English form is “hypostasis.” What is meant, then, when it is said that in God there are three hypostases?

It is meant that in Him there are three distinctions of being, or three sides to His nature, or three modes in which He manifests Himself, each mode having a real ground of difference from the others. In using this last phrase we must hasten to add that we do not hold these to be mere modes of manifestation, as was held by Sabellianism. A ring appears from one position as a line, from another as an ellipse, and from its own zenith as a complete circle; yet these differences have no ground in the ring itself, but are owing wholly to changes in the position of the spectator. The definition which we have given, however, implies that each of these modes of manifestation is essentially necessary; that it has behind it a cause in the nature of God Himself. Each of these sides is so organically related to and implied in the others that it cannot be contemplated apart

from them. In every one are involved all. In each of these centers of being the whole abides, not manifesting itself in them successively or alternately, but simultaneously and eternally. Speaking loosely, we may call these the essentially divine side, the human side, and the abstract side.

Theology has been objected to and derided for its anthropomorphism—its description of God in terms of humanity. But while we know well that men have made their gods not only in the image of themselves but of their worst selves, this, we must believe, is because they have attributed to their deities not that which was essential to human nature, but that which was accidental. The characteristics of the ordinary man would not necessarily be the essential characteristics of human nature. The ordinary man has much that is individual, much that is deficient or excessive, that does not therefore belong to the complete, the real standard of human nature. The characteristics of the complete man would be those only which are self-consistent, for which there is an inherently necessary reason. Judged by this standard, lust and cruelty are seen to be abnormal developments, and therefore improper to be attributed to a god; but love and will are essential to the conception of humanity. And the more we apprehend the ideal of humanity the more

we shall see that in the self-consistent, perfectly whole or holy type, the love must necessarily be a love of that which is good, and the will a will toward the good.

It is this canon which will save anthropomorphism from the degradations which have befallen it: that those characteristics only of humanity are to be attributed to the divine nature which are inseparable from the essential, the highest ideal of human nature. Men have always represented their gods anthropomorphically, and will always continue to do so; but with this canon such representation will be not misleading, but authentic. And those who hold this view find a confirmation of their belief in the doctrine of the Incarnation: that the most complete and authentic representation of God possible could be made only through humanity raised to its highest power.

Anthropomorphism is declared to be degrading to a true conception of God; since He, being infinite, must be above being pleased or angry, repenting or changing in any way, or, indeed, loving, thinking, or willing; for all these, it is asserted, are the functions of a limited and imperfect being. This objection, however, assumes that infinity means absence of limitation. But being, stripped of all limitation, would be not-being, and a God infinite in this sense would be not only unknowable, but impossible, since exis-

tence itself must be a limitation. We must rather hold that infinity means self-limitation; and the moment this conception strikes us we see its consonance with our own experience. Limitations which are imposed on me from without I always regard with hostility as fetters of slavery. If I am compelled to live in a tenement-house when I feel myself adapted to a palace, I fret under the tyranny of fate. But if I could afford to build myself a gorgeous villa and yet prefer to put up a modest cottage, I do not think myself hampered in it. The very essence of spiritual life is that the limitations which are at first imposed by outward necessity, when cheerfully adopted and made my own, become opportunities of development, because they have now passed from being the decrees of an external fate and have become self-imposed—children by adoption. Death feared and fought against is terrible; but a welcome to death is the death of death and the way to life.\*

So we find that with us the adoption of limitations which are in themselves desirable, that is, which are necessary, is not only consistent with

\* “ Stirb, und werde!  
Denn so lang du das nicht hast,  
Bist du nur ein trüber Gast  
Auf der dunkeln Erde.”

GOETHE.

an infinite life, but is the avenue to it. And the law of continuity compels us to believe that this is the same with all personality; that infinity is reached not through the negation of limitation, but through the adoption of it. It is the discussion of this question which is to-day revolutionizing philosophy and theology—the question whether the infinite excludes or includes the finite.

We have stated our belief that an incomplex infinite would be not only unknowable but non-existent; and therefore we are compelled to believe there are self-limitations in the divine nature. One of the most important forms of limitation, essential, so far as we can see, to all being, is that of which we were just speaking: that in which a condition, imposed at first from without, is adopted and made one's own—in case of the lower orders of being, by the unconscious law of growth; in case of the higher, by love and will. This form of limitation, then, must find its place in a perfectly infinite Being. And so we are prepared to recognize one side of the divine nature as that of life under limitations imposed from without, but adopted and made the means for developing and manifesting the indwelling deity—that is, what we have called a human side in God. And the “withoutness” and “withinness” which such a thought involves point to

fundamental distinctions of being in the divine nature.

We have discovered, then, that complexity of nature is what we should expect to find in God. What this complexity is, the doctrine of the Trinity, with its assertion of three distinct yet organically united sides of being, attempts to describe. Each hypostasis, we were saying, has a ground of existence distinct from that of the others. The fundamental thought of God is of Him as the ultimate source of the universe—an *Ens Divinum*, a cause of all things and of Himself. All motion, for example, resolves itself into force; but what does force resolve itself into? God. All matter is but a form of mind; but what is mind? A form of God. Right and wrong are what they are not by conventionality; they have an absolute and eternal basis. But that basis is not independent; in what does it find the ground of its being? In God. Throughout the universe God is seen as the primal reality underlying all differences of form. Change that is self-originated is, as we were saying in the last chapter, not only intelligible, but verifiable. I see it in every conscious motion of my body or effort of my will. The fact that I myself am in some degree an originator of being helps me to understand how self-causation is possible and at the basis of personality. And to this element in God, by which He

is the ultimate source of all things, *Causa Sui*, to this the essential substance of His being there is given the name of God the Father.

We were saying that the divine nature has an essentially human side. Just as we cannot conceive of existence, if we think our thought out to the end, without personality, so we cannot conceive of personality without intelligence, affections, will; and these must be essentially the same in one individuality as in another, in God as in us. But all life, which, like that of man, is derived and therefore limited from without itself, attains perfection only by growth. Its knowledge is gained through labor, its goodness through temptation, its will is balanced and fortified through many calls for judgment. This mode of attaining perfection is widely different from that of the being who is *Causa Sui*; is even, it would seem, incompatible with it. Infinity is what it is without the necessity of development: "He spake, and it was done." But among the self-limitations of Infinity there must be for completeness, as we have seen, this submission to limitations imposed from without. And therefore we must believe that this kind of life finds its place in the infinite nature of God—the life of growth, of struggle, of temptation, of experience with failure, of conflict with limiting conditions, and victory over them. This gives the assurance

that man's ideal forms part of God's ideal; that the highest type of manhood, which calls for our supremest loyalty and reverence, has with God a place of equal moral worth, since it forms part of His character also. All that is best in us exists in Him too, for in Him it existed first. All that forms the ground of our being He knows. He knows what loyalty to truth and right is, devotion to duty, love, that due adjustment of one's self to all claims which we call justice. Not that He merely knows these, but since with Him knowledge and being are one, they form the ground of His being also. And this ground of being is one of the hypostases in His nature; it is that side which we call the eternal Son.

This recognition of a human element eternally existing in God does not necessarily carry with it a recognition of the divinity of Jesus Christ. The former may exist without the latter. To hold to the existence of a human side in the divine nature is one thing; to hold that this has been manifested completely and in a particular instance is another. Some manifestation of this side, as of the other sides, there must, indeed, be. The human element in God must express itself, since with Him there is no division between being and expression. And since humanity of nature can express itself only in terms of humanity, it must be that the human side of God has revealed

itself in some way through men. If there is a spiritual connection between heaven and earth, there must be a historical connection also. But in what men or man the revelation has been made, and whether it has been partial or complete, is a matter for consideration in connection with the doctrine of the Incarnation.

How does the finite transcend its finitude and become infinite? And how, on the other hand, does God impart Himself to man? There must be some common ground of meeting; they must have in some department community of being. Plainly, that common something cannot be the essential powers of Deity. I cannot reach high enough to become omniscient, holy, perfectly self-limiting. But perhaps my best is high enough to reach God. I am at my best when I am filled with those qualities which we call distinctively spiritual—wisdom, truth, righteousness, love. Is there any common ground of union between God and me in these? If my uprightness is something which I *have*, if I merely hold it as a theory, or practise it outwardly, or keep it in any way upon the outskirts of myself, then I am not fully identified with it. But if it has so permeated my whole being that I *am* it, then I share its nature. And so, if God has uprightness, this may not be a sufficient meeting-ground for Him and me; for my uprightness may be one thing, of one sort,

and His uprightness may be another. But if He not only has uprightness, but *is* uprightness itself, then I cannot be upright without sharing His uprightness. If these so-called abstract qualities are part of the very nature of God, then I may through them become partaker of the divine nature, and God through them may mingle Himself with me and become part of my very being. It is this which is asserted by the doctrine of the third person or hypostasis of the Trinity. God not only has love but is love. Not only God is true, but He is truth and truth is God. Not only He is righteous, but He is righteousness itself. These are not divine emanations, once created and then sent on their way with an independent existence. They are essentially and perpetually a part of the divine nature.\* And this

\* The evil of emanationism is seen in the history of Gnosticism. An emanation is a portion of the divine essence regarded as separated from it and sent forth as independent. Having no perpetual bond of connection with the divine, it either sinks into degradation (cf. the "Abrasax" of Basilides) or becomes actively hostile to the divine (cf. the "Jaldabaoth" of the Ophites). The same results followed when the Deists of the last century came to regard the laws of nature as having an independent existence, i.e., as emanations. And the denial of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit involved in the refusal to recognize goodness and truth as essentially divine because they appear in persons who are considered non-Christians leads inevitably to the same result: these virtues are attributed to the power of evil, and the eyes are trained to regard them as evil, until moral blindness ensues. (Cf. St. Matt. xii. 24, 31.)

insures that moral and intellectual predicates have the same meaning for man and for God. For if the spiritual nature of man is an essential part of the divine nature, terms used on either side mean the same. What we mean by goodness must be goodness for God, truth must be truth, and all those qualities which are distinctively characteristic of spiritual life must form part of His nature also.

It would seem as if this were too plain to admit question. And yet there have been those who held that the difference between God and us—His infinity—changed the nature of every predicate applied to Him not only in degree, but in kind; so that while justice, for example, was one thing to our understanding, infinite justice was something very different; how different an infinite mind only could tell. This position was summed up and advocated by Dean Mansel in his Bampton Lectures (1858: “The Limits of Religious Thought”). He there holds that, since all finite knowledge is relative, we cannot know God as He is in Himself. We have our conceptions of Him, but we can have no assurance that these correspond with the fact. We know what wisdom, benevolence, mercy mean as they exist in us, but we do not know at all what they mean as they exist—if, indeed, they do exist—in God. This position gave occasion to John Stuart Mill’s noted reply to Dean Mansel, in which he says:

"I take my stand on the acknowledged principle of logic and of morality, that when we mean different things we have no right to call them by the same name and to apply to them the same predicates, moral and intellectual. Language has no meaning for the words 'just,' 'merciful,' 'benevolent,' save that in which we predicate them of our fellow-creatures; and unless that is what we intend to express by them, we have no business to employ the words. Anything carried to the infinite must have all the properties of the same thing as finite, except those which depend upon the finiteness. What belongs to infinite goodness I do not pretend to know; but I know that infinite goodness must be goodness, and that what is not consistent with goodness is not consistent with infinite goodness. If in ascribing goodness to God I do not mean what I mean by goodness; if I do not mean the goodness of which I have some knowledge, but an incomprehensible attribute of an incomprehensible substance, which for aught I know may be a totally different quality from that which I love and venerate, what do I mean by calling it goodness, and what reason have I for venerating it? If instead of the 'glad tidings' that there exists a Being in whom all the excellences which the human mind can conceive exist in a degree inconceivable to us, I am informed that the world is ruled by a being whose

attributes are infinite, but what they are we cannot learn, nor what are the principles of his government, except that the highest human morality which we are capable of conceiving does not sanction them; convince me of it, and I will bear my fate as I may. But when I am told that I must believe this, and at the same time call this being by the names which express and affirm the highest human morality, I say in plain terms that I will not. Whatever power such a being may have over me, there is one thing which he shall not do: he shall not compel me to worship him. I will call no being good who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fellow-creatures; and if such a being can sentence me to hell for not so calling him, to hell I will go.” \*

Let us do a little longer what we have been doing: let us continue calling these aspects of spiritual being—truth, goodness, justice, love—abstract principles. It is important to notice that these are connected with the essence of the divine nature in a different way from the hypostases of which we have been speaking. The first hypostasis is what it is independently. The second hypostasis—*independent life voluntarily brought under limitations*—requires an act of will on the part of the first; in theological language, it is “be-

\* J. S. Mill’s “Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy,” Amer. ed., vol. i., pp. 129-131.

gotten." The third hypostasis implies no such act of will for its existence. It follows as a necessary consequence of the existence of the other two. Wherever God exists as Father or as Son this fact must, even without any express effort on His part, make itself manifest; the stream of His personal influence proceeds forth from Him inevitably and continuously. It is the same in this respect with men. One way in which I influence others is by expressly trying to influence them. I plan and act and speak in my purposeful endeavor to reach those whom I wish to affect. I send out a part of myself, as it were, to get at them and carry my influence to them. But another way in which I reach them is through the power of my unconscious influence. Actions and words which are not intended to have any reference to them, thoughts and feelings which I have even supposed secret, the whole range of my daily life and character—all these are constantly exerting upon others an influence unknown to me. It is as if a certain atmosphere went out from each one of us and surrounded us, and others coming within its circle breathed it in. We do not intentionally make the atmosphere; it proceeds from us inevitably. The words and actions whereby we design to affect others are "begotten." The atmosphere of unconscious influence is not begotten, but "proceeding." Or, to sum up the modes

of relationship in which the different hypostases stand to one another, we may quote from the Athanasian Creed: "The Father is made of none, neither created nor begotten. The Son is of the Father alone, not made nor created, but begotten. The Holy Ghost is of the Father and of the Son, neither made nor created nor begotten, but proceeding."

These aspects or elements of spiritual being—truth, goodness, beauty, and the like—we allowed ourselves to call abstract principles in deference to popular usage and in order to bring to mind more easily what we meant. But now at last we must examine our phraseology more exactly. What the popular mind means when it calls these abstract is that they exist apart from personality; and that is precisely what we must now deny. Truth is not something non-living, a neutral zone of territory, lying between God and man, into which each may make incursions. It is a reality for thought; and every reality for thought is ultimately a reality in being. This is at first not necessarily seen, because to us thought and being are not always one. The good which I would, I often, alas! do not; while I am also heartily thankful that my evil thoughts are not myself unless I entertain them. But the real thought and real being, of whose nature mine partakes, toward whose perfect stature my as yet

but partially developed personality is tending—these are ultimately one. Not that every thought in my brain has an objective reality corresponding to it, for then I should soon cease to be a poor man. But all thought of that kind which we have called necessary—that which is essential to my sane conception of myself—for this we have agreed to postulate a real existence, recognizing that we stake our all upon that postulate, and that we cannot demonstrate that it will not tumble out from underneath us, but convinced, too, that as long as it does not we are founded upon a rock.

Another reason why these aspects of spiritual being, as we have called them, seem non-personal is because they are non-individual. I do not recognize them as belonging to me, and so I do not stop to think whether they belong to anybody. But thought is not invention; it is discovery. When I try to impress it upon myself that longitude is not north-and-south distance but is east-and-west distance, I am endeavoring to make my inward idea correspond to a fact which exists quite apart from my mental processes. All the truths of geography, psychology, ethics, of the universe—I do not make them; I do but find and enter into them. But thought, as we were saying, necessarily implies a thinking mind. And it is not a product of mind, as we

temporarily called it, in any such sense as would imply that it is manufactured by the mind out of some foreign stuff, some *tertium quid*, or even out of itself, and then thrown out to be independent. We can throw our individual thought out and still find it based on the universal thought; but the universal thought has no such support to fall back upon. It must be held in its every atom as a constituent part of the universal Mind, or it must tumble over into non-being. It is, then, but an aspect of this universal Mind, or, as the last chapter gave us the right to call it, of God.

Our abstract principles, then, must drop their abstractness. Truth and goodness and noble love, and all that we have called the bones of thought or elements of spiritual being, are a mode of the divine existence; they are one side of God; they are a hypostasis of His nature. And while we may loosely refer to them as His impersonal side, by way of concession to the popular thought, to convey quick apprehension, we must remember that they are essentially personal, and that it is this living spirit of God which forms the ground of union between God and us and between us and other men. For what binds me to my fellows is not community of circumstances nor of origin, but community of interests. I may have had the same parents some other man had, but that does not necessarily beget love between us. I

may live in the same house with him, and yet hate him only the more for it. "Blood," says the medieval proverb, "is thicker than water." This is true only of persons who are in the medieval stage of development. In reality, water is thicker than blood; that is, the ties which are formed by choice are stronger than those which are formed by birth. To have common objects of interest is what binds men together. In proportion as these interests take hold on things spiritual, they become deep and personal. Where the highest interest of husband and wife is pushing a common way into society, the quality of their marriage can rise no higher than legality. But where both are deeply interested in intellectual matters, in character, in practical righteousness, in building up a department of any kind of the kingdom of heaven, then their union is "in the Lord." Then it has a charter of permanence; a charter holding good not only on this side death, but—the only comfort of many a bereaved heart—on the other side also; for those who are joined to God are joined thereby to each other.\*

It has often seemed to many an earnest mind as if this doctrine of the Trinity was but a wilderness of verbal distinctions, and that the correct path through it, the path which should wander neither to the right hand nor to the left, was

\* Cf. Euclid, Book I., Axiom 1.

hard for faith to attain. We tremble and fear lest, with all our sincere desire to find the right way, we may mistake and fall into heresy. Doubtless the danger that we may not think right about the Trinity is one we may properly dread. But we need not fear falling into heresy if we are earnestly desirous of knowing the whole truth, and if we are loyal servants of the truth so far as we do know it. For heresy is never the same as error. Error is the holding of an opinion which does not correspond to fact; but heresy is the holding of such an opinion from an evil motive—some disinclination to recognize the truth; some unwillingness to change our course in accordance with the demands recognized truth would make on us; some personal dislike or spite toward those who hold an opposite opinion. We may be in error through no fault of our own; but heretics we cannot be unless to our intellectual error we join some moral evil. It is for this reason that St. Paul classes heresy among the works of the flesh;\* there is always a sensual element in it. It is a sin one can never fall into who is pure of life and eager for the truth. “No man,” says Jeremy Taylor, “is a heretic against his will.”† If a man mingles not a vice with his opinion, if he be innocent in his life, although deceived in

\* Gal. v. 20.

† “Errare possum, hæreticus esse nolo.”—ST. AUGUSTINE.

his doctrine, his error is his misery, not his crime. A wicked person in his error becomes heretic, when the good man in the same error shall have all the rewards of faith. For whatever an ill man believes, if he therefore believe it because it serves his own ends, be his belief true or false, the man hath an heretical mind ; for to serve his own ends his mind is prepared to believe a lie. But a good man that believes what, according to his light and upon the use of his moral industry, he thinks true, whether he hits upon the right or no, because he hath a mind desirous of truth and prepared to believe every truth, is therefore acceptable to God ; because nothing hindered him from it but what he could not help—his misery and his weakness ; which being imperfections merely natural, which God never punishes, he stands fair for a blessing of his morality, which God always accepts.” \*

We find, then, that in the nature of personality there is necessarily involved a dialectical process : the infinite, by an act of self-determination, gives birth to the finite. This finite, however, is not isolated in independence, but is continually returning into the infinite ; and such return is necessary, that each may realize or become completely itself. The different aspects of this process we may call, in abstract language, Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis ; or, adopting the terms of German

\* “ Liberty of Prophesying,” sec. ii., 12, 8, 22.

philosophy, *Ding an sich*, *Ding für sich*, *Ding an und für sich*; or, translating them, Being in itself, Being for itself, Being in and for itself; or, again, recognizing the process in its completest instance, God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost.

This analysis of the triple nature of thought indicates the answer to the question frequently asked, why just three modes of being are asserted of God, and not four or forty. The reply is that these three exhaust, so far as we know, all possible modes of being. We find three dimensions of space—length, breadth, and thickness. We cannot demonstrate that there is not a fourth dimension, but we cannot conceive its existence. So there may be other modes of being, but we are incapable of conceiving them. There cannot be fewer, for we can detect these three. So far as we can see, the formula A, not -A, and A plus not -A, expresses the universe; and these three terms are needed to express it, for each is implied in the other and would be incomplete without it.

## ON A STATUETTE.

(A FAUN HOLDING HIS TAIL IN HIS HAND AND CONTEMPLATING IT.)

WHAT is it fills thy thought with sudden pain,  
Thou merry Faun that hast not known a care?  
Have haunts deep in the woodland lost their charm,  
Where thou so oft in noontide's sultry glare,  
Pillowing thy head upon thy bended arm,  
Careless and free hast lain?  
Have wood-nymphs ceased to seek thy favorite nooks,  
Or run, with garments fluttering in the breeze,  
Along the glades, under the moon-lit trees,  
Or cross, white-limbed, the cool, clear mountain brooks?  
  
Where is thy pipe, which 'mid the yellow grain  
The half-awed reapers heard, and stopped to hear,  
While thou from far, beneath some low-boughed tree,  
Madest the notes resound, thin, sweet, and clear,  
Melting thine own heart with the melody  
That swelled along the plain?  
The world is fair to-day as e'er before;  
The reapers listen for thy song again,  
And turn to work. Why is their listening vain?  
Why dost thou play and sing and sport no more?  
  
Alas! poor Faun, futile is all thy pain!  
Those old sweet days thou nevermore shalt see,  
For thou has looked upon a life more wide.  
Some spirit-touch has found and wakened thee,  
Some vision strange from which thou canst not hide,  
Yet seest all in vain.  
Why did Fate show thee what thou hadst not known!  
Thine eyes have peeped within her folded scroll  
Only to see revealed a human soul,  
Only to know thou hadst and couldst have none!

## CHAPTER IV.

### THE INCARNATION.

THE doctrine of the Incarnation is often rejected because the idea of it is regarded as inherently absurd. This is partly because it is considered as resting upon some one or more proof-texts which a former generation of Biblical scholars had pressed into the service of the doctrine, but which a more scrupulous and intelligent Biblical criticism pronounces to have no reference to the Incarnation. Or it is regarded as bound up with some patristic theory of the atonement, in which Christ's death is represented as a price paid to the devil; and because the modern world has come to see the inadequacy of this on both metaphysical and moral grounds, it is supposed that the whole doctrine of the Incarnation also has been outgrown. It naturally takes a long time to learn that theologic doctrines are always scaffolding, supports put up to hold temporarily and explain great soul-facts which are eternal. One generation forms a theory to explain them. Another generation learns more about the facts and revises the explanation. The facts remain,

for they are what they are; the explanatory scaffolding is being continually taken down and readjusted. We must always remember that a doctrine of theology is aiming at something too great for perfect expression.

The test of a doctrine, a poem, a declaration of love, an action, a life, is necessity; was this compelled to be, in order that the rest of the universe might exist in its due completeness? Superfluous things, which have not running through them the spinal marrow of vital connection with the universal life, soon dwindle and die, for the world is too busy to spend its time invalid-nursing. But vital organs live. Is there, then, any necessity for this doctrine of the Incarnation? To many it seems that in tracing the development of the human spirit we come to a point where an Incarnation is necessarily demanded to explain the facts we find.

Everything that is real ultimately shows itself. The body's need for food might remain unnoticed but for this law of necessary connection between inward and outward. As it is, every one has had hungry demonstration of the existence of this great law of necessary expression. Some men have a passion for order. It must inevitably happen in the history of the world that this will become prominent in a whole family, a tribe, a nation. And when a whole nation becomes filled

with this devotion to law, to obedience, to outward authority, and when the age they live in is a fighting age, then there will be a Roman empire; it will be a historically necessary embodiment of the evolution of the world-spirit. So, too, given a love for the study of human character, a sense of the comedy and tragedy involved in man's struggle with destiny, given an age which is imaginative, which is interested in poetry and beautiful expression, and a Shakespeare will be evolved. That is, some time or other, when these conditions all coincide, there will inevitably appear some one who will express this side of the human spirit in a preëminent way.

So it is, also, with God's manifestation of Himself. He reveals Himself through everything in the universe, according to its capacity for manifesting Him. The possibilities of a stone for revelation may seem small; but in its shape and properties and its relation to its surroundings it shows the operation of natural laws, which are God's thoughts. Throughout the whole range of existence—inorganic things, the lower forms of organic life, man—God is continually revealing Himself more and more intimately, according to the fitness to express Him of the object acting as His prophet. The quality in man which He needs in order to show Himself satisfactorily is goodness; and wherever this exists in a

man, God utilizes it, and at once speaks out through it His inner self. That God is like all that is best in every good man and woman, has been the crown of the joy such goodness has brought to those who have known it. Justice and honor, intelligence, uprightness, and loving sacrifice—the climax of our delight in such lofty qualities is that they do not belong privately to him who embodies them, but that they are facts, permanent and eternal, in that type of character which must appear in every being as high in the scale as a good man, or higher. If, then, the lower orders of existence reveal God to some extent; if He is revealed more completely and yet partially in every good man, must not this process go on to its logical conclusion? Must it not be the case that at some point in the world's career there will appear a man who will reveal God completely—as completely, that is, as it is possible for Him to be revealed in human conditions?

That would seem to be the logical order of evolution. Whatever is spiritual must, because it is spiritual and therefore real, embody itself at some time in material form; for, as our Lord said, "There is nothing hid, which shall not be manifested." Nature's vital force must burst forth in buds and blossoms. Love must crystallize into families. If there is a spiritual connection between heaven and earth, it must inevitably follow

that at some time there will be a historical connection. If the nature of God is revealed in the soul, it will be revealed through a body, a living person, also; and if on many occasions incompletely, at last on some occasion fully and perfectly. The divine Son of Man is the logical conclusion, the necessary counterpart, of the prophet, the seer, the poet, the saint. It is this aspect of the Christ—the logically necessary climax of creation—which the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews exultantly sets forth: “God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by a Son, our forerunner, the Captain of our salvation” (Heb. i. 1, 2; ii. 10; vi. 20).

It must be the case, we say, if we may trust this law of expression, that if men here and there embody partially a revelation of God, some time there will arise one who will embody this revelation as completely as is possible under human conditions. Of course a complete presentation of God in the conditions of humanity is impossible. He who is infinite, eternal, unchangeable cannot be completely set forth in terms that imply limitation other than self-limitation. But so far as the means used can go, as much as the divine Word which is uttered can express, a structure as perfect as the materials and tools can build, the

human side of God—this will at some time in the world's history surely appear.

What sort of being, then, must he be who should thus represent the human side of God? He cannot, as we have said, embody the distinctly non-human side; he will not be invisible, omnipotent, wholly eternal. He will be subject to all the limitations of humanity—its weakness and hunger, its tendency to ally itself with its own lower side, its inherent ignorance, its necessity of development. He will not have his powers and knowledge full-grown at birth, but will get them only by growth; for that is the inevitable course for all men. As his body will be subject to weakness, so his soul will have unsatisfied longings, whose demands will be pain. His moral character must be gained through temptation and struggle; for this, again, is the only path to goodness open to humanity. Along this path he must walk; but because it is God whom he is embodying under these conditions, he will walk without falling. He will be in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin.

It is precluded, then, by the conditions of the case that he should represent the transcendent elements of the nature of God; and it is in the conditions of the case that he should be subject to all the limitations of humanity. Where, then, would be the point where the human and divine

would coincide, the point where the human would pass into the divine; where he would be entirely human and yet authentically divine; where he would be God while yet remaining man? It would be in his will. For the will is that part of man—and it is the only part—of which he is absolute master. His circumstances he has little control over. His powers of mind as well as of body are largely determined for him by heredity. His loves and hates are in great degree moulded by inheritance and by events. But his will is, or may become, absolutely his own. His power of choice is preëminently himself. In the department of willing man is a First Cause, even like God. He can know something of the divine power and joy of creating. He too, within his limited range, can say, "Let there be!" and there is. He can originate an impetus in the universe, so that when he says, "I will," a force has come into being which did not exist before. It is this department of will which, through its prerogatives, joins man to God.

It would be, then, in this department that the one who would reveal God under human conditions would represent Him with absolute completeness. His will, being under his own control, he could make the same as God's will. His powers and actions could not be precisely the same as God's; they would be God's under the

conditions of humanity. But his will would be absolutely God's will. Here he would be entirely one with God.

But community of will and purpose with a higher being gives possession of much of his knowledge and power. A child helps his father, seeing him plan and fit and accomplish his ends; and his father's superior powers become more intelligible to him, and he acquires something of them himself. So the man who was one with God in will would be one with Him in something more than will. Some of God's knowledge and power would become his. He would understand many of the laws of nature which other men do not understand. He would know God's purposes for men; and this would give him the key to the character and, to some extent, the career of each individual. In every man, degraded as he might be, in every woman, however outcast, he would see God's plan, broken, but not destroyed; and this would fill him with an infinite lovingness for the sinner and an infinite hope for all men not wilfully evil. Men and women would see their real selves reflected in his view of them, and, seeing this, would rise in astonishment from their low level and become what they thus found they were in the sight of God. Such a person would have a power for spiritual renewal for all who came within the influence of his loving discernment.

These powers over man and over nature, coming from a perfect union with God's will and a knowledge of it, would be so far in advance of those possessed by ordinary men that they would be superhuman; so far in advance of those we see as common that they would be supernatural. And these powers would show themselves in acts which would seem marvelous. People would call them miracles—events happening out of the ordinary, well-known course of natural law, though entirely in accord with laws which men at the time knew little or nothing about. These wonderful occurrences would not only be an advertisement to the person exhibiting them; they would be a step to belief in the authenticity of his revelation of God. They would not be the chief ground for such a belief, for that chief ground would be the moral revelation made, the revelation of God's character rather than His powers. But the absence of them would give legitimate occasion for doubt. We believe Jesus to be the Christ, not because He worked miracles, but we should find it difficult to believe Him to be the Christ if He had not worked miracles.

In describing the one who would represent God under human conditions we have aimed to show what such a one, whoever he was, must inevitably be; and we have seen at every step that that is just what Jesus Christ was; a being under

all the limitations of humanity—heredity, fixed circumstances, powers gained by growth,\* moral character dependent on struggle †—and yet having, in His obedient loyalty, in the entirely perfect uprightness of His will,‡ a nexus or point of union with God, which made Him partake of the inmost essence of the divine nature; which enabled Him to say, “I and My Father are one”; which empowered Him to be the authentic representation of God under human conditions; which constituted Him Son of Man and Son of God.

It is sometimes supposed that an identity of Jesus with God is claimed in the New Testament. But the Bible nowhere asserts that Jesus is God. It is continually regarding Him as the representative of the human side of God. It was reserved for succeeding generations to discover that He could not be this without being something more —“very God of very God.” The complete exhibition of the Son of Man necessarily involves the manifestation of the Son of God. But as Son of Man He represents, to use the phrase we have so often used, God under the limitations of humanity. And that means, let God live the life of a man and He would be just what Jesus Christ was; the life that Jesus lived was just such as God would have lived if He had been on earth,

\* St. Luke ii. 52.      † St. John xvii. 19; Heb. ii. 10.

‡ St. John v. 30; xii. 49, 50.

just such in its principles and aims as God is forever living in heaven. Jesus is by nature human. Through the perfect union of His will with the divine will He becomes one with God; so that He is the Son, or typical representative, of man, and He is the Son, or typical and unique representative, of God. He is man become God; He is God become man. The truth of the Incarnation is that humanity raised to its highest power becomes divinity.

On account of the corollaries of this conclusion there is a reluctance to accept it which seems to spring from humility, but which in reality comes from lowness of aim and lack of faith. If humanity raised to its highest power becomes divinity, then there is divinity potential in each one of us. But how absurd, how irreverent this seems when compared with our ordinary attainments and expectations! Yet can we suppose for a moment that we know already the full possibilities of man? Is it not the most glorious legacy a great man leaves to the world, that he has shown greater capacities in humanity than had been seen before? Every one who reveals a larger range for human nature renders a larger type of man possible. A part of the joy and wonder with which we greet lofty character and high powers comes from the fact that we recognize in them in fuller development that greater humanity whose germ

we know to be in ourselves. "Who is this?" we say to each embodiment of the ideal of Christianity, as it comes before us bearing the trophies of its greatness—"Who is this that cometh from Edom, with dyed garments from Bozrah? this that is glorious in his apparel, traveling in the greatness of his strength?" And a voice within us answers, "It is I, amplified with larger growth, revealed in this one who speaks in righteousness and is mighty to save."

Our poverty of outlook, our faithlessness, appears when we contrast our expectations for ourselves with what Christ expected for us. "The works that I do," said Jesus, "he that believeth on Me shall do also; and greater works than these shall he do." Was that an empty assurance or figure of rhetoric? "To him that overcometh will I grant to sit with Me in My throne, even as I also overcame, and am set down with My Father in His throne." "Where I am, there ye shall be also." Are we to interpret these promises as of place only? Has not experience taught us that local nearness to a person is remoteness from him unless there is likeness of character? However much we may picture to ourselves the future dwelling with Christ in terms of time and place, we must remember that these ultimately resolve themselves into likeness of character and powers.

And so it should seem to us no strange thing that Christ claims as possible for every man that intimate union with God, with its sharing in the divine knowledge and powers, which He had Himself. That sonship with God which He announced as existing in all men, and which He called upon them to realize, was not one thing for Him and a wholly different thing for them. "For which cause," says the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "He is not ashamed to call them brethren." Not that you and I and every man may legitimately be demanded to become as Christ on the instant. God, who knoweth our frame and remembereth that we are dust, expects that the blade and the ear will come before the full corn in the ear. But with all eternity before us and all God's power behind, there is no reason why we should not realize fully our sonship, and stand erect according to the measure of the stature of the fullness of Christ.

The Incarnation, in this view of it which we have been maintaining, could not have been to Jesus a humiliation. The man Jesus became identified with, and therefore was representative of, the eternal Son of God. Regarding for the moment these two elements as separate, we may affirm that this could involve no humiliation for either. For there can be no more exalted occupation than the salvation of men. It is a work in

which God Himself—to judge from the continuity of His self-revelation—is joyfully engaged. It is a work which in the view of Jesus outweighed all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them. It has been supposed that before His incarnation Christ dwelt above the earth in some heavenly sphere, where His occupations were more congenial to Him than those of His earthly career. But setting aside questions as to the mode of His preëxistence, may we not be sure that His earthly life involved no derogation from His dignity, since to the true servant of God there is in service no great nor small? Infinite power is as careful in gilding a butterfly's wing as in guiding a hurricane. The only degradation possible to God's servant would be a moral one—to find the moral character of his work less than the highest; and this he can himself always control. We cannot but regard the Incarnation as an exaltation, or, as Christ Himself called it, a "glory." We must think of it as an opportunity which the Son of God joyously embraced, that, as He said, men might "behold My glory, the glory which I had with Thee before the world was." And in denying a humiliation to Christ we are not necessarily denying His preëxistence. For it is involved in this view of the Incarnation which we have been maintaining that Jesus represented in time and in terms of humanity that dis-

tinction of the divine Being which we have called the Son, and that this Sonship did not begin with the birth of Jesus, but was independent of time and humanity, being eternal; “begotten of His Father before all worlds; God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father; who, for us men, and for our salvation, came down from heaven, and was incarnate by the Holy Ghost of the Virgin Mary.”\*

What the results of this view of Christ are on the mind and heart will doubtless be estimated differently by different persons. Those who hold the view cannot believe it will diminish our love and reverence for Him, or our worship of Him, to think of Him as in the condition in which He insisted on regarding Himself—one with humanity. They cannot but think we are drawn closer to Him by every fresh discovery made of the processes of humanity as taken up into Him, developed into attractive completeness, and made spiritual and natural. They cannot but think it will make His divinity more intelligible, and that that will mean making it more mysterious and more potent, and spreading its blessed saving power over whole tracts of life which are now arid and dead for lack of the springs of living water it can reveal. They cannot think it will

\* Nicene Creed.

minister to carelessness of spiritual things, or to undue pride, to see the possibilities of man stretching away till they touch the divine nature of God Himself. They cannot but think that the essential nature of God, which they long to know and worship, is intelligible only in terms of humanity ; and that while half the value of the Incarnation is that it reveals man, the other half is that it reveals God.

There are persons who cannot be trusted with riches ; who are made indolent and cruelly selfish by any knowledge that they are wealthy ; who enjoy liberty only as an occasion to the flesh ; who throw down a loving heart and trample on it the moment it is won. But are the divine plans for the world's growth and redemption held in abeyance because of the misuse of them by such as these ? Doth God take care for such cattle ? So the knowledge of the close relation of the human to the divine may be a savor of life unto life or of death unto death. We cannot but believe that in this doctrine of the Incarnation—that God became man and man became God—there lies the interpretation of the world's painful ages of evolution, the center of all that is of worth in the world to-day, the key to life's perplexities, and the chart of its development.

## SUUM CUIQUE.

IF I were but a grain of sand,  
I'd sing my Maker's praises loud  
In angles sharp, in substance, and  
Arrest the thoughtless crowd.

Or if I were a gorgeous flower,  
I'd flaunt abroad my Maker's praise,  
Showing His colors hour by hour,  
Painting to men His ways.

Or if I were a climbing hind,  
My feet should tell my Maker's art,  
Since for His praise He thus designed  
And dignified that part.

So now I am a living soul,  
My thought and will shall praise the Lord.  
Let all my parts with nature's whole  
Shout forth some glorious word!

## CHAPTER V.

### SOME RESULTS OF THE POINT OF VIEW.

IT may be well to stop for a moment before going on with the main body of our thought, and note some results following from the method of proceeding we chose. We were saying that in our view the universe is intelligible only when regarded as the expression of a personal Being; that however completely its phenomena may be reduced to atoms or elements or force, these in turn are but different aspects of infinite personality, which abides behind them as the ground of their existence. If this is the case, it throws light upon the relation between God and the world, and upon the relation between the divine personality and human personality.

One of the chief questions now at issue in the world of thought is, stated in its broadest form, whether the Infinite excludes or includes the finite; or, in other words, whether "divine" means "non-human" and "human" "non-divine," or whether the human—that is, humanity freed

from accidentals and in its essential, ideal condition—is a typical part of the divine. From the opposite answers to this question two streams of conclusion flow, as widely divergent as Pison and Gihon, rivers which flowed from the Garden of Eden.

To indicate this more fully we may take a few illustrative cases, and endeavor to point out in them the wide divergence which must ensue according as one or the other position is adopted.

The generation just past has been eagerly debating whether, in the genesis of the world, the presence of a method which can be traced, a method proceeding by regular steps in intelligible succession, disproves or demonstrates the hypothesis of a personal force behind the method. There are two parties which are inclined to hold the former position—that such an exhibition of method would disprove the existence of an operative personal force. These are, on the one hand, some earnest students of science who know little of religion; and, on the other, some earnest religious persons who know little of philosophy. The latter have been exclaiming, “Evolution is impious. It was God who created the heavens and the earth. They were not evolved of themselves; ‘He spake, and it was done.’ If it were to be shown conclusively that the world developed slowly through ages from a nebula, that

man descended from an ape, that religion was a growth, this would be abolishing God, for it would leave no room in the process for His agency." And so these persons refuse to hear what students of science may have to say, because they are not willing to accept what seems to them to follow as a conclusion.

On the other hand, many scientific men have replied, "We quite agree with you. If we demonstrate the genesis of the world by evolution, surely there is no place for a God. And that is precisely the fact. The proofs of evolution are simply overwhelming. You agree with us as to the conclusion which must follow, though you try to dispute the premises. We are convinced of the premises, and do not hesitate to draw the conclusion."

Both sides, then, however much they may differ in other respects, agree that if the steps of a method can be demonstrated, but one conclusion must follow. But if the position we have been maintaining is correct, this conclusion does not follow. We have been declaring our conviction that it is impossible to regard the processes of the world as other than expressions of personality. To point out that that which was supposed to be an event is really a process, or to trace within the process self-consistency, order, consecutiveness; to substitute, in our conception of the operation

of personal force, intelligent method for magical creation by a mere fiat—this surely is not to abolish personality, but rather to establish it. For thought, order, conformity to inherent necessity, are marks of personal existence. Where they are, it must be. And so if any species of life, any institution, the world itself, is shown to have attained its present form by regular steps of development from previously existing, less complete forms, this, in our view, so far from obviating the necessity of that personal force we have called God, does but demonstrate the existence of such a force, since it points out the infallible signs of its presence.

Here, then, are the two opposite views in regard to the genesis of the world. “I must believe,” says one, “that in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” “That cannot be,” says another, “for it can be demonstrated that all forms of life, inorganic and organic, were developed from preëxisting forms in regular succession.” But, we ask, what opposition is there between the two statements? Is not the former merely generic, while the latter is specific? Does not personal force always act intelligently? And are not sequence, order, law, terms into which thought, and therefore personality, necessarily enters? Are we prevented from saying that God makes the sun rise because we are acquainted with the revo-

lution of the earth? Granting the process of evolution—which we are told is “an integration of matter and concomitant disintegration of motion, during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity, and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation”\*—does not every element concerned in this process—“homogeneity,” “heterogeneity,” “concomitant,” “coherent”—involve thought, and therefore, on our hypothesis, a thinking Mind? If force and atoms made the universe, what made the atoms and force? In this process of evolution there is involved action by order and method; and therefore, so far from being inconsistent with the hypothesis of an all-originating personality, in our view it implies it.

Two opposite views exist also in regard to the genesis of conscience. The student of conscience traces the growth of the moral instinct from its first appearance in the higher animals to its most completely developed form in the loyal servant of God. He finds no place in the continuous line of which he can say, “This step is different in kind from the preceding and unconnected with it.” He therefore believes that conscience is of natural growth, and this he supposes—for he has

\* Herbert Spencer, “First Principles of Philosophy,” part ii., chap. xvii., end.

been so taught—is equivalent to saying that it is not of divine origin. But while granting, while welcoming, his evidences of development, we must dissent from his conclusion. He may point to the instinct of fear, which drove solitary animals to become gregarious; to the loyalty to a common safety, which tended to perpetuate those races which had it; to the birth of a sense of duty apart from direct individual gains. All this does not alter our conviction that the idea of oughtness is of divine origin; that is, that it is an essential part of the constitution of the highest type of man. The question of the time or manner of its appearance is not one in which we have much interest. Those who hold that man and the world were in their ideal condition at their beginning, and that their course since has been one of degeneration because of variation from the primitive form, to them, indeed, the question whether this or that characteristic was part of the original type is of the greatest importance; for whatever was primitive was, in their view, divine; the addition or subtraction since has been non-divine and evil. But to us the test whether anything was divinely created or intended is its presence not necessarily in the original form, but in the final and finished form; not at the beginning of its career, but at the end; its essentialness to the complete conception

of itself; its existence, to use the theological phrase, not in the first man, Adam, but in the second man, Christ. The first man is of the earth, earthly; it is the second man that is of heaven. The position of those who hold the opposite view is that God made everything such as He wanted it to be, and wants everything to stay as He made it. Our position is that He expressly does not want it to stay as He made it, but to develop from itself some higher form of life. If the primitive state could be discovered, it would be by the former hypothesis, the standard for every age at once to conform itself to. In our view the presumption would be that it was not the pattern for any other age, just because it was adapted to its own age. Applying the test we mentioned above, we can heartily welcome the evidences of the gradual growth of conscience, and yet affirm our belief that it was divinely implanted in the constitution of man.

This gives opportunity for saying what did not seem necessary when we were speaking of the universe as an expression of personality—that we do not regard it as in all its parts a complete expression. This is but saying that it is not as yet a complete universe; it is in process of becoming. We might have added our conviction that if each thing were its complete self, the universe as a whole would be a complete expression

of the divine. But while part of it expresses the divine authentically already, in part of it the expression is imperfect, owing to imperfection of conditions. "We see not yet all things put under Him." The divine, however, appears in each thing whenever it is at its best. It is this that distinguishes Christian pantheism from Hindu pantheism. To the Oriental all that is is divine, one thing as much as another. There is therefore no such thing as evil, for all is equally of God. To the Christian all things are divine only when they are at their best, that is, when each is consistent with itself and with all other things. To the Hindu the world is of God as it is; to the Christian as it ought to be. To the former there is no distinction between present condition and ideal condition; to the latter it is the best and that alone, which is the true expression of God. The Oriental, therefore, knows neither sin nor progress. The Christian, because he has the conviction of sin, sees a world lying in wickedness, and limitless advance toward the kingdom of heaven.

It was necessary to point to this distinction before referring to two opposite views of revelation. According to one view, all knowledge that is human is, *ipso facto*, non-divine, and that which is divine excludes any human element. Revelation, therefore, consists in the utterance by God

of certain truths which before had not been, and which could not be, known by men. Though these truths were uttered by chosen persons, they did not come through the use of the natural faculties of the individual, but passed through him as light passes through glass, he remaining passive. Any certification of divine truth by human reason or intelligence is, in this view, regarded as impossible, and any such attempt as impious, for it would be subjecting the divine to the human. The human mind can, in the department of revelation, but receive what comes through the divine channels and bow in obedience to it. Those who hold this position have never cared greatly for the criticism of credentials, and have rarely stated what constitutes in their view the test of a divine utterance. They are accustomed to refer each special case to some central standard—the Bible, the creed, the church—the divineness of whose utterances is supposed to be established once and for all. There are many persons, however, who cannot see that wrapping a number of small bundles together into one, however much it may diminish their inconvenience, diminishes at all their weight.

The other view of revelation holds that divine and human are not antithetic, but that human thought and character at their best are a direct expression of God. There can be no distinction

between man discovering truth and God imparting a revelation, except that the one phrase calls attention to one side of a process and the other phrase to the other side of the same process. Revelation always comes through natural channels. The words which prophet and evangelist uttered were the expression of their loftiest thought and profoundest experience; and because they thus embodied humanity raised to its high powers, they became by that fact an expression of the divine. They had the ability to bring men into the presence of God, or, as it is commonly called, the power of inspiration.

Inspiration is often regarded wholly as passive, rather than as active also; as a power exerted upon the prophet, rather than exerted by him; as a guaranty of the authenticity of his message, rather than as the means by which his message becomes efficient. Undoubtedly this passive side exists; but the conception of inspiration is incomplete without the active side. And indeed it is the active side which establishes the existence of the passive. The only way we can know that a man is inspired is by seeing that he is inspiring. Does he guide men's thought aright? Does he enkindle their loftiest feeling? Does he confirm their weakness of will? Does he bring them into the presence of God, so that through him the potencies of that presence are exerted upon

them? Then he is inspiring; and because inspiring, it must be that he is inspired; for no man can do these miracles except God be with him. The important thing for us to know concerning any messenger is whether or not he is sent by God. This cannot be known directly, but only by signs. The signs of divine authorization are that through him who has it the blind are made to receive their sight, the lame to walk, the lepers to be cleansed, the deaf to hear, the dead to be raised, and the poor to have the gospel preached to them (St. Matt. xi. 5). After a prophet's credentials are established we shall say of him, "He is inspired; therefore he will be inspiring." But in order to establish his credentials we must be able to say, "He is inspiring; therefore he is inspired."

It follows from this that revelation is not confined to one institution, one nation, one time, one degree. No institution nor man can embody God that is not concerned with bringing the eternal into human conditions; but every one that is so concerned may become the vehicle of revelation. In every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted. It is not every nation, however, that is capable of hearing and uttering God's voice in such a preëminent manner as to constitute it prophetic to the world. But here and there there will be a nation whose birth and education mark it out as God's "peculiar people."

Continuity, also, is inherent in the very idea of revelation; it must be as much a reality for the present and future as for the past. For if God once spoke to men, He cannot, in this view, be conceived as closing His lips and remaining forever after silent, so long as the conditions on the human side remain the same. Revelation, too, must admit varying degrees, according to the capacity of its instrument. The divining-rod, the fleece, the ephod breastplate, the sacred grove—these undoubtedly brought at times helpful answers to men in their perplexity. But they yielded to the living voice of the prophet and the apostle, because man's capabilities for revealing God are intrinsically higher than those of inanimate things. Among men, too, who are capable of receiving and reflecting God, the degree of such capacity must vary. While one sees but few aspects of eternal truth, and those mainly as adapted to his own time, another's vision is comprehensive, seeing the truth on many sides and in its naked, eternal form. It has been a great good fortune to the Christian church that the canon of the Scriptures has recognized this, and that we consequently have in the Bible books inspiring and inspired, which yet vary in their degrees of inspiration; books differing as widely as Ecclesiastes and the Gospel of St. John. The lower degree of inspiration, local and temporary as it may

be, may yet claim to be the instrument of revelation. For inspiration is not infallibility. God the inspiring Spirit can dwell with partial knowledge, just as God the sanctifying Spirit can dwell with partial holiness; for if He could not so dwell with men, He could not dwell with them at all.\*

\* A clear statement of the opposite view of revelation is given by the Right Rev. George F. Seymour, D.D., Bishop of Springfield, in his reply to an editorial in the New York *Tribune* (cf. the *Tribune*, November 5, 1893; also the pamphlet, "Danger-Signals," p. 18):

"Your editorial confuses the realms of truth. There are two, Revelation and science. The Church, as regards the subject-matter of revelation, is not a searcher after truth. She already holds the truth as God's gift to her, and it is her highest duty to guard it and hand it on, as St. Paul says, 'as she received it.' The Church, as God's accredited teacher in the sphere of faith and morals, would contradict her own claim as speaking with authority if she were to allow for one moment that she is seeking after truth. I plead guilty to the charge that in the realm of revelation, the sphere of God's gift to us, I am not a seeker after truth."

This position is repeated in the *Tribune* of November 25, 1893:

"In reply to the *Tribune* I have simply to say that, with the Church universal, I hold that for man there are two realms of truth, revelation and science. God rules in the one absolutely; man is permitted to rule in the other. Revelation is God's direct gift to man. Science is man's acquisition. The *Tribune* and the average man confuse these two fields of knowledge, and discourse about them as though they were on the same plane and governed by the same principles. In the realm of revelation I am not a seeker after truth. In the realm of science I am a seeker after truth, and I am in hearty sympathy with the most advanced and progressive seekers after truth in this department of knowledge."

Bishop Seymour has undoubtedly never perceived that this is

We stated our conviction at the beginning of this chapter that the use of intelligible means toward an end is not only not inconsistent with the theory of a divine agent, but is involved in it; and we have been showing some instances, such as the genesis of the world and of conscience, revelation and inspiration, in which two opposite views resulted according as this position was held or repudiated. In case of miracles, also, two results follow, according as the human is regarded as non-divine or as part of the divine. If it is considered essential that there should be in miracles no human element, that they should be outside the realm of law, they will then be regarded, on the one hand, by those who believe in the universality of law, as flatly impossible. On the other hand, by those who have but a feeble sense of

Manichæism; nor that such dualism is always atheistic, in that it hands over to man one province of life and thought as without a God in it; nor that it is what churchmen of his school would call "rationalistic," since the boundaries between the two realms must certify themselves to the human intelligence or "reason." If the human mind is competent to assign data to the one realm or the other, or if it is capable of apprehending the divine assignment, why is not this capacity sufficient for determining the character of each datum as it is presented, i.e., for knowing? To know that there are two realms is itself knowledge. To distinguish the divine voice assigning its place to any datum involves the use of that very "private judgment" which the existence of a realm of revelation is supposed to supersede. In order to save walking we construct a canal-boat to carry us, and then we make our journey leading the towing-horse.

law—that is, who feel no necessity of attempting to coördinate one event with another—they will be believed in, but miraculous power will be held to belong to a few persons only, here and there, appearing in them for no intelligible reason and unrelated to their other powers. An act in which there is no inherent connection between means and end is an act of magic; and miracles, in this view, will be magical, in that the end accomplished does not rest on the attendant use of intelligible and sufficient means. A sharp distinction is drawn between natural and supernatural; and in order that miracles may be supernatural—a claim passionately defended—it is felt that no natural element must be allowed in them. To explain a miracle would be, on this theory, to destroy it.

The other view of miracles is that they are the result of personal force, exerted apparently not through indirect means, but directly, though this on closer examination is seen to mean that they are in accordance with natural law, but that the law of their occurrence is not at the time understood. They are natural, in that there is in them a necessary connection between means and end. They are supernatural, in that this connection is beyond the knowledge of those who witness them. What is a miracle at one time may not be so at another. The prediction of an eclipse

is easy to modern astronomers, but to savages it is miraculous. The power which expresses itself in miracles in the extraordinary man exists in the ordinary man in germ. The attempt to trace a connection between modern faith-cures and Christ's miracles of healing; between the child's acquisition of moral character by assimilation\* and Zaccheus or Mary Magdalene; between a case of hypnotism and the raising of Jairus's daughter—this would seem, to those who define "divine" as "non-human," to be derogatory and profane; but to those who regard the truly human as a revelation of the divine it opens a new source of reverent and joyful acquaintance with God, and draws all mankind nearer to Christ.

To regard miracles as startling anomalies is contrary to the custom of Jesus. He never spoke nor apparently thought of His own miracles as anything remarkable. His power to perform them was to Him as much a matter of course as their ordinary powers to ordinary men. He insisted that this power belonged to humanity, and could be exercised by men if they would but rise to its assertion. The ability to forgive sins and to heal sicknesses, He once told a wondering crowd (St. Mark ii. 9, 10), was inherent in the ideal

\* Cf. 1 John iii. 2: "We shall be like Him; *for* we shall see Him as He is." Note the law of assimilation referred to in the conjunction.

man. He promised His followers that likeness to Him should bring with it powers greater than His own (St. John xiv. 12). The inability with which He was confronted occasioned Him ordinarily no surprise. But one of the few instances in which His words seem to have a tinge of impatience is when He is met by an inability which to us would seem not only natural, but inevitable. His disciples are unable to heal a lunatic boy (St. Matt. xvii. 17, 20). Jesus heals him. But He turns to them with words of surprise and indignation, as if they might have been expected to perform such a miracle as a matter of course; and when they ask an explanation He tells them plainly that their inability here was culpable. It was a discovery which the young church made after the day of Pentecost, to its glad surprise, that participation in Christ's character carried with it the exercise of His miraculous powers.\*

If "divine" is equivalent to "non-human," a miracle is an act of magic, and therefore, to those who reverence the reign of law as the sway of God, is incredible. If the human is the incomplete expression of the divine, or, as the Bible

\* Cf. Acts iii. 16: "His name, through faith in His name, hath made this man strong;" Acts viii. 18, 19: "When Simon saw that through laying on of the apostles' hands the Holy Ghost was given, he offered them money, saying, Give me also this power, that on whomsoever I lay hands, he may receive the Holy Ghost."

calls it, God's image, then miracles become natural, to be expected, and inevitable.

This same question, whether the infinite excludes or includes the finite, gives rise to two opposite views of the divinity of Christ. The one makes it consist in the possession of non-human characteristics and experiences. It holds the Virgin-birth essential to His divinity, because it is necessary, on this theory, that His birth should have been unlike that of all other beings. In spite of St. Luke's assurances to the contrary (St. Luke i. 80; ii. 40, 52), it cannot allow that He attained intellectual and spiritual maturity by gradualness of growth. It posits for Him a special set of powers different from those of humanity, and in these it regards His divinity as residing. It is compelled, however, by the historic creeds to recognize a real humanity in Christ, and it consequently ascribes to Him the conditions of humanity. But as it is dualistic in regard to God, so it is dualistic in regard to Christ also. Having severed these two things, His divinity and His humanity, it then crowds them into one body, where they exist side by side, distinct from each other, one only in appearance. They are so distinct that it may be said of Christ that He did now this as human, now that as divine; so distinct that many an act of His has no relation to us, and

therefore no instructiveness for us, since it was done by Him in His divine capacity.

It is often supposed that this view of Christ exalts His divinity, since it raises it so far above humanity. But the elevation which it bestows on Him is one of circumstance, not of character—like the raised throne of a king, or the gorgeousness of his dress. Christ's preëminence, in order to have saving power for the world, must be a moral one, consisting not in superiority of conditions and unrelatedness of character, but in similarity of conditions and superiority of character. In the view of the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, His title to be regarded as Captain of the salvation of men rests upon the fact that He passed successfully through all the conditions through which humanity has passed with only partial success (*Heb. ii. 10*).

Those, on the other hand, who hold that the infinite includes the finite, that "divine" does not necessarily mean "non-human," must regard the divinity of Christ as consisting not in powers essentially different from those of humanity, but in humanity raised to its highest power. This is not equivalent to saying that Christ was man and nothing more. Difference of degree becomes difference of kind. Just as the animal is a step higher in the scale of development than the

plant, just as man is an animal and something more, so Christ is man and something more; so His divinity is the development and completion of His humanity. He is the "Son of Man," that is, the inheritor of all the characteristics of humanity, its typical and full expression. And it is worthy of note that all the functions of Christ which we are apt to think of as belonging to Him on the side of His divinity, He ascribes to Himself on the side of His humanity. It is the Son of Man who is Lord of ecclesiastical institutions (St. Matt. xii. 8); to whom the judgment of this world is committed (St. Matt. xxvi. 64), and the forgiveness of sins (St. Luke v. 24). It is this element in Him which has sacramental grace (St. John vi. 53), and which enables Him to rise above death (St. Mark viii. 31). This view—that divinity and humanity are not two unrelated things, but that the former, while different in degree and in kind, is yet a higher power of the latter—this seems to have been the thought underlying St. John's use of language; for the same function—judgment—he ascribes at one moment to the Son of God and the next to the Son of Man (St. John v. 25, 27). Throughout his Gospel no sharp line of separation between the two is maintained.

If the divinity of Christ consists in His non-humanity, He is relegated to a sphere which can never be the world in which men live and sin

and need salvation and long for help. However much they may worship Him with ecclesiastical ritual and external show of reverence, when they are driven by the stress of a great need they will look elsewhere than to Him. Every glimpse we get of the aims of Christ shows that His eager purpose was to draw all men unto Him. Any view must be opposed to this result which makes Him to have been a magic being, or with a nature essentially different from that which is the inheritance of every man. If, however, His divinity consists in the fullest development of humanity, if the human side of God is identical with the divine side of man, then we have in Christ a Saviour of the world; one through whom sinful men may find deliverance from their sins; an Intercessor between God and man, who bridges the two; a Mediator—one who by partaking of both becomes a medium of communication; a Son of man—the representative of humanity; the Son of God—the authentic representative of God under human conditions, and therefore “very God of very God.”

Differences of view such as these we have been pointing out are daily becoming plainer as factors in the world’s condition. It is no wonder that those who regard Christianity as bound up with the dualistic view of the separation of human and divine; who hold creation to be exclusive of growth, and the moral sense to have had no unde-

veloped germs, and revelation to be the impartation to man of certain truths from outside himself, and the supernatural to be the unnatural, and inspiration to have ceased, and the value of Christ to be in His remoteness from humanity—it is no wonder that such feel despondingly that religion is losing its hold and being overwhelmed by a rising tide of intellectual anarchy and atheism; no wonder that they stand bravely, but hopelessly, exclaiming with the medieval saint:

“ Hora novissima, tempora pessima sunt; vigilemus.  
Ecce minaciter imminet Arbiter ille Supremus.” \*

But those who cannot but believe that the place in which they find themselves is a universe—that is, a self-consistent whole, expressive in all its parts of the personal life which is at its center—these must rejoice as they see things material discovered to be, after all, personal, the secular found to have a sacredness, the truly natural to be spiritual, the only type of character worthy of being called human to be divine. To them such a sight seems to be saying, “ *Sursum corda!* ” and their hearts are lifted up, because they think they discern in this onward-moving wave the coming of the kingdom of God.

\* Bernard of Clairvaux.

## ABSENCE.

How glad am I to be awhile apart!  
Not that thy presence is not joy to me,  
And life ; like breath and sunlight and the free,  
Clear morning air—such life to me thou art.  
But that thine absence makes thee present more ;  
For thou art with me even when most alone,  
So deep into my very soul has gone  
Thy spirit's sweet and penetrating power.  
Thou prophet, Absence, thy glad voice I hear,  
That Death itself can send me to no spot  
In all God's universe where She is not ;  
If I am I, She must be with me there.  
Where art thou, Death? My Love and I have killed thee!  
O parting Space, my Love and I have filled thee!

## CHAPTER VI.

### SALVATION.

ALL Christian people have believed that the salvation of men is in some way necessarily connected with the life and death of Jesus Christ. As to the mode of this connection they have widely differed, but the fact itself has been universally acknowledged. Indeed, it has established its place so firmly at the center of Christianity that even those who know it only through some popular and distorted theory of the Atonement, if they are unable to accept this, at once class themselves as non-Christians. To both friend and opponent it is the *articulus stantis vel carentis* of the Christian system. All acknowledge the fact. But there has been hardly any point in theology as to which such wide and bitter difference has existed as upon the fact's explanation, that is, the doctrine of the Atonement.

What is the part filled by the life and death of Jesus Christ in the salvation of men?—that is the problem. Or, to put it in different words, How are men saved through Christ?

But before this can be fully considered a num-

ber of preliminary questions present themselves for answer. What is salvation? is plainly the first of them. As we see this hinging on repentance and forgiveness, we have to ask ourselves what these are. As we note a certain part of the process of salvation not fully explained by these, we look about and find another force at work which has been called vicariousness, and this too we must study. Each force interplays with the other, so that we cannot keep the study of it wholly distinct by itself. No function of a living being is a separate entity. It can only be understood in connection with the whole of which it is a part.

It might seem needless to stop to define matters so rudimentary, so apparently simple, so generally taken for granted, as salvation, repentance, and forgiveness. And yet the conceptions entertained of these are widely different, for they are tinged with different theories of government and different ideals of moral character. In regard to salvation especially, conceptions are prevalent which are medieval, legal, and materialistic, which have darkened theology and brought ill repute upon the name of religion.\*

\* "In ordinary Protestant theology, forgiveness is still something else than the moral act of putting off the old man, salvation something else than putting on the new."—THOMAS HILL GREEN, "Faith," p. 62.

Many of the dark conceptions of theology took their rise in the interpretation of the divine government through human governments. At the time when the Roman empire stamped deep upon the thought of the world the imprint of its arbitrary power and its legal code of morals, the inference was almost inevitable that with the Supreme Ruler also right was based upon might, and that the divine rewards and punishments were other than the continued operation of the causes which gave rise to them. The unsatisfactoriness of the present as a field for the display of the divine justice early caused the next life to be regarded as the sphere of retribution. As it was quite possible to break a human law and avoid the penalty, it seemed equally possible in case of a divine law. The great thing to be desired, therefore, came to be to escape future retribution. Salvation plainly meant being saved *from* something. When, then, men asked themselves what that something was, the ready answer came, From hell hereafter.

There were several apparent advantages in this answer. In postponing the whole matter to the future after death, it was removed to a region conveniently vague. Perhaps, after all, there would be no hell, perhaps no life hereafter. At all events, the necessity for present action was removed, and that was a gain. It was free, too, from inconvenient demands for uprightness of

conduct and character. Righteousness might be, no doubt, a good thing, but it was, on this theory, a luxury, not a necessity. It was not involved in salvation. Salvation was deliverance from future torment, and therefore belonged wholly to the future, except so far as preparations for it might be made in this world. Conduct and character were to be judged not by their intrinsic worth, but by what they would by and by produce. If one could only be sure of escaping hell he might sin as much as he pleased. In fact, the clever thing to do would be to sin to the full extent of desire in this life, then at the last moment repent, or have performed whatever ceremonial was believed to insure escape from hell, and behold, you have got your will with both worlds.

“ ‘Would a man ’scape the rod ?’

Rabbi Ben Karshook saith,

‘ See that he turn to God

The day before his death.’

“ ‘Aye, could a man inquire

When it shall come?’ I say.

The Rabbi’s eye shoots fire—

‘ Then let him turn to-day!’

“ Thus Karshook, the Hiram’s-Hammer,

The Right-hand Temple column,

Taught babes in grace their grammar,

And struck the simple solemn.” \*

\* R. Browning, “ Ben Karshook’s Wisdom.”

The theological results of this view appeared in Anselm's theory of the Atonement, by which the Atonement was made to consist wholly in an arrangement between the Father and the Son for delivering men in the future from just punishment; in the Augustinian doctrine of election, with its conception of an elect few, who would be saved no matter what their character, and a reprobate many, who would be lost no matter what they might do; in the Romish doctrine of the sacraments, which were regarded as agencies outside personal character for avoiding hell; in an almost complete obscuration of the nature of sin, which came to be the transgression of an arbitrary, external rule, a transgression which could be compounded for by equivalents of suffering, merit, or even money. The fundamental defects of this conception of salvation are that freedom from pain hereafter is its highest aspiration, that it breaks the essential connection of the present with the future, and that its means for attaining its future end are magical; that is, not in the nature of the agents employed, but extraneous. If there is to be any salvation hereafter, it must be also a matter of here and now, capable of being tested—known and read of all men.

It is a gain when the operation of salvation is made to include this life, even though its aim is still held to be escape from pain. Every step

which binds the pain close to the transgression, and tends, by making them inseparable, to identify them, is an advance. And so it is an immense step in progress when men come to recognize that sin is an evil here and now, and not merely for the consequences it may produce hereafter. The more completely morality is made to coincide with religion the greater gain there is to religion in closeness of touch with life and in reality, and to morality in passion and effectiveness. So when men, in pondering the question, What is salvation? instead of regarding it as escape from hell, came to contemplate it as escape from pain, they made an approximation to a truer answer than had been previously possible. It seems the readiest, the necessary meaning. To the child who has done wrong and is dreading the punishment, salvation, such as his semi-innocent mind could conceive it, would be the rod banished, with unlimited petting instead. If the thief, who is meditating suicide rather than face detection, the loss of social position, and the jail, were assured that he should be saved, he would feel cheated if his arrest and imprisonment were allowed to go on unhindered. The ignorant pious man, who has invested in religion as a vaguely felt good thing, loses his property or his health; and a large part of his pain is his indignant astonishment that God has let this happen to him, since

it was to his mind expressly precluded by the covenant of salvation he had entered into with the Almighty. "Do God A'mighty a know wot a's doin', a-taäkin' o' meä?" \* he exclaims.

And yet this conception of salvation as freedom from pain, like all steps which are made shelves, works incalculable harm. It renders holiness, moral reality, impossible. For if pain is the only thing to be avoided, sin is no evil except so far as it entails painful consequences; and in estimating painfulness I shall be quite certain to take into consideration the feelings of myself only, as an individual, and near interests rather than those which are remote. Selfish calculation, therefore, takes the place of the struggle for righteousness, and instead of the divine command, "Be ye perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect," the highest maxim of life becomes, "Look out for Number One." Much of the organized selfishness dignified by the name of religion, which so justly brings religion into disrepute with those who know it but slightly, finds its support in this mistaken definition underlying it of salvation.

Many persons are spiritually dying from atrophy of moral fiber, through the fatal mistake that pain is the great thing to be dreaded, and that consequently salvation is merely a device to escape pain. Salvation most certainly does bring deliver-

\* Tennyson, "The Northern Farmer."

ance from both pain and hell, but it is indirectly, not primarily. The endurance of pain is as truly a condition of salvation as the annihilation of pain is its ultimate aim. Salvation treats pain as a comparatively trivial matter, inflicting it and taking it away indifferently; but pain's ultimate cause is salvation's bitterest foe, for salvation is always deliverance from sin. It is the evil itself, not merely its unpleasant consequences, which the awakened soul most dreads, and from which it would at any expense be freed. This evil it has discovered to be not outside itself, but within; no mere material circumstance, but twined around the very roots of its being. To cut loose from it is like cutting out a part of itself; but not to cut loose from it is the reality of which hell is the symbol. Not to be pure, not to be truthful and honest, not to be worthy its own respect, not to stand before God, bringing, however little of accomplishment, yet a noble sincerity of intention and a loftiness of aim—this the earnest, striving soul finds unendurable, even in thought. No heaven could be heaven which did not advertise this as its characteristic charm, and any hell would be welcomed which, after however many cycles of torment, should prove eventually a purgatory.

This, then, is our answer, the only Christian answer, to the question with which we started: salvation, if it is to be worth having, must mean

salvation from sin. That is what the soul would demand for itself if God had not decreed it already. "Punish me," it will pray, "no matter how much, here or hereafter. I shall welcome every stroke, if only thereby the harmful consequences of my sin are curtailed and its grasp on me is relaxed. Spare me no pain; let nothing interfere with the completion of the eternal process which I prize alike with my soul itself. Give me the largest measure of salvation. 'Wash me thoroughly from mine iniquity, and cleanse me from my sin.' 'Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me.'"

The first step toward getting anything is to see exactly what it is that we want. Our whole theology, our whole course of life, will be turned one way or the other according as it is pain or sin which is with us the ultimate evil to be shunned. If salvation means to us deliverance from hell hereafter or from pain now, then we can have no verifiable assurance of it; there is no necessary connection between the present and the future; the worth of morality is problematical; the sacraments become the magic passes of a priestly wand; Christ's life is changed from a source of inspiration to a table of logarithms for the successful navigation of the soul, being of doubtful utility even for that; His death—the only matter of importance—becomes of overwhelming importance, since it is the price of a bargain by which

God is overreached, belief in which transaction furnishes the insurance policy that is the only preparation needed for the hereafter; eternity is a vague, vast something into which men are plunged by death; and true wisdom is to secure as many pleasures as possible in this world, without regard to their moral quality, and then dodge hell at the last moment.

But if, on the other hand, salvation is always salvation from sin, then its existence at present can be tested by observation, while its existence in the future, provided the conditions on the human side continue operative, is a resultant of absolute certainty from the present, since the conditions on the divine side cannot be conceived as changed; the sacraments are signs of a perpetually outpouring divine life, and therefore means for partaking of that spiritual sustenance; Christ's death becomes the consummate, crowning event of His life, which then fulfils its inspiring function of enkindling the heart to passionate enthusiasm, opening a revelation to the understanding, elevating and intensifying the will, and thus, by the law of personality, imparting itself to the absorbing soul; God is freed from the imputation of selling eternal life for a belief in the existence of an immoral transaction, and is seen to condition it simply upon righteousness—the inward righteousness of an honest desire and aim; eternity is primarily life qualitative, only secondarily

quantitative ; there is no sharp distinction in kind between the present and the future, for eternity is here and now as truly as hereafter.

Sin, then, is the only evil. Salvation from sin is therefore the only kind of salvation worth serious consideration. Questions of locality hereafter must depend on moral condition, not condition on locality. We must give up the idea that putting a man somewhere will make him either happy or miserable. The punishment for falsity, selfishness, sin of every kind, is the diminution of life they involve, the fact that under them judgment, reason, conscience—in a word, the man—die by inches. The cure of the disease is the only freedom from pain. The Great Judgment is not the inauguration of a new condition, but the declaration of an already established fact. The evidence that a man will be saved when he is dead is that he is being saved now while he is alive. “It is eternal misery that makes hell, not hell that makes eternal misery. It is eternal happiness that makes heaven, not heaven that makes eternal happiness. One man is in heaven because he belongs to heaven. Another is in hell because he belongs to hell. Heaven belongs to one because he has that within him which makes heaven wherever he be. Hell belongs to the other because he creates a hell wherever in creation he may stand.” \*

\* Bishop Hugh Miller Thompson, “Sin and Penalty.”

## COUNT HENRY TALKS.

(SWABIA. 15— .)

YES, holy Father, you have answered well,  
What's hardest is the greatest. But go on;  
What that means here is not so plain to see.  
Forsake the world? Become a monk like you,  
And Brother Pax and Brother Bernard here,  
Just as for many a year I looked to be?  
Whatever is hardest, that I wish to do,  
As greatest offering of my life to God.  
Bid me leap headlong into the oublie  
There in the north tower, or lie flat in the mud  
Down in the village yonder and kiss the feet  
Of our own peasants as they pass me by;  
Let me be sure it is the voice of God  
Calling, and I, Count Henry, will leap up  
And gladly rush to death or open shame.  
The hardest, greatest service—that I seek.  
Your office, Father, is a service great.  
Is there a greater, harder? Let us see.

If you had lived, say, in the castle here,  
And knew, as I know, how the talk goes round—  
How soon the emperor will meet the Turk,  
Will boars be plentiful or not this year,  
How long before this heresy is put down—  
If you knew how this much-demanding life  
Compels a man to grow on many sides,  
In knowledge, skill, strength, judgment, aye, in soul,  
Perhaps you'd think, as I lately have thought,  
Whether such life, asking a man's whole powers—

This raising him to his highest, one may say—  
Might not give pleasure, seeing it, to God;  
Might even be a service done to Him  
As truly as services of Holy Church.

I know you think there is another aim  
That lurks beneath these thoughts, unknown to me,  
Which makes the world look different, and makes me  
Different from what I was six months ago.  
Yes, you are right, there is another aim;  
And wrong, since I am not unconscious of it.  
I love the Lady Alice; for a month,  
Since our last talk, I have been questioning  
If I should ask her soon to be my wife.  
Doubtless to you that seems a weakness; but  
If you monks knew what love is, sure I am  
You would regard it not as worldliness,  
Opponent, or no helper at the most,  
To piety, but as your best ally.  
Notice that vine outside the window there.  
Cut off its tendrils, and then bid it climb;  
It has the trellis and the castle wall.  
But no, it lacks the little clinging hands  
That would have stretched and drawn it up and up  
And been unasked the trellis's ally.  
We read it differently, the selfsame word.  
Cap to a beggar means a dirty rag;  
Cap to an emperor means a splendid crown.  
So love to you speaks from and of the earth;  
From and of heaven to me, since it demands  
Body, mind, soul, one's all, and all for God.

Both you and St. John tell us God is love.  
Is not that higher love like mine to her?  
Has it not depth and passion? Yes, God's love,  
I must believe, is like, is more than, mine.  
Think of that organ you and all the rest  
At the Abbey are so proud of, which to hear

On holy days the people come in crowds,  
And sit in awe, while all within them thrills  
Responsive, and deep calleth unto deep.  
You and I never were at Brescia; yet  
Do we not know John Antignati's soul  
Held music in it, singled note from note?  
Could that be in the instrument he made  
Which was not in the maker? Nay, not so.  
What saith the Scripture? "He that planted the ear,  
Shall He not hear? and He that formed the eye,  
Shall He not see?" And He that made the heart  
To love and suffer and to lose itself  
In pure devotion to its noble love,  
Must we not say a heart beats too in Him?  
Yes, God's love must be greater far than mine.  
This earthly instrument, whose stops and keys  
Beget such music—nay, it cannot be  
That this outranks its Maker! that the choirs  
In God's own house have no such harmonies!  
Then earth is full of song, but God is dumb.  
Then earth were heaven, and this instrument  
Of John of Brescia would say more than God's.

Your test of hardness—come to that again.  
Thou hast appealed to Cæsar; unto Cæsar  
Shalt thou then go. Which is the harder here:  
Forsake all thought of love, and spend my life  
In matins, vespers, and the Abbey's round  
Of holy services and manual toil  
In care of poor and sick and peaceful dead;  
Or wed the Lady Alice, if I may—  
If, as I hope, I may—and live with her,  
And daily strive to do the thing I would,  
And daily strive to be what I would be  
In her pure presence, nor let daily wont  
Dull apprehension, lower lofty aim?  
Which, once again, were harder, greater gift?

Father, I know 'twere this a thousand times.  
 Easier, I grant, to wed and to become  
 Less than the highest, sink, and be a brute,  
 Than be a monk and win the crown of saint ;  
 But easier far to be the cloistered saint  
 Than achieve highest manhood, being wed.

Ha! there she passes singing through the court.

### SONG.

“ ROSE, why are you blushing so,  
 Crystal drops enfolding,  
 Flaunting brave without a care,  
 That who will may see?”  
 “ June is sweet and skies are fair,  
 Flowers are for beholding ;  
 How can I do aught but glow,  
 Since joy it is to be!”

“ Whither are you hastening, Swallow,  
 You, our early comer,  
 Wheeling, darting, wings a-glisten,  
 Reveler of the sky?”  
 “ Speaks a voice, and I must listen :  
 ‘ Follow after summer,  
 Onward, onward ; ’ and I follow,  
 Though I know not why!”

“ Is the world new-born, Sir Lover,  
 That you pass unheeding,  
 With the wine of life elated,  
 Singing clear and strong?”  
 “ Everything that God created  
 Trusts its largest leading.  
 Let them sing the wide world over!  
 I must join their song!”

## CHAPTER VII.

### FORGIVENESS.

FORGIVENESS is the second of the forces we must study in order to understand Christ's Atonement. And we take it for examination—both the need for it and the act in itself—in its commonest form, as between man and man; knowing that all these things are after the pattern showed in the mount.

The first thing, the great thing, we want when intimate, friendly relations have been broken, is at-one-ness, the familiar consciousness of being at one with our friend again. Day after day has passed in happy union, and suddenly a great chasm of offense breaks in between us. How wistfully we look across its apparently hopeless permanence and long for five minutes of that old sweet time, so near and yet so infinitely remote, when a complete unconsciousness of mutual relations bore witness to their loving intimacy! We long to get back to being at one again. Is there no process of at-one-ment?

The person most sinned against is likely to be misled into thinking he has nothing to do, but that the whole task of making all right again belongs to the offender. This assumption is sure at the outset to block the path to restoration ; for in almost every quarrel one of the main points at issue is, Which is the offender? Each regards himself as in the right; and therefore if it is the one who is in the wrong who alone needs to take a step, the condition may continue forever. But granting that one has been preëminently the transgressor, even then we find on closer examination that if the two are to come into harmonious union again, the one who has been sinned against must on his part be willing to give up something. He will, moreover, be likely to mistake at first what this something is. He will perhaps say to his brother who has sinned against him and is longing to be forgiven and restored, " I have, it is true, the power to inflict some penalty on you for what you have done. I may legally arrest and fine or imprison you. I will not, however, inflict the penalty; you shall go free. But I will take good care that you shall never have a second chance to cheat me. I shall never trust you again."

Would that be the forgiveness which the longing heart of the penitent brother wants? Would he not say, " Inflict the severest penalty on me

the law allows. I shall feel a satisfaction, even, in it, if only I can be sure that the barrier which this sin of mine built up between you and me is broken down; sure that you have given up your right to put me away from you, and have taken me back to your trust and your love again"? Would not the infliction of the penalty be a matter of little importance, of no importance, to a really noble nature weighed down with a sense of its sin?

Often men make here a grave mistake. With the distorted idea that pain is the thing most to be dreaded, we suppose that forgiveness means remission of the penalty, and that the bearing of the penalty makes full atonement for the sin. Say to a man who has stolen from you, "I forgive you, but I shall prosecute and imprison you," and he would be apt to think that your action contradicted your words. And yet the forgiveness might be quite real. You have given up the attitude of alienation from him you were compelled into, and are now working lovingly for him and with him; and yet you judge it best for the community, best for him too, that he should taste the full fruits of his sin and pay the legal penalty. That may be the truest forgiveness. In case of a crime in which the community is concerned, that is generally the best course. The reason why we feel obliged to remit the penalty

is because forgiveness is so difficult that we are often justly suspected of not really forgiving, and so we must remit the penalty to prove our sincerity. And it is by no means the case, as we sometimes carelessly suppose, that bearing the penalty is all that is needed to restore the offender; that a man can buy a sin as he does a house: for he must be willing, indeed, to pay the price, the legal penalty; but when once that is paid, all is again as it was before. It is this conception of sin which prompts the absconded cashier to propose to return what he has stolen and pay the legal expenses, with the expectation that thereby things will be restored to their former condition. It is a discovery he has yet to make that the penalty, whether borne or remitted, has really little to do with the forgiveness of the sin.

The one who is to forgive, then, must be willing to give up something. But what is that something? That question has a barbarous answer and a Christian answer. Among barbarous men, whether they lived in former times or are living now, I may lawfully inflict on my enemy the same pain he has inflicted on me: "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth." And if I am at heart a barbarian, I shall feel this infliction of pain on my enemy to be so keen a delight that I shall not be willing to forego it unless I am bought off with some equivalent. The dragging

of the dead body of Hector around the walls of Troy is to Achilles a precious part of his triumph. The giving up, then, of this delight in witnessing another's pain is the barbarous conception of forgiveness, if barbarism can be said to know forgiveness at all. And barbarism has succeeded at times in putting its dark conception into many of the doctrines of theology; and so men have pictured God's forgiveness as consisting in His reluctantly consenting not to inflict infinite torment on His children because Christ allowed infinite pain to be inflicted on Him. All theories of the Atonement which make Christ's sufferings a satisfaction to an angry God are barbarous, and would be blasphemous if those holding them were conscious of their enormity.

This is barbarism's answer. And then there is Christ's answer. An outcast woman once stood before Him, plainly convicted of sin, but uttering no word of penitence. And yet because Jesus saw the soul's ability to be forgiven, He crowned her with the crown of a full forgiveness: "Neither do I condemn thee: go, and sin no more." Those uplifting words must have been most precious to her forever after. She must have felt in them that here was one who saw a degradation, a horror, in her sin such as she had never seen in it. And yet in the midst of this she must have felt a loving pity for her, the far-off sinner; felt

that those searching, knowing eyes saw that she was not utterly worthless, but that they discerned with trust a better self lying hidden within her. That pity and trust must have been an awakening, comforting support. And almost as great a comfort, too, must have been this sight of the evil of her sin, which for the first time she gained in seeing it as Jesus saw it. For seeing facts as facts, whatever the inference, brings always a certain comfort. And so, penitent or not hitherto, she rose to receive the divine forgiveness, and in rising became worthy of it.

This forgiveness of Christ's was no cheap, inexpensive process. It involved for Him the expenditure of some portion of vital or spiritual power. He gave as He forgave. The healing of disease was with Him a kind of physical forgiveness. For it proceeded with Him not by the ordinary method, in which something external to physician and patient—a drug—is put into the body and left to fight the disease. But the sufferer was inspired with an enthusiasm for Jesus which begot a belief in His power to heal and in the patient's ability to be healed. It established, too, a right relation between the patient's spiritual powers and his physical condition, since it filled him with the same spirit that was in Jesus. This enabled the renewed forces of vitality to flow again in their normal channels,

and normality, once established, perpetuated itself. Without claiming this to be a complete account of Jesus' method of healing, we can see that that method must have followed essentially these lines. But this involved expenditure on the part of Christ. An application was once made to Him of which He was not aware, but which, on account of the fulfilment of the necessary conditions, was successful. But He became aware that it had been made through His consciousness that "power" had gone forth from Him (St. Mark v. 30). The expenditure of forgiving power, which was ineffectual because unmated with repentance in those who were to be forgiven, was one of those serious drafts upon Him which constituted the pouring out of His blood, His life-force, for men. "Ye will not come to Me," He sadly exclaimed, "that ye might have life." "This is My body, this is My blood," He said, as He set forth the symbols of forgiving love, defeated and yet victorious.

That is Christian forgiveness. The old idea of giving up a private vengeance has vanished, and instead there has come a deep sense of the sinfulness of sin, a loving pity for the sinner, and an insight that can see in him, still undestroyed, the power to rise above his sin. And it is by no means the case, as at first it might seem, that in leaving the idea of vengeance to be given up we are leaving the idea of giving up altogether.

Look at the eager missionary, zealous and self-sacrificing and inextinguishable of hope, as he walks the shores of his desert island or treads the slums of the city. He is bringing to men the divine forgiveness; and does it involve no giving on his part? When a husband or a child has sinned, not so much against us individually as against manliness, against honor, against that ideal self which makes him dear to us, must we not, in order to forgive and reclaim him, give not only time and labor, but all the joy of life? Must we not give our very life-force to save his soul? Yes, life-force, all that is symbolized by blood, must be poured out; for "without shedding of blood is no remission." If one would redeem a soul, he must give himself for it. It is such experiences as these that flash their interpretive light back on Christ, and explain that necessity that made Him the Bearer of the sins of the world and its Saviour.

But every one who has longed to forgive his brother and be at peace with him, and at the same time be loyal to the rightful cause he believed himself to be upholding in his quarrel, must have met here a difficulty. He has not the slightest desire for vengeance. He has turned away from his brother because he saw in him a gnawing evil—a cowardliness, a lust, a willing baseness. This is a thing he was bound to op-

pose. He cannot, then, for the sake of peace, give up his opposition, for it is not a personal one ; he is but the agent in it of a higher Power of righteousness. Even if he should say he would put it aside, it would still be there, just as long as he is loyal to the right and the evil is gnawing at his brother's soul. The only thing that can abolish it is the abolishing of its cause. Until that is removed he cannot be at one with his brother. His side of the bridge is ready ; but the keystone cannot make the bridge complete until something on his brother's side is built up to meet it.

That is a difficulty in the way of our forgiveness and of God's. The one to be forgiven has a part, and unless his part is performed the full forgiveness must wait, unmarried and incomplete. Just as love, for the splendor of its full-orbed glory, needs reciprocation, needs one to love and one to return, so forgiveness must be met by repentance, or it must stand ready, calling, but unsatisfied. Another apparently simple term, then, comes to us for definition, and we ask ourselves, What is repentance ? Certainly it is not a mere desire to escape punishment. Every one who has ever looked into his own soul as it rose from a sin to the dignity of an honest penitence will remember how, as we said, he welcomed the punishment as helping to express his own newly gained hatred of his sin ; how he refused to allow that the

sinning self was the real self, but stood up concentrating all his forceful energy into a mighty protest against it: "I will never do that evil thing again! I will be free from its power!" Any one who has ever passed manfully through such a sinful fall and penitent rising will have learned a lesson in spiritual analysis—that repentance involves three things: hatred of the sin as distinct from the punishment, a determination to amend, and a resolute belief in the possibility of freedom.

Repentance, we know, evolves a mighty power. And we are not inclined to wonder at its greatness. We expect it to do almost everything. And we are right. But we sometimes fail to see the power of forgiveness. This is Christianity's characteristic discovery; this is the center of the power of Christ. For ages the world had tried to punish men into being good. One code of law after another had stood sternly erect and declared, "The soul that sinneth, it shall die." It was all of no use. Men did sin and did die, and the law was justified in its assertions. But something more was needed than the justifying of law; the need was that men should be saved. And then came Christ's wonderful plan of forgiving them; and it saved them and changed them and raised them and made them sit in heavenly places in Christ Jesus. "For what the law could not do, God did in sending His own Son." Law was

weak; punishment was weak; but forgiveness was mighty to save.

The old theologies which discovered this saw deeply into facts, and their phrases consequently sound utterly meaningless or barbarously unchristian until this point of view is discerned. But when it is once discerned, the real significance becomes plain, a significance which many even of those who adopted the phrases were not fully aware of. If we have discovered the true nature of forgiveness and repentance, we shall see that it is the case that the forgiveness of the sinner is substituted for the punishment of the sin; that Christ's vicarious sufferings make an Atonement between man and God; that pardon of sins is gained through the merits of Christ; that we have forgiveness through His blood; that the chastisement of our peace is upon Him, and by His stripes we are healed.

In studying these cases of forgiving and repenting between man and man we have not been able to separate them from repentance and forgiveness between man and God. And it is interesting and comforting that we have not. All relations between God and man are the same as the like relations between man and man seen at their highest. And so we may have certain knowledge as to the Godward side of them, and get a taste of their joy, by realizing at their best

our relations to one another as enemies and friends, parents and children, husbands and wives. How much self-inflicted torment to souls and ecclesiastical persecution would have been spared if men had only perceived this—that God forgives us our trespasses as we forgive them that trespass against us; that like as a father pitieith his children, so the Lord pitieith them that fear Him!

These common facts of forgiveness cast, as we have said, their interpretive light on Christ, and help us to understand why His life was such as it was—wealthy with a sense of God's infinite, just forgiveness for men; joyous with the mission of bringing this good news to them; heavy with the burden of the sins of the world; and ending in rejection and death. It shows why all this must have been as it came to be. And in noting the operation of these great common laws of forgiveness in the case of Christ, it will be well to trace more clearly in the paths of our own experience two instances of them already mentioned. One is the law that forgiveness inevitably involves suffering to the forgiver. Every one has discovered this if he has ever labored over some loved one who has sunk into sin and been covered up by it into insensibility to his condition. He cannot be forgiven and redeemed as he is, because he is not conscious of needing forgiveness. But as I try to evolve in my friend the capacity for being forgiven, my

labor becomes agony. I go down and put myself beside him, and my loving identification of myself with him brings upon me the sense of sin and the pangs of shame which his hardened conscience does not feel. I take him into the purity of the region in which, in respect to this sin at least, I dwell. I entice him with its charm; I clothe him with my righteousness. I persist in seeing him more truly, because more nobly, than he sees himself, and I insist with loving determination on his taking this ideal self as the real one. It is no holiday play. The struggle between life and death going on in his soul transfers itself through loving sympathy to mine, so that I feel the wear and the damage of it, and all but the actual guilt. The sin is his alone; but through love a part of the punishment flings itself on me also. In forgiving him I give myself for him; and if he accepts my sacrifice and is made one with me, he is thereby redeemed from his sin and made one also with God.

The other thing to be noted is the raising power of forgiveness for the forgiven. As you go down with your larger life and place yourself in the condition of the sinner, you take up the sin-narrowed life and endue it with some of your own righteousness and joyful vitality; in your light it sees light and lives through you. Your forgiveness of your brother, loosing him thus, as it does,

from his sins on earth, goes far to effect that he shall be loosed in heaven. And the sad converse is true. If, with an unforgiving spirit, you refuse to count him worthy of anything but his miserable habit of sinning, and so bind it more firmly on him, he and his sin tend to become bound together even in heaven. To every man is thus fulfilled at times the apostolic promise, that he shall sit on a throne and judge the tribes of Israel. And as he stands with the offering of his brother's penitence, made explicitly or silently, before him, well is it for him if he realizes the weighty solemnity of his judicial office, and knows that he is holding in his hands his brother's soul.

If the soul has but the capacity for being forgiven, forgiveness may lift it and raise it to the stature of Christ Himself. In the light shed by experience of this law it is no marvel to see the effect of Bishop Bienvenu's words on the convict whom he forgives for his theft: "Jean Valjean, my brother, you no longer belong to evil, but to good. I have bought your soul of you. I withdraw it from black thoughts and the spirit of perdition, and give it to God."\* Nor do we need to go to fiction for examples of this uplifting power. They come crowding in on us, the forgiven, uprisen souls—Jacob and David; Mary Magdalene and Zaccheus and Peter; the man whose fall and

\* Victor Hugo, "*Les Miserables*," vol. i., bk. ii., chap. xii.

rise I myself witnessed years ago; the man who years ago I myself was: they all come, a great multitude which no man can number, of those who have washed their robes and made them white in the blood of the Lamb; who love much, because to them much has been forgiven.

## CONCORDIA DISCORS.

KISS me again, now we are friends once more;  
Now that the harpies, strident-winged, are fled!  
Here in my neck as usual lies your head,  
And all is with us as it was before ;  
Oneness and you! And yet that evil spot  
I hated in you so, I hate it still;  
Though nothing troubles me, and nothing will,  
Now I am sure that you too own it not.  
How loud the clock ticks hurrying through the gloom!  
Why must a sense of saddening failure come  
In God's cause even, in fighting for the right?  
So fighting we are one. We rest, my Own,  
As on a tomb two lovers carved in stone,  
Silent. Have you forgiven me yet? Good-night!

## CHAPTER VIII.

### VICARIOUSNESS.

THEOLOGY is like most of us; it has made a great many blunders, but it has been punished for a great many it never made. And perhaps it has had no greater odium to incur than that which it has met for teaching that God punishes one man for the sins of another, and saves one through the righteousness of another. “How barbarous!” we exclaim; “how immoral! The penalty for one man’s sins inflicted on some one else! One man’s righteousness carried over and put upon another! In the first place, it is impossible; and in the second place, it would be utterly unjust. Surely God, if there is a God, must judge every man precisely according to what he is.” And yet, barbarous and absurd as the statement seems, it becomes, when stripped of its theological phraseology, so that its correspondence with ordinary fact may be recognized, a mere commonplace, a matter of course.

One sins and another is punished for it—is that a fact of ordinary experience? The memory of

many a one may furnish the answer. To any one who has ever deeply loved another, a child or a brother or a parent, who has been guilty of some act of public shame, the burning sense of the agony suffered through his sin will need no refreshing. The consciousness that you were included in the public talk about the matter; the degradation your upright name must suffer; your grief that the character of him you loved should have this stain upon it; the sense of personal identification with the sinner which your loving sympathy compelled you to feel—you need no reminder of all these. The skeleton is there beside you at every feast.

Is not this a fact of universal experience, of which every loving heart is compelled to be capable? It is the fact to which we were pointing. This law of compulsion is, in our view, but another name for the agency of God. You are innocent; your friend is guilty; and yet you are suffering what is in part the punishment of his sin. It is only a part. He may be so insensitive to God's opinion or to men's as to seem in his careless freedom to be bearing no punishment at all. But he is. You do not, cannot, however nobly loving your desire, bear the whole of his punishment for him. The central core of it, the moral degradation every sin inevitably brings—this the sinner, and he alone, must bear. But your part is ample; ample

for love to find in it the keenest torture, and ample to furnish means for the salvation to the uttermost of him who has sinned.

That is its compensation, the mighty saving power which this involved suffering has. Punish the sinner coldly, and he hardens himself in bravado under it. Tell him of Christ's grief at sin and of God's forgiveness, and he either does not understand it or he regards it as the weak foolishness of professional piety. Go down and stand beside him, and make him feel your love, first as real, and then as precious, and then as wounded for his transgressions and bruised for his iniquities, and you have a mighty engine with which to lift him out of his depths; for God's forgiveness and Christ's Atonement are behind, furnishing the power which is brought to bear through your human, intelligible love. Perhaps even this engine may fail, for sin can defy God Himself. But this, applied in some form, is the mightiest; God's storehouse contains no other.

Do we need further proof of our fact? Perhaps not. But in a wide range of evidence our sad knowledge may recognize itself more completely. Strangely enough, this involved suffering is not only the consequence of wrong-doing; it is the consequence of right-doing as well. It is not only the result of law broken; it is the result of law kept. It is a part of the natural course of the

universe that the gain of one is conditioned on the pain or death of another. Rocks must crumble away to form the soil for vegetable life. Grass and plants must become food for animals and man. Animals must give their services and their lives to develop human life. The pangs of the mother are the condition of the birth of the child. Multitudes are enjoying freedom in peace, unconscious that it was bought by blood and war. In every department others have labored and we have entered into their labors.

This great process has a name. It is called vicariousness, the capacity one thing has of ministering through its suffering to another. Every conceivable thing has it to some extent, from God to a grain of sand. The higher in the universe the thing stands in rank the more vicarious opportunities it has. The grain of sand can give itself for the world in one or two ways only. But the avenues of possible help opened by understanding and willing acceptance of the law are infinite, as Good Friday and Easter testify. All life is based on death. The innumerable ranks of unconscious creation are swept on to their beneficent destruction blindly, serving their glorious end, though they know it not. But man sees it; and in seeing his tragedy begins. Sometimes he turns, unable to endure the pains of righteousness, and madly fights against his lofty destiny

and refuses to die. That is what those have done whom the seer of the Revelation sums up in his catalogue—the fearful, and the unbelieving, and the abominable, and murderers, and idolaters, and all liars. But even so they have not escaped their dreaded death; for the seer adds, “They have their part in the lake which burneth with fire and brimstone: which is the second death” (Rev. xxi. 8). But those who see the law, and yield themselves willingly to it, not only give life to the world, but find life coming to themselves out of death. This is that long procession of Jephthah’s daughter, and Iphigenia, and Martyr Stephen, and the great Apostle who died daily, and Arnold von Winkelried, and General Gordon; these, with all their kind, who follow the Lamb whithersoever He goeth; for Christ with His cross is at their head.

All the processes of life are intensified and become plainer as they reach the spiritual province, because there they are freed from materialistic limitations and can be seen clear and on a large scale. The law that one strong soul attracts another and moulds it like itself was known long before Newton discovered the law of gravitation. And so when we take our law of vicariousness and come to Christ, we shall expect to see it showing itself in Him on a large scale. And it does; on so large a scale that He has sometimes

seemed to own vicariousness wholly, as if He were the only one whose actions had this subtly involving power. But vicariousness in Him is the same quality as in us, only multiplied by the size of His character. A being such as He must inevitably have all the fortunes of humanity as His—its hopes, its powers, its destiny. These would be His by nature. But men's sins He would feel the burden of through His loving identification of Himself with them. He would take them upon Himself voluntarily, and yet through the compulsion of love. He would suffer for them vicariously. He would so identify Himself with these sinful men and women whom He loved that He would be plunged into all the fortunes which their sins brought. He would be wounded by their transgressions; He would be bruised by their iniquities.

It is difficult for us to conceive suffering on so large a scale as real. Our power of identifying ourselves with others is so rudimentary, so confined to a few persons, that this magnificent range of suffering seems impersonal and therefore unreal. But we have instructive examples which may go far to teach the reality of it. In missionaries, who have felt yearningly the degradation of savage races even before they knew the charm of giving their lives in labor with them; in philanthropists, who have spent their years and their

fortunes in arousing the public conscience to abate some evil they personally were not touched by ; in soldiers, dying in heaps around a blood-stained flag for the abstract idea of country ; in devoted fathers and mothers, who have silently, joyfully laid down bodily comfort and mental cultivation, giving their labors and their hopes and almost their souls, except that they have unconsciously gained them in the process, in order that their children might have some chance in the world which they themselves never had—through such magnifying-glasses as these we can catch a glimpse of a larger passion, and rise from the natural love for special men to an all-embracing but real love for man.

We must keep a close hold on this clue to the mysteries of Christ's Atonement : that it was this mighty love of His which was the necessity compelling Him to His fate. For we often mistake here in interpreting the older theologies. They delight in ascribing everything in the life of Christ directly to the finger of God. "The Father sent the Son into the world." "It pleased the Lord to bruise Him." "The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquity of us all." The old phrases were right. Or rather the thought deep underlying them was right, though it was often held in hard, materialistic, revolting ways, which made God a stern tyrant delighting in pain and blood. But that was the

caricature of the thought. The real thought was true. It was God who ordered it all. But His hand was working, as it does in ordering our course in life, through natural causes. It is God who gives us our daily bread; but it is none the less through our exertions that we get it. So Christ's miracles, His rejection and death, His vicarious sufferings, the salvation of men through Him—these were ordained by God; but they were none the less the natural and inevitable results of the facts in the case—the character of Jesus and of the men among whom He lived.

Here, then, was the primary necessity which compelled Christ to bear the sins of men—His mighty love; which not only was wounded at the sight of their transgressions, but made Him so identify Himself with those loved, sinning men and women that He felt in Himself the pain and shame as well as the outward consequences of their iniquities, and so bore in part the penalty of them. One who did this could be no other than a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief. One who embodied before men the life of the soul, and insisted that they should live up to their spiritual possibilities, could be only despised and rejected of men. It is inevitable that sin must wound its bearer, whether he bears it primarily or vicariously. But is that the end of his suffering? Does it stop there and go no further? Does it bruise the in-

nocent and have no reflex action on the guilty? Is it only the case that Christ was wounded for our transgressions and bruised for our iniquities? No; we may thankfully hear the rest of the prophet's message, its salvation-half: "The chastisement of our peace was upon Him; and with His stripes we are healed."

Men have, as we were saying, interpreted these phrases and others like them in ways which made them unreal and justly repellent. They have made them to mean that the pain resulting as punishment for all the sins of the world was by some outward agency inflicted on Christ, and that men were in consequence considered as free as if they had never sinned. Our consciences have rightly risen up in revolt against such an unjust, impossible transaction. We have said God had no right to inflict on any one pain which did not belong to him; and that agreeing on account of such a proceeding to count another free from his sins could not really make him free. And we were right. Interpreted in that external, legal way, the theory of the Atonement ought to be abhorrent to every just man. But this is, as we said before, a caricature of the reality. That underlying reality is that the voluntary and loving suffering of one for the sins of another is the most powerful factor in working out the salvation of all who come within the range of its mighty influence.

We are so apt to think of the assertions of theology in regard to Christ as having little to do with the course of life with which we are familiar, as arbitrary and unreal, instead of as algebraic formulæ for the explanation of common spiritual facts, that it may be well to point to some familiar instances of unconscious salvation through vicariousness. Sacrifice always carries some of its wealth even to those who do not know of it. There are thousands living in unhampered political freedom in America who never knew the signers of the Declaration of Independence, nor even know that there has been such a Declaration. We have been saved from the evils of political arbitrariness by the merits of our forefathers. We are saved unconsciously from our sins in part by those forces in the community which are filled with the spirit of Christ. For we are judged by others and by ourselves according to standards which are partially Christian standards. There is a certain common average of uprightness demanded of every man by law and custom, and imposed on him by the influence of society exerted through inheritance, acquaintance, public opinion, which tends to repress sins of some kinds and to cultivate some degree of outward and inward righteousness. We are living in a land not only nominally, but to some extent actually, Christian. This is in reality the power of Christ

permeating the community, and by it many a man gains unconsciously some degree of salvation. To use the old theologic phrase, such men are saved by the merits of Christ imputed to them.

If unconscious participation in the Atonement of Christ can bring so large a measure of salvation—and we must recognize that for every one salvation is a matter of degree, approximating the measure of Christ, but perfect in none but Him—there is no limit of attainment for one who brings an intelligent apprehension of the power of Christ and a deep and willing response to it. Consciousness always adds to the child's merely natural motions a stability, a depth, an intensity of purpose, a revelation of width of range, which childish unconsciousness cannot have, which it is the charm of childhood to lack. And so the marriage-vow of the soul, the "I will" which weds it to the service of Christ, is the charter of unlimited wealth through a sure and steadily growing union with Him. The enlistment-oath, "Lo, I come to do Thy will, O God," is met by the divine welcome, "Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom."

It was in accordance with this divine, common law of vicariousness that Christ suffered and bore the sins of the world. It was inevitable that the One who would bring the knowledge of God's forgiveness to sinning men should be plunged by

love into the condition of their sins; inevitable that His loving heart should identify itself with all their fortunes, and so suffer vicariously with and for them; inevitable that He whose spirit was one with His Father's should be bowed under the weight of God's eternal grief at sin. Because He embodied both God's side and man's side, He could reveal God to men and bring men to God.

## MAJOR AND MINOR.

WHY was I so glad, Love, when I woke this morning?  
Earth and heaven were all aglow—all aglow with you!  
In my ears your words were ringing—not a hint of warning—  
Just “I love you!” Oh, those wondrous words—could they  
be true?

Why am I so sad, Dear, now the dusk is growing?  
Not that, false to her, you were falser still to me.  
You are not the you I loved. Would I had died unknowing!  
For love remains, but you and God have both ceased to be.

## CHAPTER IX.

### THE ATONEMENT.

WE started to ask ourselves how we are saved by Christ; and we found that before we could answer that question we must determine what we meant by salvation. We saw that the forces operative for salvation through Christ were not brought into play on this occasion only, but that they were the great common forces of the spiritual universe, at work wherever love dwells, doing whatever uplifting work was ever done in or by any human soul. These dynamic forces Christ utilized, dominating them, amplifying their range, exhibiting them in potent action, multiplying their power by the factor of His own personality. We found that salvation was both a conscious process and an unconscious one, and that the forces at work in it were in the main forgiveness, with its correlative repentance, and vicariousness. And now, with our terms somewhat more clearly settled, we come back to our question, What is the part filled by the life and death of Jesus Christ in the work of men's salvation?

The loudest answer, the one first to make itself heard, is that it was to propitiate God ; that is, to remove His objections and render Him willing to save men. All men had sinned. God, being perfectly holy, is forever angry at sin. Christ pacifies this anger and inclines God to pardon the sinner. Such a theory naturally prevailed in times when the highest type of power was an arbitrary king, responsible to no constitution and guided only by his own whim. But the conception of God as a Father, illuminated by the interpretive experience on the one hand of a human father's wise, tender love, and on the other of the responsibility of the highest official to a body of law behind him—this renders it impossible to think that it was primarily God's attitude toward men in which the change wrought by Christ occurred. There is, indeed, a change in the divine action effected by the process of which the Atonement is a factor ; for God's treatment of a sinner who has repented is different from that of one who has not repented. But this is really not a change in the divine attitude ; it is merely a change in one of the conditions determining the direction of the divine action. The roof which deflects the course of a hailstone does not alter the law of gravitation. So we cannot but regard the attitude of God toward men as having been the same before the life and death of Christ as it has been since. His desire is the

same toward the sinner before repentance as after it; for we must believe that He has been ever eagerly desirous that men should repent, turn from their sins, and be saved; ever more than willing to forgive and save them if they did repent. We cannot think that Christ's life and death made God willing or changed by one thought His attitude toward men, because we must believe that He has been ever willing. We must believe that the effect of the Atonement was upon the other side; that it was not to reconcile God to men, but to reconcile men to God. To think otherwise is derogatory to that element of His eternal and infinite nature which we call His love.

But, it is said, Christ's part was not to make God willing to pardon men, but to make it possible for Him to pardon them. Men had sinned. The eternal justice demanded punishment. God might be inclined to forgive, but in self-consistency could not until the claims of justice were satisfied. Sin deserved an infinite punishment because it was committed against an infinite God. All men, therefore, in strict justice, deserved to be cast into hell forever. But now Christ comes forward and says, "Somebody must bear this punishment. I will." As He is divine and shares the infinite nature, any punishment inflicted on Him will be infinite, and so will be an equivalent for the punishment of the whole race of men. Christ,

then, by the humiliation of His life and death having borne the punishment, the claims of justice are satisfied and it can allow men to go free. And as He has a right to the advantages of the arrangement, He determines whom He will admit to its benefits. He decides to admit all who believe the transaction. Those who believe that it has occurred have part in Christ's Atonement and are therefore saved.

This theory will be recognized as that which is at the basis of many familiar hymns and exhortations and much of the popularly held theology. But it takes for granted many positions which we cannot grant. It assumes that when a law is broken the main requisite for remedy is that a certain amount of pain shall be inflicted. Whether this shall be suffered by the transgressor himself or by some one else is, in this view, immaterial ; the debt of suffering must in some way be paid.\* And so it becomes possible for justice to be satisfied by Christ, the innocent, suffering and paying

\* "In the event of the depletion of the family by loss of blood—the loss of a life—the Goël had a responsibility of securing to the family an equivalent of that loss, by other blood, or by an agreed payment for its value. . . . An accepted payment for blood fully restores the balance between the aggrieved parties and the slayer. . . . All through the East there are regularly fixed tariffs for blood-canceling."—H. C. TRUMBULL, "The Blood Covenant," pp. 260, 262.

"Whosoever shall be slain unjustly, we have given his heir power to demand satisfaction; but let him not exceed the bounds

the debt for the guilty. This, however, can be possible only if God is like a savage monarch, delighting in pain and blood, and insisting on just so much of it as is His due. It assumes, too, that what Christ saves us from is punishment; whereas it is, in reality, as we have seen, not primarily the punishment of sin, but the sin itself, our love of it and its hold upon us, from which we are freed. There is many a man who has learned to thank God for the punishment of his sins, and to pray that though he may miss many blessings, he may never, never lack the great blessing of being duly punished. We heartily thank our Heavenly Father that He loves us too well to save us, as at times we would weakly have Him do, in sin and from punishment, but that His wise and tender love insists on saving us ever from sin, even though in and through punishment.

The objection, then, which the thought of our time feels to this theory of the Atonement may be stated briefly. While it may not have been incon-  
of moderation in putting to death the murderer in too cruel a manner, or by revenging his friend's blood on any other than the person who killed him."

"O true believers, the law of retaliation is ordained you for the slain; the free shall die for the free, and the servant for the servant, and a woman for a woman. But he whom his brother shall forgive may be prosecuted, and obliged to make satisfaction for what is just, and a fine shall be set on him with humanity. This is indulgence from your Lord, and mercy."—The Koran, chaps. xvii., ii.

sistent with an Oriental or medieval conception of God as an arbitrary monarch, it is absolutely incompatible with the thought of Him as embodying the highest ideal of wisdom, guiding care, and love, which is summed up in the word "Father."

How is it, then, that Christ accomplishes salvation for men? If the fact of salvation is ascertainable only after death, certainly it will be difficult to discover its method. But if salvation is deliverance from sin and therefore a present reality, then its method will be observable and verifiable.

It is the latter view that we have been maintaining—that salvation can be had, and therefore can be studied, here and now; and so we turn to the sinner ready to be saved, to one, that is, who has become conscious that he is in the grasp of a mighty power of evil, and ask how it is that he can be rescued from the evil which he feels is surely destroying him.

There are two departments in which, to be complete, the rescue must be operative, the present and the future. "How about God's side of this sin of mine?" the reverent, penitent soul asks. "The sin has built up a barrier between Him and me. Is He willing to have it done away? This past of mine has created a great debt from me to God. Is He willing to give up that claim against me? As long as He holds to this claim I cannot be free."

How many theologies have been constructed to satisfy that cry of the sin-conscious soul! Priesthoods have been denounced because they claimed the power, by one magic or another, to set men free. But it is men who have insisted that priests should assert this power, whether a magical one or not. Christ's answer to this demand is in His revelation of the real attitude of God. By parable and by act He was continually setting before men His characteristic message—that while God was ever stern toward wilful sin or sin-induced blindness, there was neither claim nor barrier which repentance did not at once surmount. The prodigal said, "I will arise, and go to my father;" and while he was yet a great way off, his father saw him, and ran, and fell on his neck, and kissed him. The sinful woman who poured her tears and her hair on Jesus' feet was assured that her sins were forgiven, not because of some arrangement external to herself, but because she had loved much. It was not the case, Christ assured men, that God had a claim against them when penitent which He needed inducing to give up. The divine Shepherd, on the contrary, would eagerly go out after the lost sheep and seek diligently till he found it.

St. Paul, who developed into dogmatic form the germs lying implicit in Christ's teaching, found here the very center of his joyous belief. "The

just shall live by faith." Repentance is the gate of free salvation; there is no barrier beyond—nothing to be torn down which is of God's erecting. God's attitude toward man has been always the same. It is only man's attitude toward God that needs changing.

The guilt of sin, then, the burden of the past, which the penitent sinner feared would still shut him away from God after he had abandoned the sin itself, finds its deliverance with the knowledge gained through Christ that by repentance he has become reconciled to God and is at one with Him. In Christ man sees the true character of God, and half of his at-one-ment is accomplished.

But the guilt of sin may have vanished in the cross of Christ—that is, in Christ's exhibition of sin as seen from God's point of view, and of God seen in His true attitude toward the sinner—and yet its power may remain. Many a drunkard who abhors his evil habit feels in terror that it has still a tyrant's grasp over him. How about the future? Though he has repented and been forgiven, how is he to be saved from losing his at-one-ment with God through a relapse into his former sin?

We sometimes say that love is the result of like. But it is quite as true that like is the result of love. Whatever I love I tend to become like; its nature insinuates itself into mine and moulds it into more or less of its own image. In this lay what

we may call the special characteristic of the method of Jesus. He demanded of His followers an unbounded personal attachment to Himself. "Ye call me Master and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am." "Come unto me, and I will give you rest." Most religious teachers have been anxious to have their followers understand that the allegiance which they claimed was not for themselves, but only for the truth of which they happened to be the representatives. But Jesus made no such distinction. In fact, He expressly repudiated it. "I and the Father are one." "He that hath seen Me hath seen the Father." If this assumption of His was correct, the soul held close to Him would be permanently at one with God, because it would be one with Christ. Loving Christ, it would become like Him. So close would be the union that one who knew it by experience could say imaginatively of the man held in it, "He cannot sin, because he is born of God."

This union with Christ is real, though not yet complete. The at-one-ment is not finished until growth has developed the soul into perfect likeness to Christ. But it is complete in will, in desire, in aim. And God, who ever counts the hunger of the heart to accomplish for the accomplishment itself, imputes this to the longing soul for righteousness, because it is its righteousness.

Union with Christ, then, is the assurance to the

soul which finds itself freed from its burden that it will not be reenslaved, union with Christ and with all that is representative of Him. It is here, however, that the profounder forms of historic religion, by a blind devotion to their special endowment, have sometimes destroyed that power of religion over men which they aimed to conserve. They have insisted that to believe in Christ is eternal life; but they have gone on to maintain that Christ is identical with the historic Jesus of Nazareth. The object of religion, then, comes to be to exalt the historic facts of the life of Jesus, regardless of the spiritual processes in the soul of which they are the type and the interpretive revelation. But this creates a breach between past and present. Religion is made to consist in the knowledge of certain historic events; while the struggling soul, absorbed in its life-and-death conflict, cries out after a living power, present now and moving manifestly as divine on the face of the waters. Many a hungry soul, unable to find life for itself in the tables of events presented to it for belief, or in the dogmatic explanations superimposed upon them, or in their ritual embodiments, has exclaimed, with Mary Magdalene, of the ecclesiastical forms of religion, "They have taken away my Lord, and I know not where they have laid Him."

This presentation by religion of a merely his-

toric God to meet present needs has given rise to two opposite modes of solving the problem. Many reject historic religion, either altogether and in derision, or like some earnest agnostics, regarding it respectfully as a past instance of processes now more valuable in their present stage of development. On the other hand, many endeavor to drag history bodily into the spiritual domain and reinforce its weakness by imagination. In addition to exalting the historic event and persuading myself that belief in its historicity constitutes salvation, I assure myself that in these facts of the life and death of Jesus lies, whether I see it or not, the help of every need; and, this being the case, I endeavor to bring these facts to bear on my present needs by imagining what Jesus would have said or done in my circumstances. These crude efforts of the imagination are necessary if the only way to join Christ to the soul is—to use the Apostle's language—"to bring Christ down from above." But if He has His representatives in the world to-day, and if these are not merely Gnostic emanations of Him, but are actually His spirit, His living presence, then the first century does not hold exclusive possession of Christ. Whatever things are true, honest, lovely, are as really, if not as completely, incarnations of Him, in their degree, as was the form of Jesus of Nazareth nineteen hundred years ago;

and a yielding of one's self loyally and lovingly to them is the modern equivalent of that personal devotion to Jesus which He demanded of His disciples.

It is objected to this worship of the essential or spiritual Christ, as it has been called, that it does away with the need of an historic Christ. "What has the first century to give, if we can find it all in the present? Let every man evolve Christ from his own consciousness." But this overlooks the fact that Jesus of Nazareth will always stand as the first-born of the whole creation; that is, as we said in speaking of the Incarnation, as the completely developed, crowning, indicative instance of processes which are not confined to Him, but are in their degree universal. In order to know the spiritual Christ of to-day I must know the historic Christ of the first century, since the one is the interpretation, the corrective standard, the logical outcome of the other. Reversing St. John's phrase, we may say that he who loveth that which is begotten must love Him that begat. Historical religion was designed to be a readily apprehensible aid to spiritual religion. Through the mistaken zeal of its adherents it has become at times a stumbling-block in the way of the life of the soul. It was the passionately held conviction that the necessary bond of union between the two had been found which made St. John exclaim,

“Who is a liar but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ?”

It is also objected that this union with the spiritual Christ is abstract and impersonal, and therefore cold and deadening, as compared with the warm and loving association with a living person, such as the disciples had with Jesus. It is undoubtedly the case that bodily presence, with its possibilities of sight and touch and hearing, may increase the warmth of a loving devotion and therefore the range of its power. But it is also true that it may limit the range, and diminish the warmth and power. For if it is amplifying, it is also narrowing; if it reveals the charm of nobility of character, of truth and love in themselves—and it is these that are ultimately the foundation of every worthy attachment—it is also apt to limit the recognition of them to the particular person or mode whereby they were first apprehended. It is often necessary that the revealer should be removed in order that the revelation may be perceived. And so, as Jesus said, it was expedient for His disciples that He should go away, for otherwise He could not come to them in a more universal, more permanent, and therefore more comforting form. The ampler form is never merely abstract and impersonal, as Jesus assured His disciples in His own case. Truth is not a lifeless principle, but, as He called it, a spiritual

presence of Himself. Love, as we pointed out, is not merely an avenue of approach to God; it is a part of the divine personality, or, as St. John said, it is God.

A study of young lovers has not, perhaps, been considered essential for an understanding of the doctrine of the Atonement. But as the universe is contained in a grain of sand, so the coming together of the greatest soul in it with any other must follow the laws of attraction which obtain in the simplest case. A trifling quarrel, righteously settled, will furnish the principles of that great reconciliation between man and God which was effected and "writ large" in Christ. Young lovers, or, better still, old wedded lovers, are an admirable field for studying the ways in which a soul grows to be at one with God.

There is another department of human life in which this theory of the Atonement can be tested, and that is childhood. If it is through the Atonement of Christ alone that men are saved, then children, unless they are eternally lost, must also be saved through Christ and His Atonement. If we take the definition of salvation which has been adopted here, that it is always from sin, and therefore recognize that the process of salvation can be verified in case of any given person by referring to his outer and inner life and ascertaining, so far as ascertainment is possible, whether these are becoming

purged from evil, then we can be sure in case of many a child that it is from its birth a saved being, a Christian. The question then comes, How is it saved? How does Christ's Atonement, which we think of as adjusted to a world of men and of wickedness, apply on this diminutive scale and to this lovely young creature? We need not settle the question of natural depravity in order to make a place for our little ones. If Christ took them up in His arms and blessed them, without classifying them theologically, so may we. But still, in the interest of the salvation not so much of our child as of our doctrine, we return to the question, How? Is not the theory we have advanced applicable here in both its departments? Does not the child's freedom from sin past and future, from its guilt and power, come through the channels we have indicated? When the knowledge of his own unstable equilibrium, if we prefer to call it this rather than depravity, is brought home to him by some childish misdeed, and he sees in it a dawning revelation of the sin of the world, is he not saved from sinking by the same gospel of repentance and pardon which on a large scale is named with the name of Christ? Though the child concretely refers being sorry and forgiven to his father as a center, while in case of the world at large we amplify this into universal and abstract form, and clothe it with

language drawn from its loftiest historical instance, yet the one is as truly an example of salvation through the Atonement of Christ as the other; for the attitude of the parent, God's representative, and the process of reconciliation to him, are the same as the attitude of God and the process of at-one-ment revealed in Christ. Is not the child preserved from sin through union with Christ, that is, with what is representative of Christ? Is not the sense of close fellowship with his parents, or those who stand to him as types of the highest, his most precious spiritual possession? Is he not deprived of this by being naughty? Are not these childish terms, "naughty" and "good," real, if inadequate, representatives of the mighty forces of sin and righteousness? Is not his love for his parents thus a personal devotion to Christ, though the word "Christ" is not mentioned in it? Yes, surely; in his obediences and disobediences he accepts or rejects Christ, and if he is saved, it is through the presence in his family, in the community, and therefore ultimately in his soul, of those ideas of sin and God, those customs of wise education and loving forgiveness, those living, partial incarnations of God's character, which have Jesus Christ for their center and highest instance. Those are the merits of Christ embodied in the Christian community, and it is through these

merits that the child finds vicarious salvation. To translate the work of Christ into intelligibility, and incarnate it anew effectively in vivified terms, is that blessed function for parents and teachers, for all Christians, which St. Paul called “filling up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ.”

It is one of the advantages of a recognition of the reign of law in the spiritual world that by the conviction it gives of the universality of law it saves its possessor from the necessity of the explanation of special cases, of positing exceptions. However exceptional a given instance may apparently be, in reality it is only the mode of its connection with the law which is doubtful, not the fact of that connection. So those who hold that the Atonement of Christ is universal in its range, and who explain its method as we have been explaining it, find no difficulty in recognizing its application in case of that vaguely defined class, “the heathen.” We are not obliged to assert one mode of salvation for those who lived before the Christian era and another for those who have lived since; one for those who live in so-called Christian lands and another for those who do not. The conditions of salvation are universal and unvarying. Child or man, ancient or modern, pagan or enlightened, all must pass through the same door in order to enter into the sheepfold. They must be saved, if saved they are, by the Atone-

ment of Christ; for there is none other name given under heaven whereby men can be saved. That salvation will be tested for every one by his attitude toward Christ and His representatives. Of course it will be understood that by the latter are meant not so much those persons who undertake to be His official representatives, as all, whether persons, things, or processes, which represent the spirit, thought, and power of Christ. Any "heathen," therefore, who has some portion of the spirit of Christ for his ideal in character, who in any department of his being is what Christ would be in his circumstances, not merely will be saved, he *is* to that degree and in that department saved. There are, as we have before remarked, many degrees of salvation, complete salvation being found only in one who is in perfect union with God. But the man who lived before the Christian era, or who now lives in a country where the name of Christ is never heard, stands as to the mode of his salvation on precisely the same level with the contemporary of Jesus or the modern church-member. He has, it is true, many disadvantages which the latter has not. There is in his community less traditional righteousness; he has an absence of instinctive example, an absence of that which is in any department representative of Christ; he has a lack of intelligent apprehension of spiritual processes in general and of his

own aims. He lacks, most of all, spiritual steam-power. These disadvantages it should be the aim of Christian missions to overcome. But disadvantages such as these are not confined to certain times or places. God has, to use the Apostle's phrase, "concluded all" under them in varying degrees; so that there is no sharp line of distinction in kind, such as was held to exist in days when a certain outward and visible organization was believed to embrace all Christians, between "heathen" and those who live "under the Christian dispensation." "Does this person," we shall ask of every one, whatever he may be — "does he embody some portion of the spirit of Christ? Then he is so far saved." What his condition will be in the future will be determined by the process of this embodiment, whether it is a growing process or a diminishing one.

We have maintained that the Atonement consisted in making men at one with God; that Christ's method was to reveal to men God's true attitude toward sin, and to bind them in loving union with Him through personal attachment to Himself and all that is representative of Him. Of course it follows from this view that the Atonement does not reside in the death of Christ exclusively. Popular hymns which ascribe atoning efficacy to the blood alone of Jesus are to be understood as speaking a language that is ima-

ginative, not scientific. They are to be accepted, if at all, like other hymns, for their power of inspiring, not for their dogmatic teaching. The death of Christ we certainly cannot regard as the sole point of union between man and God. We must consider it of preëminent value, as being the completion and crown of all that had gone before in the life of Jesus. If it were not for the death, the life would be incomplete. "This man blasphemeth," is the verdict of the blind world upon its Saviour; and the cross is the hideous embodiment of this verdict, an exhibition of what sin is, painted on a background of holiness. Its subjective meaning lies in its being the ultimate expression of that sacrifice which the lips had already presented: "Father, not My will, but Thine, be done." Neither Christ's death apart from His life, nor His life apart from His death, is the center of Christian interest and faith, but that harmonious whole in which the one is the completion of the other.

There is a phrase sometimes used as a reproach to a theological opponent. It is to say of him that he denies the Atonement. It is the same charge that is brought by the partisan upholder of any theologic or political system against all who do not receive his doctrine: they are accused of disbelieving or opposing the fact. But a doctrine and the fact which the doctrine aims to explain

are two different things, and it is entirely possible to hold one without the other. To attribute to a person the rejection of one when in reality it is the other which he rejects, argues either ignorance or dishonesty. There are, it is true, many persons who deny the Atonement; but the rejection of one or another theory of the Atonement does not necessarily involve such denial. For one may be unable to accept any given theory aiming to explain how the life and death of Christ are potent for the salvation of men, because he finds the reality too mighty for the explanation. His refusal will then be not on account of disbelief in the fact, but precisely because of his belief in it. So one may reject the ransom theory of the Atonement, the substitutional theory, the moral theory, because he feels so deeply the power of Christ, and sees His sway extending so broadly over the souls and lives of men, that he finds any one of these theories incompetent to express the glorious reality. This is no denial of the Atonement. The real denial, like all heresy, involves a moral issue. To refuse to believe the account of God which Christ gives; to withhold personal allegiance from Him or His representatives; to allow one's self to harden in culpable ignorance or unrepentance, or to stand aloof in unforgivingness from a penitent brother; to substitute a dead orthodoxy, which would make sins where God has made none, for

a large lovingness which yearningly seeks to loose men from their sins—this is in reality to deny the Atonement of the Lord that bought men, to crucify the Son of God afresh and put Him to open shame. No one who loves Christ and His ideal of God can be a denier of the Atonement; but every one who is unloving is inevitably full of such denial, because he knows not love.

NIHIL HABENS ET OMNIA POSSIDENS.

I GAVE my Love a kerchief blue;  
It was the first thing e'er I gave her.  
She looked adown; her thanks were few.  
Was it her coldness, or her favor?

I gave my Love a diamond bright,  
In which lay depth and passion meeting.  
She gave me kisses as of right,  
While Life's awed pulses held their beating.

I gave my Love a plain gold ring,  
The joyous goal of long endeavor.  
She gave me—gave it glorying—  
To love and live with her forever.

And now what have I left to give?  
I stand, my poverty confessing.  
She has my all. And yet I live  
More than a world of wealth possessing !

## CHAPTER X.

### THE CHURCH AS AN EXPRESSION OF ORGANIC LIFE.

WE started with the idea that there are certain conceptions necessary to each individual's understanding of himself ; and we have been asking what these were, and disentangling one after another from the folds of its implications. We found that these inferences were what certain theologic doctrines of all times had been aiming to express, and that they had been expressed in convenient form in the so-called Apostles' and Nicene Creeds. We have attempted no analysis of these Creeds, phrase by phrase. We have found the course of our independent study giving us results which happen to be embodied in these Creeds ; and, on the other hand, we have pointed to the Creeds and said, " These statements can only be justified by such study as we have been undertaking." We have shown that the idea of necessary thought presupposes that the universe is an organism ; and that the idea of organic life applied to God discloses in Him a triune nature, and makes

necessary the creation of the world and a historic Incarnation. As applied to the relation of man to God it reveals repentance, forgiveness, vicariousness, atonement, and salvation. But now another question arises before us: How does the organic nature of spiritual life express itself in the external relations of men to one another?

To this we may answer briefly that those who are joined to God will thereby be joined to one another also; and since every spiritual reality must ultimately embody itself in material form, this will necessitate an outward organization. We find that men in all countries and all times have believed that such an organization existed—a body called, by its most generic name, the Church.

Instead of pursuing the method we have adopted hitherto—the method of considering what results would follow from the law of implied existence, and then looking around to see whether we can find instances of them—we will adopt here a new method. We will take several of the Protestant religious bodies and examine them as to their recognition of the organic principle.

Among the various religious bodies in America to-day there is one which seems to me to express especially the organic elements of spiritual life in combination with its individual elements. Such a combination will naturally attract us in our study of life as organism. I shall proceed, then, to

point out how, as it seems to me, in this body, the Protestant Episcopal Church, organic elements and individual elements are combined. I must disclaim the desire to identify the Church with the Protestant Episcopal Church. I do, indeed, hold the latter to be in many respects a worthy representative of the body of Christ, the Holy Catholic Church, which is, as the Episcopal Church herself defines it, "the blessed company of all faithful people." But just because the Church is holy and catholic—that is, is characterized by certain qualities which are independent of time and place—no one religious body can claim to be the exclusive representative of it. Where those qualities are there is the Church. "*Ubi Christus, ibi Ecclesia.*" I desire, however, to show how the Protestant Episcopal Church is, as it seems to me, based preëminently on the view that the relation of men to God is an organic one; and therefore in this chapter we will make a study of this church and the principles for which it stands.

During the last twenty years the Episcopal Church in the United States has received more accessions from other Christian bodies than in all the rest of her existence. No doubt the same may be said to some extent of every other church. The general movement of religious belief, call it upheaval or call it quickening, which has characterized the last half-century, has resulted in

ecclesiastical transfers of all kinds. But it is believed by members of the Episcopal Church that their gains of this sort have been not only greater than their losses, but greater in proportion than those of other churches. Whether this is the case or not, it is certainly true that this church has recently been making great strides in New England, that part of the United States which, until within the last twenty-five years, was, through its historic traditions, more bitterly opposed to the Episcopal Church than any other part of the country. The wave of Episcopacy has succeeded to the wave of Unitarianism. Small country towns which half a century ago had a Unitarian church as the church of the fashionable, while the "Orthodox" church raised the wooden steeple of its small meeting-house and proudly and bitterly exclaimed, "I, even I only, am left, and they seek my life, to take it away;" towns which knew hardly more of Episcopacy than that it had "forms" in its worship, and that its piety was suspected of being lacking in "experience"—in many of these towns there is now a stone house of worship belonging to the Episcopal Church, which is growing at the expense of its ecclesiastical neighbors, and yet is regarded with kindly feelings by them. The course of events has been making the barren woman to keep house and to be a joyful mother of children.

But a still more noteworthy fact is the change in the other churches in the direction of Episcopacy. New England Congregationalism is to-day feeling so strongly the influence of the principles for which the Episcopal Church stands that many of the Congregational churches are openly adopting one and another feature of organization, ritual, and belief which were formerly supposed to be the peculiar property of the Episcopal Church. And this marks a very great change. New England Puritanism had the conviction that being in the kingdom of heaven was synonymous with hating its ecclesiastical mother; and the consequence was that in New England the Episcopal Church was more cordially disliked than any other of the Protestant religious bodies. Indeed, there was a certain contempt felt for its members which was not felt in case even of the arch-enemy, the Church of Rome; for Episcopalians were presumably papists at heart, and yet had not the courage to come out and show their colors. Now, however, the two results mentioned are taking place: the Congregational Church is feeling the Episcopal Church to be its closest spiritual neighbor, and is becoming permeated by its tone and ritual. And while this is preëminently true of New England, what has taken place there is going on in less degree in other parts of the country also.

There is much in the conditions of the time to

account for this change. The breaking down of localism which followed the war has contributed to it. Before the war certain types of religion prevailed in certain localities because they had always prevailed there. With the growth of a larger national life the different types of religion were brought face to face, and compelled to see one another's excellences and defects, not as they had been traditionally reported, but as in fact they were. Together with this rise in national feeling came a decline in individualism. The meaning of federation was just being realized—that the individual was no solitary unit, but was a part of a larger whole. And this gave birth to the perception of organic relations between the whole and its parts. The political doctrine of protection, it has been felt, must be defended, if at all, on account of its benefits not to one State, but to the country; some have even said, to the world. There has been in the business community an unparalleled increase in the number of trades-unions, trusts, and syndicates of all kinds. Musical interest has centered about Wagner, a composer whose aim has been to show all sides of life as having each its contribution to make to a manifold organic harmony. The most popular poet has been Browning, a poet who has been engaged almost wholly with the subtle elements of human life and the inevitable mingling in it of defect and

excellence. The increase of wealth in this country has brought leisure to consider the complexities of society, the specialization of its class distinctions, the refinement of its manners, the logical developments of its thought—all those departments which were inevitably slighted when the energies of every one were absorbed in merely making a living. There has never been a time in the history of the world when the kinship of all men was so fully recognized as it has been in the century just closing, that century with the French Revolution at its beginning and "Looking Backward" at its end. The word "solidarity," whose meaning in the early part of the century was hardly known, has now become the unconscious premiss of popular feeling and legislation. And although we may still selfishly refuse to meet our brother's needs, we have come to recognize that any one having needs is our brother.

Every branch of the Church universal stands preëminently for some particular aspect of truth. It is, I believe, the view heretofore mentioned—that the relation of man to the universe is an organic one—for which, on its religious side, the Episcopal Church, preëminently among Protestant churches, stands. Rating the chief Protestant bodies with reference to this principle, we may say that at the opposite end of the scale is the Baptist. This Church stands for complete indi-

vidualism. Each person must himself determine his relations to God. Unconscious relations are of no moral value ; and children, therefore, cannot be members of the church until they of themselves enter into conscious connection with it. Next to this comes what may be called middle Congregationalism, meaning by that the Congregationalism which prevailed in New England for a century and a quarter from the Great Awakening in 1735. During this period New England Congregationalism is almost wholly individualistic, differing in this respect both from that of the last quarter-century and from that of the seventeenth century. The Cambridge Platform, whose Confession of Faith was adopted in 1680, recognized children as having the same spiritual status as their parents.\* But this recognition of the organic relation of the individual to the kingdom of heaven was superseded after the Great Awakening by the demand for a conscious change as a test of regeneration. Methodism and Presbyterianism have in their fuller church-organization a somewhat greater acknowledgment of the organic connection of

\* “ The whole body of men throughout the world, professing the faith of the gospel and obedience unto God by Christ according unto it, not destroying their own profession by any errors everting the foundation, or unholiness of conversation, they and their children with them are and may be called the visible catholic church of Christ.”—Cambridge Platform, Confession of Faith, chap. xxvi., II.

men with the kingdom of God. But they have failed to be catholic because they have not seen man to be the child of God by virtue of His humanity. They consequently have not recognized the Church as coextensive with the race, but have regarded it as composed of a few selected through their own choice or by divine election. Methodism, through its hierarchy of class-leaders, ministers, presiding elders, and bishops, has welded itself into a closely knit organization; but the organic relations it recognizes are those of partizans to their party rather than of spiritual parts to a universal whole. Presbyterianism has seen very clearly the vital connection of man with man on the side of evil. In holding to the depravity of all men through the sin of Adam it has preserved some idea of the corporate unity of the race. But it has failed to work this out on the side of righteousness; and those who are saved are therefore, on its theory, being drawn out of organic relations rather than into them.

Now the Episcopal Church stands preëminently for the recognition of the organic relation of men to the kingdom of God. It is this thought which is at the basis of that church's views of theology, history, and worship, and which gives rise, in these departments, to her main characteristics. These characteristics are three: her view of the method of entering the kingdom of heaven, her

view of religion as necessarily historic, and her liturgical service. Almost all the modifications which have taken place in other Protestant bodies in the last quarter-century—and this has been the time when they have been most profoundly modified—have been in the direction of the organic idea, and therefore in the direction of one or all of these characteristics of the Episcopal Church. Presbyterianism, Congregationalism, the Baptist polity, Quakerism, all had their origin at a time when the world was still aglow with its discovery of the dignity and worth of the individual, and they are all based more or less on individualism. But in the course of a couple of centuries weaknesses have appeared in them, which are being discovered to arise from their neglect of that other focus of the orbit in which human life revolves, the principle of organism. This becomes plain if we take each of these characteristic positions of the Episcopal Church, and see how in every case the modifications of the other churches have been in its direction.

The Episcopal Church has always refused to identify entrance into the kingdom of heaven with consciousness of entrance. The latter she regards as but one element of the former; an important element, indeed, an element necessary to a mature and powerful Christian life, but by no means essential to a spiritual life that is real and efficacious.

In answer to John Wesley's affirmation that a man cannot have the Spirit of God in him without knowing it, she takes a little child and sets him in the midst; and she bids take notice that Christ said not, " Except your children be converted, and become as you," but, " Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven." To Presbyterianism's solemn enunciation of the organic relationship of mankind on the side of evil—" In Adam all die"—the Episcopal Church joyfully adds the reminder, " Even *so* in Christ shall all be made alive." And the emphasis which she lays on this "*so*," pointing to a connection in the nature of things, she puts also into the two rites, baptism and confirmation, with which she symbolizes entrance into the kingdom of God. Baptism, she holds, is to be administered to every child by virtue of his humanity. For there is in that very fact a kinship to God, which makes the child not merely capable at some future time of eternal life, but in some degree an actual possessor of life eternal. What is needed to develop this into eternal life in its completeness is education and choice. And so she requires sponsors at baptism to undertake that the child shall learn all things " which a Christian ought to know and believe to his soul's health," and shall be " virtuously brought up to lead a godly and a

Christian life." But what is it which circumstance always needs before it can become fully incorporated into character? It is choice. Or, to put the question in different form, What is it which the unconscious choice, begotten by inheritance and education, needs before it can become that determined purpose necessary for manly and complete Christian character? It is consciousness. And so the Episcopal Church asks each of her baptized members, when he comes to years of discretion, whether he himself deliberately ratifies by his own choice what was promised for him by his sponsors in baptism. If he does, he then becomes a confirmed Christian, since to the organic processes which bind him to the kingdom of God he has added his conscious acceptance of that kingdom. And herein, in recognizing the element of mature choice, the Episcopal Church differs from the Church of Rome; for in the Romish Church, though confirmation exists, it is administered at so early an age as to preclude the exercise of mature intelligence. And, on the other hand, the Episcopal Church differs from other Protestant bodies in recognizing the organic element, in holding education to be as truly an entrance into the kingdom of God as conversion, and, indeed, the only normal entrance.

During the last few years an impetus has been given to theological thought and spiritual life by

an increased appreciation of the doctrine of the divine immanence. Modern philosophy has been gradually rising to its culmination in the substitution of a complex and qualitative Infinite, necessarily implying and implied in the finite, for the former simple Infinite, conceived as quantitative and therefore the opposite of the finite. But this qualitative Infinite, with its necessary corollary of the immanence of God in every portion of the universe, involves also, as we have been asserting, the conclusion that the relation of man to the universe is organic; he cannot understand himself completely without reference to men in general and to God; and, on the other hand, in the divine nature is an eternal need of self-expression, resulting in that revelation which begins with the lowest inanimate atom and culminates in the Son of God. Now it is this thought of the organic relation of the finite and Infinite which underlies the view held by the Episcopal Church of entrance into the kingdom of heaven. If man's relation to God is an organic one, his choice will be but one element in the establishment of that relation; an element essential, indeed, to maturity and power, but now seen to be supplementary to birth and education. The ideas of the immanence of God and the solidarity of man, and the practices of infant baptism and confirmation, are all harmonious with an institution which recognizes the world

at large as in some true sense already God's, and does not confine this kinship to a select body taken out of the world.

There can be little doubt that in the last quarter-century Baptists and Methodists, Congregationalists and Presbyterians, have been unconsciously modifying their doctrine of conversion. While there are still some in each of these denominations who hold that conversion must necessarily be instantaneous and conscious, and that there can be no salvation without such conversion, yet there are now many who recognize entrance into the kingdom of heaven as gradual and unconscious; who regard the individual's "I will" as the filing of his claim rather than his beginning of residence. It is a proof of change that many among the older persons in these denominations lament the absence of what they regard as genuine conversions, and think that religion is falling into decay because the established sequence of emotions which was formerly considered indispensable—anxiety, grief, despair, sudden joy, peace—is now not so common. Various expedients are resorted to to explain this phenomenon. A man whose piety is indubitable, but who can recall no "experience," is supposed to have been converted in childhood. Horace Bushnell's "Christian Nurture" did much to call attention to the organic connection of the child with its Heavenly Father

through its earthly parents; and, partly in consequence of this book, the "children of the church" are not now required nor expected to pass through the same experiences as are looked for from those who have not had Christian training. There are probably few who would follow unflinchingly the logic of seventy years ago, and maintain that the child of pious parents, brought up with a Christian education, upright of life and of lofty aims, was lost unless he should experience what is called "a change of heart."\* The modern Presbyterian is coming back to the position of that Presbyterian saint, Richard Baxter. This pious man was greatly troubled concerning himself, at one time, because he could recollect no point at which a gracious change took place in

\* "I believe the Holy Spirit is striving with him [another son, William], and that he has some conviction of sin; but he fears, as I do, that it may pass off without a saving change, which may God avert by the merciful interposition of His saving grace. One child out of danger would give me joy to which I am yet a stranger, and relieve the sickness of heart occasioned by hope deferred. . . . My dear son, is not the present your time? I cannot endure the thought that amid such excitements to seriousness you should continue unawakened and unconverted to God. Should the revival prevail in college, your obligations to piety and the aggravations of unbelief would be greatly enhanced. My heart is pained, is terrified, at the thought that you should be left. . . . Most earnestly do I pray that I may never have the trial of weeping over you, on a dying-bed, without hope."—"Correspondence of Rev. Lyman Beecher, D.D.;" letters to his son Edward, June 22, August 25, 1820.

him. But he discovered at length, he says, that "education is as properly a means of grace as preaching."

This view of a connection in the nature of the case between man and God justifies and necessitates the emphasis which the Episcopal Church lays on the historic side of ecclesiasticism and religion. It is not so much that the present is bound by the past as bound to it; not so much fulfilling a duty imposed by it as that without the past the present is unintelligible to itself and incomplete. Its development must take place along the lines of former development, because, the Church believes, these were, abstractly considered, the right ones. Truth is not settled by majorities; it is not invented. It is an absolute reality to be discovered; and having been once discovered or revealed, its existence conditions the future. And if this is the case with the facts of doctrine, it is also the case with the facts of outward organization. There are certain general principles in regard to church-organization which have been certified as true, whether by the manner of their origin or by their efficiency, and no ecclesiastical organization can be in a state of health which does not embody them. Among these are the impossibility of independent existence for any congregation, and its essential connection with others of its time and of all times; the recognition

of infants as members of the church equally with adults; the specialization of the different departments of ministerial work, each requiring specialists for its maintenance; the necessity that any one, in order to become a minister of any grade, should be examined and should receive outward authorization from persons appointed for that purpose, and that no one should minister without such authorization; the congregation's active participation in worship, together with that of the minister in his institutional and also in his private capacity. These are all developments of the thought that man's relations are inherent and organic, whether those relations are to other men, to the kingdom of heaven, to the Church, or to public worship. Spiritual life is not self-evolved, but is always communicated from one to another by the touch of a living personality. And as a symbol of this conception of the Church as a receptive and creative organism, in order to typify the reception and transmission of her inward and outward life, the Episcopal Church uses in confirmation and ordination the rite of the laying on of hands, or, as she calls the doctrine expressed in the symbol, the Apostolical Succession.

Compare this with the ecclesiastical bases of the other Protestant bodies. Take, for example, the polity of Congregationalism, and see how all its changes from its position of two centuries ago

have been in the organic direction. In the early Congregational churches in New England a minister was regarded as such only while in official relations with the congregation to which he belonged. Apart from them his ministerial character ceased, so that the minister of one parish or town could not rightly perform official functions in any other.\* But to-day a Congregational minister of Boston, in regular standing, is recognized no less truly as a minister in San Francisco; and this is because the former unit of Congregationalism, the local church, has been found to be too narrow, and the real unit to be coextensive with Congregationalism throughout the world. Again, in the seventeenth century the independence of the local church was carefully guarded against the encroachments of councils, the decisions of a council being simply advice, which each church was free to accept or reject, and no penalty could follow the rejection.† But to-day every Congre-

\* “ Church officers are officers to one church, even that particular church over which the Holy Ghost hath made them overseers. . . . He that is clearly loosed from his office relations unto that church whereof he was a minister cannot be looked at as an officer, nor perform any act of office, in any other church, unless he be again orderly called unto office; which, when it shall be, we know nothing to hinder but imposition of hands also in his ordination ought to be used toward him again.”—Cambridge Platform, chap. ix., 6, 7.

† “ Councils are to give light, not by imperious binding of the church to rest in their dictates, but by propounding their grounds

gational church, in order not to hold an independent position, but to be included in the statistical reports of the denomination, must belong to some Association. The County Association finds its larger unit in the State Association. The State Associations in turn federate in a National Council, whose decisions in doctrine and discipline are enforced by public opinion, if not by provisions of ecclesiastical law. The International Council, not long ago held in London, has completed the logical expression of this federative tendency.

The prophet of the organic idea is history. The necessity of the historic element in religion is involved in the views of those even who count the spiritual processes now at work in the soul of man as the only sufficient evidence of the dealings of God with humanity. Granting that this is the case, yet God has manifested Himself in these processes not only in your soul and in mine, but in the souls of others heretofore. It is not likely

from the Scriptures. The sentence of a council is of itself only advice, not of itself authority nor necessity."—RICHARD MATHER,  
"Church Government," pp. 62, 66.

"Churches reserve to themselves to refuse or accept the advice of council. The decision of council is of no force till received and ratified by the inviting church, nor does it render that church obnoxious to community if she recedes from advice of council. No church is hereticated for not receiving the result of synod."—EZRA STILES, "Convention Sermon," pp. 46, 62.

Cf. both the above, as quoted in Cummings's "Dictionary of Congregational Usages and Principles," art. "Councils."

that the highest revelation has been made to you or me, and the complete revelation certainly has not. I must know, then, what has been revealed to others in order to know my own revelation. Now for history the Nonconformist bodies which arose in England in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries cared but little. They had been fed upon it too long. To carry history in their exodus with them was a task for which they had no desire, but which they regarded as a foolish and frivolous attempt to borrow from the Egyptians jewels of silver and jewels of gold. They preferred to go out into the wilderness with nothing but dough and kneading-troughs.\* But by

\* “If any man will contend that ceremonies be lawful under the gospel, he may be answered otherwhere. This, doubtless, that they ought to be many and costly, no true Protestant will affirm. Now I appeal to all wise men, what an excessive waste of treasure hath been within these few years in this land, not in the expedient, but in the idolatrous erection of temples beautified exquisitely to outvie the papists, the costly and dear-bought scandals of images, pictures, rich copes, gorgeous altar-cloths. . . . Most certain it is that ever since their coming to the see of Canterbury, for near twelve hundred years, to speak of them in general, they have been in England to our souls a sad and doleful succession of illiterate and blind guides; to our purses and goods a wasteful band of robbers, a perpetual havoc and rapine; to our state a continual hydra of mischief and molestation, a forge of discord and rebellion: this is the trophy of their antiquity and boasted succession through so many ages.”—JOHN MILTON, “Of Reformation in England,” Prose Works, Amer. ed., 1845, Book II., p. 29.

degrees they began to discover the value of a pedigree, and there grew up in them all a High-church party, which asserted its special polity and form of worship to be identical with those of the church of the Book of Acts.

This claim of every denomination, that its polity represents that of the early Church, is a testimony to its sense of the importance of the historic element. The claim in most cases appeared in the original founders in germ only, but in time developed into the direct assertion that the particular polity in question was framed complete by Christ Himself and committed to the apostles, to be handed on through the Church in all ages, unchanged and unchangeable. Each of these claims, if good, of course disproves the others.\*

\* "The parts of church government are all of them exactly described in the Word of God, being parts or means of instituted worship, according to the Second Commandment, and therefore to continue one and the same unto the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ. So that it is not left in the power of men, officers, churches, or any state in the world, to add to, diminish, or alter anything in the least measure thereof."—Cambridge Platform (Cong.), chap. i., 3.

"It is a well-established fact that in every period of their history the people of Israel were accustomed to a government, in the state and in the church, of presbyters, elders. They might therefore very properly, so far as their form of government was concerned, it is claimed, be denominated Presbyterians. Our Lord and His disciples were all of them Israelites. No other than this Presbyterian form of government was known to them. Consequently they must be regarded, it is claimed, as having per-

It is one of the advantages of the Episcopal Church that no party in it can claim exclusive possession; that each has as much legal right to an existence in it as any other. And perhaps it is for this reason that the various sides of human thought have embodied themselves somewhat

sonally sanctioned this system of order. It had previously been sanctioned by prophets, priests, and kings, through every period of the singular history of the Hebrew people; so that if any form of church government can be claimed as of divine right, Presbyterianism may claim it as its own. . . . Such are the grounds in general, with some possible variations, on which Presbyterianism claims to be both primitive and apostolical, as conforming more closely to the New Testament pattern than any other form of church order."—REV. EDWIN F. HATFIELD, D.D.

"George Fox and his followers announced as their aim the revival of primitive Christianity; and this phrase still remains as the best definition of their work."—THOMAS CHASE, president of Haverford College.

"The essential distinction between the belief of Baptists and other bodies of Christians is found in their view of the constitution of the visible church. Holding the supreme authority of the Holy Scriptures, and the doctrines of God's choice of His people, of regeneration as the sovereign work of the Holy Spirit, and of justification by faith alone, they believe that the churches mentioned in the New Testament were formed in closest accord with these doctrines; they believe the New Testament gives us examples of, and commands us to receive as candidates for membership in the churches only those who give credible evidence of their faith in Jesus as their Saviour. They believe immersion in water is the baptism enjoined in the New Testament."—REV. HOWARD OSGOOD, D.D., LL.D.

The last three quotations are from official statements in the "Schaff-Herzog Encyclopedia," arts. "Presbyterianism," "Friends," "Baptists."

more plainly in it than in the other churches. There are High-churchmen and Low-churchmen, Broad-churchmen and Ritualists, among Presbyterians, Congregationalists, Unitarians, Methodists, Baptists, and, indeed, in every church that ever had four or more adherents; for these parties are the embodiments of the legal, the emotional, the philosophic, and the esthetic tendencies of the human mind. They can, however, be more plainly seen, and therefore more clearly studied, in the Episcopal Church than elsewhere. Examining them, and ascertaining what they stand for in that church to-day, we can see the better what these tendencies are as they appear in the religious world at large.

The first thing that strikes us as we study High-churchism is that while every other party is identified with some particular views in theology, the High Church has no special theological system as its distinguishing characteristic. This in itself is one of its distinguishing marks. It is an ecclesiastical tone rather than a theology. The fundamental position of High-churchism is that the faith—by which it understands a body of truths—was once, and once for all, delivered to the saints. A revelation was made, and then at a certain time closed. The function of all subsequent ages, therefore, is not to add to it, for this is impossible, but to hand it on unchanged, ex-

cept so far as formal change is necessary in applying it to new conditions. The agent to whom this trust was committed is the Church. Her attitude toward the body of revelation is that of the lawyer to his *corpus juris*. The body is believed to contain all necessary directions for all possible cases; it needs only to be interpreted and applied. The voice of the Church, therefore, in interpretation and application is the final authority in all matters as to which it is uttered. It follows that the tendency of the High Church is to conservatism. Criticism of her premisses she must be hostile to; the virtue she most inculcates is obedience; individualism is in her view essentially evil; man's proper attitude to God consists not so much in apprehension as in reverent adoration; and of this public worship is the highest institutional expression. High-churchism has taught the world the value of the organic sides of life, of organic unity. Behind the emphasis which she lays on institutionalism lies a precious conviction of the solidarity of all believers, of all humanity. Behind her arrogant assertion of her own authority lies her unwavering belief in an absolute standard, in presence of which private judgment is valueless and individual opinions are wicked. Law, authority, obedience, order, decorum, reverence, the voice of the Church—these are her watchwords.

High-churchism prevails, as we were saying, in every church, though the contents of the body of revelation and the point at which the revelation is supposed to have closed vary in each. The same arguments by which the Romanist establishes the infallibly authoritative position of the General Councils and the pope are used, *mutatis mutandis*, by the High-church Presbyterian in regard to his interpretation of the Bible and the Westminster Confession; by the Episcopalian, of an undefined "voice of the Church"; by the Lutheran, of Luther and the Augsburg Confession; by the Methodist, of John Wesley; by the Quaker, of George Fox; by the Swedenborgian, of Swedenborg.

Turning to the Low-church party, we find that, unlike the High Church, it has identified itself with a special system of theology. Low-churchism has for its theological name Evangelicalism, and the doctrines which constitute its center are the infallibility of the Bible, original sin, the vicarious Atonement, and the everlasting punishment of the unconverted. Its interpretation of original sin is colored not so much by the thought of the hereditary transmission of character as by a supposed act of Adam in the Garden of Eden; and it has viewed the Atonement of Christ rather as the arbitrary substitution of an innocent victim for many guilty ones than as the crowning in-

stance of the great and universal law of vicariousness. Wherever this system has been held, it has been accompanied by an overpowering sense of the value of the human soul. The Low-church party has done this great service to the Church at large, that it has maintained the opposite point of view to that of the High Church, the counterpart necessary to completeness of apprehension of Christian truth—the assertion of the value of individualism. That each man stands naked and alone before God; that he has access directly to Him; that nothing must be permitted to come between God and himself; that all things in the world are trivial in importance compared with the saving of the soul—these are the great forces which have given Evangelicalism its power. And its adherents have not been slow in following joyfully the leadings of their logic. If every man had a soul, and all souls were of equal value, if everlasting misery awaited all who did not accept Christ before death, then how could any Christian rest quietly and think of the millions of human beings who have never heard of Jesus? These must be saved from the awful future which awaited them. And so Evangelicalism has everywhere been zealous for missions; and almost all the forms of missionary effort which originated more than forty years ago were born or ardently fostered under the influence of Evangelical the-

ology. The Low-churchman's theory of conversion, and his conviction of the immediate presence of God as his possible privilege, have combined with his belief in the lawful use of the emotions in religion, and have led him into the wildest vagaries of sensationalism and the loftiest consecrated enthusiasm. With the publication of Darwin's "Origin of Species" in 1859, and the rise of the modern scientific spirit, bringing in its train Biblical criticism and the comparative study of religions, the modified Calvinism which formed the basis of Evangelicalism has been still further modified, and the Low Church as a party in the Episcopal Church in America has declined in prominence. Devotion to the Bible, to conscience, narrowness through the lack of a critical instinct, zeal, a missionary spirit—these are the special characteristics of the Low-church party.

Another party has been called the Broad Church. While High-churchism is, as we have pointed out, rather an ecclesiastical polity than a theology, Broad-churchism is rather a theology than a theory of ecclesiasticism. By many, it is true, it is conceived to have no theology properly speaking, but to consist rather in a tone of mind, an intellectual attitude. But every intellectual attitude entails results. And in case of Broad-churchism, where these results have remained unsystematized, it has been because the Broad-

churchman cares little for system or party. In his eagerness for what seems to him the soul of thought and of religion, he has often undervalued their embodiment. The Broad Church has been identified with latitudinarianism, the lack of all positive or systematic belief. But so far from being a mere negation, it has in reality clearer dogmatic bases than any other party, with the possible exception of the Low Church. It starts from a different basis from that of any other party. High-churchism founds all doctrine and ecclesiastical practice upon the voice of the Church; Low-churchism upon its interpretation of the Bible. But Broad-churchism takes as its foundation the truth inherent in the nature of things. Truth is true not because it is in the Bible, but it is in the Bible because it is true. The voice of the Church is not so much the ultimate guaranty of the religious consciousness of men as the standard expression of that religious consciousness. The laws of God depend not so directly upon His will as upon His character. To conform ourselves, therefore, to that character is the great object of life; growth in character is man's chief aim.

There is another difference between the Broad Church and the other two parties mentioned. While High-churchism hears the voice of God

speaking directly through the Church only, and Low-churchism through the Bible, Broad-churchism hears it speaking also, and with equal authority, through the pages of nature and history. The laws of nature are God's thoughts. Man is made in His image; or, in other words, God has revealed Himself most plainly in the constitution of the human mind and spirit. The study of the world, the history of the human race, are therefore to the Broad-churchman full of value as furnishing a direct revelation of the divine nature and will. Science is with him not an opponent of religion, but an aid to it, even a department of it. Literature and art, society and politics, action and thought, are all claimed not merely as departments of life which a Christian man may be permitted to enter, but as belonging to God and containing each a voice of divine revelation. Broad-churchism finds its interest and its theological system in unfolding these inherently necessary data, given, it believes, in the constitution of man and the nature of things, which cannot be conceived as other than they are if one would understand completely the world or himself. Its fundamental position is that all the truths of religion are based on the nature of thought itself, and that all theologic doctrines and ecclesiastical customs which are not so based, however they

may concern the completeness of belief and the well-being of the Church, do not affect religion or the Church vitally.

There is a party that is often confused with the High Church, which yet is really distinct from it, and that is the Ritualist party. The Ritualist is always a High-churchman, but the High-churchman is not always a Ritualist. Ritualism starts from the necessity underlying all kinds of religion, even the barest Presbyterianism or Quakerism, of having forms of worship which shall express the doctrines it is aimed to teach and shall enkindle religious feeling. It agrees with High-churchism in its view of revelation and the weight to be attached to the voice of the Church; but it differs from it in the place assigned in its theological system to its interpretation of the sacraments. The central thought of Ritualism is the communication by God to man of a special power called "grace." This comes through the two sacraments, baptism and the Holy Communion. All persons lacking the grace which comes through baptism are non-Christians; are, says the Ritualist who is logical, lost. Grace can come in the Holy Communion only through properly consecrated elements; and these can be consecrated properly only by a special body of men, who have received their power from bishops, who themselves received it ultimately at the end of a long line from the

apostles and Christ. Most Ritualists claim that the doctrine of the Real Presence which they hold is different from the transubstantiation of the Church of Rome, though to many persons the two seem indistinguishable. All Ritualists, however, agree in regarding the grace which comes through baptism and the Holy Communion as essential to the life of the soul. To be deprived of this is the greatest possible loss. To partake of this grace frequently in the Holy Communion is of itself a food to the soul.

The difference between this view and that of the moderate High-churchman is a wide one. The Ritualist holds that God has put His grace into certain sacraments, so that the grace and the sacrament are inseparable. The other holds that the sacraments are means by which men are drawn near to God, so that they may receive this grace directly from His divine self. Dorner has well expressed this Ritualistic view in the case of the priesthood : "The hierarchy did not so much consider itself to possess theurgic power over Christ, but rather, in a consonance with its disparagement of the personality, as possessed of power over grace ; that is, over the divine redemptive virtues, over the treasure which is placed to the disposition of the Church as the spiritual kingdom of Christ. The Church and its ministers were not looked upon as the instruments by which the living and ever-

present Christ accomplishes His work in the world—that work which He has reserved in His own hands; but Christ, when He had founded the institution which is His kingdom, retired, as it were, after a Deistic fashion, into the background, and to the foreground advanced the present authorities, who represent Him in His absence. These representatives were intrusted with such full powers that there scarcely remained any reason for longing after the second coming of Christ and His personal resumption of the reins of government.” \*

This doctrine of the Eucharist, with its attendant theory of the priesthood, is, from the Ritualist’s point of view, the center of the Christian faith. It is to be not so much taught as impressed upon the popular mind through sight and hearing. And hence an elaborate and ornate ritual is established. But the Ritualist party has in the main avoided the mistake of the High Church, that of regarding the performance of the service as an end in itself. At its rise in 1833 Ritualism claimed to be simply a return to the doctrines and practices of the primitive Church. It was thus in aim, if not retrogressive, at least conservative. But curiously enough, Ritualism has been more flexible, more innovating, than any other branch of the

\* Dorner, “Person of Christ,” div. ii., vol. i., p. 271 (Eng. trans.).

Episcopal Church. It has not only introduced color and harmony and variety of all sorts into public worship, but it has determined that that very church custom and order for which it seemed to be making a claim, should not stand in its way in getting at men ; and it has consequently adopted any and every means—processions and banners, unauthorized hymns and prayer-meetings and revivals—in its efforts to reach those who are outside the Christian fold. It has joined the most zealous Evangelical in his eagerness to save souls, and has sometimes outstripped even him in its missionary work in the dens of our large cities.

Whatever may be thought of the different parties of the Episcopal Church in themselves, it cannot be denied that their existence has tended to preserve in that church a balance among the different elements of ecclesiastical and religious life. No party can claim to be the sole representative of the church ; each must acknowledge that the others have as legitimate a right to existence in it as itself. This has taught toleration, and tended to preserve the proportions of truth. It has secured that manifoldness and complexity of religious life without which an ecclesiastical body must degenerate into a narrow sect.

The aim of every Christian institution in bringing men to salvation is to establish a close connection between its corporate life and the life of Christ.

To attain this aim the various Protestant churches are tending toward that method which has always prevailed in the Roman Catholic and Episcopal Churches. The difficulty is that in the other Protestant bodies the course of the church's life from year to year has no necessary connection with the historic facts of Christianity; whatever connection there is depends upon the individual minister. Now there are two opposite dangers which have ever confronted and will continue to confront Christianity. One is that which makes it consist in the worship of a being who lived and died ages ago, and who stands at the beginning of the Christian centuries, a purely historic figure. This tendency, in the unique position it assigns to Jesus, is commonly supposed to exalt His divinity. And yet it really loses sight of that divinity, since it makes His personality efficient upon the world in no other way than that of an ordinary man—through the movements to which the first century gave rise; through memory of Him, the mover; through affection for Him. His position is that of a magnified and Christianized Roman emperor. Of Christ as the ever-present spiritual and divine element of the world's life this type of thought knows little. Then there is the opposite tendency—that which fixes its gaze on the spiritual element in the world and feels it as the connecting-link between the world's life and God, but which

sees in Jesus only a historic manifestation of that spiritual element. Any vital connection of the soul's life to-day with Him it feels as little as does the preceding tendency.

The orthodox party in the catholic Church has always insisted that the life of the church, that is, the life of the soul, has an essential, a vital connection with the life of Christ. And this has been symbolically expressed in the Christian Year. Certain seasons are appointed for commemorating the main facts in the history of Jesus. The preparation of the world for His coming begins the year with the season of Advent. Then Christmas follows, and the manifestation of Christ to the Gentile Magi, or the Epiphany. Then after an interval comes Lent, the commemoration of His forty days' temptation, ending with His victory; and as His suffering and victory then were but a part of His final sufferings and victory, this is made the occasion for bringing to mind His trial, death, burial, and resurrection; and Lent closes with Passion Week, Good Friday, and Easter. After forty days more comes the Ascension, and the first part of the Christian Year closes with Whitsunday, the birthday of the Church, and Trinity Sunday, the foundation-stone of its doctrine. As this half of the Christian Year is devoted to historic religion, the second half, in the stress it lays on various Christian duties and

attainments, emphasizes religion's ethical and spiritual sides.

It has been found that in churches which do not observe the Christian Year proportion among the various elements which compose the life of the soul is apt to be neglected. Doctrine obtains an undue prominence, or philanthropy, or organization, or the worship of the past. But the Christian Year secures an annual presentation of the various sides of Christianity, and binds the spiritual life of to-day to the life of Jesus. Of course it does not of itself insure that the bond shall be recognized in its true, its spiritual nature. Symbolism, here as elsewhere, may become materialism. But it insists that there is a bond. And to have the question perpetually asked, "What went ye out into the wilderness for to see?" is of itself no small gain. Just as the earnest and intelligent Christian feels, with increasing growth, his own need of a deeper and more organic connection with Christ than can be had by merely imagining Jesus as present with him, so the necessity for a closer connection of the life of the church with the life of Christ has been making itself felt in those denominations which, in their revolt from the Church of England, broke the closeness of their connection with historic religion. If the early Puritans had foreseen that two centuries after their death their descendants would be celebrat-

ing Christmas, Lent, and Easter as a matter of course, they would doubtless at first have been inclined to lament that they had run in vain and labored in vain.\* But if they had been permitted to see more deeply, they would certainly have rejoiced with surprise that a union of what they regarded as opposites was possible with no detriment to the essentialness of either side.

That the changes which have taken place in the ritual of other churches are in the direction of the Episcopal Church's ritual hardly needs demonstration. Large portions of the Prayer-book are frankly borrowed and used. Congregational and Presbyterian churches, which, a quarter of a century ago, looked with grave suspicion on the attempt to introduce into public worship the repetition of the Lord's Prayer by minister and people, now use not only this, but the Apostles' Creed, the responsive reading of the Psalms, two Scripture lessons, the "Amen" at the close of a hymn, with anthems and collects from the Prayer-book.

\* "For preventing disorders arising in several places within this jurisdiction, by reason of some still observing such festivals as were superstitiously kept in other countrys to the great dis-honor of God and offence to others, it is therefore ordered by this Court and the authority therof, that whosoever shall be found observing any such day as Christmas or the like, either by for-bearing of labour, feasting, or any other way, upon any such ac-counts as aforesaid, shall be subjected to a fine of five shillings." —"Records of the General Court of Massachusetts Bay," May, 1669, vol. iv., part i., p. 366.

All this does not necessarily imply a direct movement toward the Episcopal Church, and probably will not result in any large accession to it. For these changes are brought to pass primarily not because they are Episcopal, but because they are the readiest and best expressions of the organic idea as applied to worship. The Episcopal Church may not directly claim them as owing to her, but she may say, in a spirit of cordial congratulation, "If ye had not plowed with my heifer, ye had not found out my riddle."

Organic worship must provide a share in itself for the whole congregation, and it will therefore demand their participation in prayer, praise, and devotional reading. It must assert their union with other existing congregations, and its order of worship will therefore be to some extent uniform. That order will also be largely a historic one, to assert a union with the past as well as with the present. Together with these expressions of the institutional side of worship, it must also have a place for the individual element; and in the forms of ritual, varying within certain limits in every parish, in the hymns and music, in the sermon, place is found for the individualism of the congregation and of the minister.

It is sometimes supposed that the Episcopal Church narrows the range of prayer by declining to adopt extemporaneous prayers in public wor-

ship. But by this use of the institutional element in preference to the individual it is rather an increase of range that is secured. In extemporeaneous prayer the congregation is limited by its mouthpiece, the person who prays. Granting that there are occasions for which precomposed prayers do not provide, and that there are here and there persons who can express an occasion better than any set prayer, yet the individual in his extemporaneous prayer cannot furnish the institutional element, and it is this especially which worship in public demands. The more the prayer comes direct from the speaker, and has its birth in the particular occasion, the less does it transcend the individual, the less express the universal and raise its hearers into companionship with the Church of all time. To one who has been accustomed to liturgical forms extemporaneous prayer is apt to seem narrow, as proceeding from a single person; angular, as possessing his peculiarities; cold, as lacking the warmth of the devotion of the ages. It is the difference between hearing a piece of music performed and having the same music interpreted in words. In the latter case you are shut up to the thought of the interpreter; in the former the range of possible interpretation is almost infinite. So in prayer. In the one case an attempt is made to give, philosophically speaking, the content of devotion; in the other the form of devotion,

which alone it is attempted to give, admits an almost infinite content. And it will generally be found that those extemporaneous prayers in public which truly uplift the soul gain their power largely through the institutional element which they embody. It is not only because they grasp truly the needs of individuals, not only because they exhibit a human soul standing in wrapt unconsciousness in the presence of God, but because that soul has transcended its own individualism and become a type of the soul of humanity, so that we cease to think of the one who is praying, and hear only the voice of needs and longings that are world-wide. It is often because a felicitous use of scriptural quotations, with the solemn dignity of their style and feeling, brings us with our narrow cares into the presence of past ages, and raises the individual from his solitariness into union with man everywhere, with the infinite and the eternal. The particular man who prays becomes a mediator of the universal, and the universal in turn transfigures and glorifies the particular. In contrast with public prayer, family and private devotion will reverse the proportion of the two elements. In them the individual element will properly receive the greater emphasis.

The principle which dominates the best thinking of our time is that of Hegel's paradox—the identity of identity and non-identity. It is ex-

pressed on its religious side by the dictum of a noted preacher of the last generation, that the truth is never the mean between two opposites, but that it always comprises the two opposites in their entirety. It was that which formed the characteristic of the argumentative method of Frederick Maurice, to discover what truth there was in his opponent's position, and take away his ground by agreeing with it. And the world is perhaps to-day coming to a point where the long opposition between institutionalism and individualism is to merge into a unity comprehending them both. The many centuries at whose beginning tyrannous ecclesiasticism waved its banner and cried, "*Extra ecclesiam salus nulla,*" and whose ending Archbishop Laud tried to ward off with his bitter word, "Thorough;" the last three centuries, when individualism has been pulling down a throne or a creed to-day and setting up a new one to-morrow—these have given birth to an age when the emperor and the pope are trying to persuade the world that they are really socialists. Institutionalism is beginning to feel in the utterances of its former enemy a forgotten kinship, and to be stirred to exclaim with yearning, "Is this thy voice, my son David?" Just as the true foundation of government consists in the due balance of centralization with localization, so the true basis of every church must be institutional-

ism, representing the organic idea, in due proportion with individualism, asserting the worth of the isolated will. It is the special mission of the present time to whisper in friendly suggestion to each of these, as it speculates on its own limited accomplishment, "Cast the net on the other side, and ye shall find."

In this state of things I have been describing there is for the Episcopal Church a great opportunity and a grave danger. The danger is that when she sees the multitude drinking gladly of the waters which flow from the rock she has smitten, she may be tempted, like Moses, to assert ownership and to insist that all who drink shall do homage to her. The dream of the ardent and unintelligent churchman of every denomination is that the kingdom of heaven is to come by all persons joining his church. If the Episcopal Church mistakes the current of the world's life at present for the beginning of the realization of this dream, she will either awake soon to disappointment, or, in order to dream on peacefully, herself enter the Church of Rome. Doubtless she will reap a benefit from the world's discovery of her storehouse, in an increase to some extent of her membership, such, as has been pointed out, as is already the case. But the dream of Pope Hildebrand can never be realized; and if the Episcopal Church is to avoid the fate of the Jewish Church, the fate which

seems probably that of the Romish Church, she must make no attempt to assert a patent on any forms of truth or methods of spiritual life, but must count it her glory to give of all she has and not ask that her name as giver be remembered, nor be jealous if what she regards as her message gets into the world in other ways than through her. The great opportunity coveted by every prophet who has "a burden," is now before her. People are flocking, eager to hear from some one the message she has been longing to preach. Surely there can be no higher function than to give them the message, no matter whether communicant-lists are increased or not; no greater joy than to know that they are receiving it, no matter whose the lips from which they hear it. That men are fed, and that she has been privileged to aid in the feeding, must be her satisfaction, as it was that of the unnamed boy who furnished the five loaves and two fishes to our Lord.

## THE SYMPHONY.

THIS world is a great solemn instrument,  
And we, the human creatures here abiding,  
Are but the keys on which God's fingers play.  
Then let us be each with his part content,  
Leaving the symphony to God's deciding,  
Waiting to let Him sound us when He may.

Striving to keep the tone distinct and pure,  
Harmonious and free from sharp alloy ;  
Satisfied to be silent many days,  
Until the Master-finger, loving, sure,  
Is laid upon us ! Then at last with joy  
Our notes shall help to swell the Master's praise.

## CHAPTER XI.

### IMMORTALITY.

WE started with asking what the nature of things had to say to us in regard to the ultimate facts of existence. We found that our necessary ideas as to the nature of God and of man and of the universe tell us much about life such as we see it. But do they tell us anything about what is beyond our sight, what is to come after this life? We can readily see how they might not. I might know all about one square of a checker-board in itself, and yet know nothing of its neighbor, not even that it had a neighbor. But every block of wood that I pick up prophesies of a tree-trunk of which it was a part, of causative roots and resultant branches. Its organic life thrusts upon me knowledge of more than itself. Now is the existence of man a self-contained square, unprophetic of anything beyond this life; or is it essentially so organic that it demands more than itself for the understanding of itself? We have been maintaining the latter position: that each part of the universe is so organically united to

every other that the whole is involved in every part, so that any one being given, the others must inevitably follow. If this is the case, the conditions of life here will have something to tell as concerning the conditions of life elsewhere—whether there is such life and what is its character.

But before receiving any evidence we must stipulate that the terms of it shall bear the same meaning when asserted of life hereafter, if they make any such assertions, that they have here. To assert that I shall live, but that the term "I" will have lost any element at present essential to it, so that it will not be recognizable as "I," will prevent us from considering the evidence further. There must be life hereafter which shall be the continuity in all essentials of the present life, or there must be a cause sufficient to destroy the present life. It may be—for I cannot prove the contrary—that I am now existing in two places at once, but with no consciousness as to my other locality. That other existence, however, differs from this in lacking the element of self-consciousness, and the consensus of mankind justifies me in refusing to be responsible for it or to concern myself in the least as to its reality. "I" must be I, and "life" must be life, or we will cease to talk about the matter.

This stipulation settles the position we shall assign to arguments which assert that there will be

life hereafter, but it will be a corporate life, in which individual consciousness will have vanished ; I shall live in the race of humankind as an element in its being, but there will be no consciousness of existence, because no existence as an individual. Just as I now owe myself in part to every sailor who struggled across the trackless ocean toward unknown America, to every Egyptian who painted his hieroglyphics without a thought of me, to every cave-dweller who crunched his bones with hardly the capacity of thought, so I am contributing to the development of the future race ; my work will live in them, and because it lives, whether they recognize their debt to me or not, I shall live also.

“ Oh may I join the choir invisible  
Of those immortal dead who live again  
In minds made better by their presence : live  
In pulses stirred to generosity,  
In deeds of daring rectitude, in scorn  
For miserable aims that end with self,  
In thoughts sublime that pierce the night like stars,  
And with their mild persistence urge man’s search  
To vaster issues.

So to live is heaven. . . .  
This is life to come,  
Which martyred men have made more glorious  
For us who strive to follow.” \*

But we are compelled to stop such an earnest soul in the midst of his song and ask him whether

\* George Eliot.

he considers the condition of a Tartar in one of the tribes of central Asia an integral part of his own present condition. Would the death of the Tartar in a foraging raid to-morrow affect him? If it would not, then this corporate element which binds him to every human being would seem to stand on a different plane from those elements of existence of which he is directly conscious. Undoubtedly this corporate element is real, and undoubtedly it may furnish a noble stimulus to lofty endeavor. Even our Lord was not above feeling its encouraging inspiration: "For their sakes I sanctify Myself." But that it by itself may be called life in the same sense in which we apply the term to that kind of existence in which self-conscious personality dominates, we cannot allow. And if corporate life here is not sufficient by itself to be called life, why should it be sufficient hereafter?

Noble and unselfish souls have always been strongly attracted to mysticism, the belief that the infinite is reached by negation of the finite. As we have before pointed out, if mysticism's postulate is true, man can approach God only by the annihilation of himself; the human must cease to be, that the divine may emerge. And at once at the summons of this thought there rise to view the self-inflicted tortures of Oriental devotees in their attempts to crucify the flesh with the affec-

tions thereof; the ecstasies of medieval saints, striving to be lost in God; the struggles of many a pale Puritan woman, trying to convince herself that the less will she had the more truly was God's will done; the aspirations of the new convert as he joins the revival song:

“ Oh, to be nothing, nothing!  
Only to lie at His feet,  
A broken and empty vessel,  
For the Master's uses meet!”

We see them all walking hand in hand with one another and with the Hindu monk, studying to keep his thoughts from wandering from the central Om, and thus to reach the logical development of mysticism, Nirvana, the annihilation of all thought, desire, personal existence. We shudder as the ghastly procession passes before us; and yet we recognize our brethren, the children of the thought which has been the parent of much that is best in us.

We cannot hold to the fundamental position of mysticism, because, as we have said, we must believe that the infinite is reached not by the negation of the finite, but by its realization. The universal must, in our view, not exclude, but include the particular. Corporate immortality, then, is no sufficient immortality, because it lacks the individual element. The unity to which it would

reduce the universe, as one individual after another became extinct, would be an uncomplex, desert unity, an infinite X. We must hold that the individual element is as necessary to the universal as the universal to the individual. And therefore, in assigning place to the evidence for my corporate life hereafter, as it does not mean "my" and does not mean "life," we shall unhesitatingly not put it with the arguments which tend to establish immortality.

We asked existence to furnish us necessary implications, and we would unfold them. The fact that life is too large for its present setting has for ages seemed to nobly demanding men to imply that there was a larger field hereafter, where the soul could expand in accordance with the possibilities of its nature. In this view death itself is the strongest presumption of a life after death. A man devotes years to the preparation for some noble work. Just as he enters upon it he dies. If that is the end, there has been a great waste for him and for the world. And the same is true in case not only of the exceptional person, but of almost every one. The powers of the soul do not find, as they develop, a field commensurate with their development; they are hemmed in and forbidden full action. The knowledge how to live does not come until life is over. More spiritual force is generated than the occasion calls for or can

use. Sooner than suppose this apparent awful waste of the most precious thing in the universe to be real, it is to many a less strain on belief to hold that death is the apparent and unreal thing, and that there is a continuity of life hereafter, where powers find their due opportunity. The preparation, of which life here so largely consists, finds its justification there.

"On the earth the broken arcs ; in the heaven a perfect round."\*

Taken by itself, this argument seems hardly more than a strong presumption, affording legitimate ground for an earnest hope. For it may be, for all this argument can show, that life here is the dreary irrationality, the gigantic jest, which it would be if the field of action were on this side of the grave only. But if it should be established on other grounds that the universe is rational and organic, then this argument would indeed be of weight as pointing out an instance of logical implication, and a department of being organically necessary to the comprehension of the present department. If the universe is in any respect teleological, this seems a legitimate instance of its teleology.

Scientific research has sometimes seemed to weaken the force of this argument by its failure to discover evidence of the existence of spirit apart

\* Robert Browning, "Abt Vogler."

from brain. But in reality it seems rather to strengthen it. For from the discovery of the universality of law it follows that the laws of the physical world hold good, *mutatis mutandis*, in the spiritual world also; and the assertion by science of the indestructibility of force would seem to carry with it the corollary of the persistence of that force, personality, which has been evolved here. This must either persist or be transmuted into an equivalent, as arrested motion is transmuted into heat. Gases and dust may be an equivalent for the body, but they can be no equivalent for the personality inhabiting the body. The only equivalent we can conceive for that would be the personality itself adapted to new conditions, a personality transcending time and place. We see the germ of such in every loving heart, which is carried beyond itself in its passionate devotion; in every inquiring mind, which in its loyalty to knowledge finds beneath itself the immutable strength of abstract thought; in every powerful will, which bears in itself its own completeness, and to which obstacles come as from an outside sphere. This transcending personality we know here in germ, and our experience reveals it to us as the only true personality, while personality permanently limited to time and place appears in its light a contradiction in terms.

But scientific study has added still another piece

of presumptive evidence in favor of immortality, a presumption which could hardly have been recognized before the discovery of the theory of evolution. We have learned that the world and all that it contains was not created complete in its present form, but that it has arisen during long ages through a series of steps, each step following its predecessor in a manner which exhibits law, progress, and organic connection with it. Gaseous nebulae condense in their rotation and deposit a rocky core. Rocks crumble into soil. Soil gives birth to vegetable life. By and by there appear plants having the ability to take in solid nutriment, which they now demand shall have been prepared for them by other plants; and immediately the animal kingdom comes into being. The simplest forms of animal life, sponges and their kindred protozoans, have the waters to themselves until fishes dominate them. Innovating fish venture out upon the land, take to breathing air, develop legs or wings, and become reptiles or birds. Some of these improve their condition by bringing forth their young alive, and at once the reign of mammals begins. At last consciousness develops into self-consciousness, the ability not only to feel and perceive, but to regard one's self as an object of thought, and man appears. Each step is an advance on the preceding; everywhere the tide goes forward without ebb, though particular waves

recede. Individual species may retrograde, following backward in reverse order the path of advance; but then extinction soon tells the world they are on the wrong track. Degradation may occur, a violent plunge to disorganization and death; for the privilege of going to hell exists throughout the organic world. But the fact that these are blind alleys, over which nature erects the warning, "No thoroughfare," points significantly to steady progress in development as the avenue to life. The individual who refuses to follow the path of the universal plunges to ruin. The universe's plan for itself is forward.

A remarkable fact about these stages of evolution is that difference of degree becomes difference of kind; or, to express it otherwise, that appears in the result which was not directly present in the component elements. When hydrogen and oxygen are mixed in certain proportions and an electric spark is passed through them, they disappear, and a quantity of water equal in weight to the sum of their weights appears in their place.\* One inorganic substance somehow advances a step beyond its fellows and acquires the power of storing its experience and handing it on; and

\* "There is not the slightest parity between the passive and active powers of the water and those of the oxygen and hydrogen which have given rise to it."—PROFESSOR T. H. HUXLEY, "The Physical Basis of Life," in "Lay Sermons," p. 136.

immediately it abandons forever its former companions and becomes organic. Consciousness cannot be resolved into its component elements; but at some point in the world's development the fit conditions met in the womb of time, and consciousness appeared.

The course of the world, then, has been a regular progress, each step being an advance upon the preceding, till it culminates in the highest type of man. Now does the process stop here? Does the ultimate, the most precious result in its turn lead to nothing, but does it then revert to an inorganic position back near the beginning of the series, to climb the steps over again? If that is the case, then the course of the world is an instance of suicide on a gigantic scale. In spite of the evidence of progress which evolution exhibits, there is no progress, but only cyclic motion, for the end returns and joins the beginning. In order to avoid such a conclusion and not give the lie to this great evolutionary plan, it seems more reasonable to suppose that the present stage also develops organically into another, an existence which is as truly an advance upon this as human life is upon that of the animal. Unless this is so, the plan of the universe, so far as we see it, has failed at its culminating point. The universe has wound up and gone into the hands of a receiver. And to find irrationality here is as truly, if not as

evidently, a discovery of the reign of chaos as to find that the triangle, which we had always supposed to have three angles, has but two. If evolution stops at death, the whole series is discredited, and becomes lacking in respect and, in some of its parts, in credibility. For what the theory seemed to bear witness to was progressive development as the law of the universe. But if it is the law of only a part of the universe, and that the least important part, it is an affair of trifling interest. If man, however, may develop an existence independent of time and place, which is therefore immortal; if there is thus a clear way from man straight up to God, as there is from the lowest plant straight up to man, then evolution is indeed the key to the method of the universe, the logic of God's action, and full of absorbing interest and superlative importance.

The mention of a life independent of time and place leads us to another point of view. We are led by the desire for verification to ask whether we find any indications of such a mode of life. And at once we reply that we do. As we were just now saying, we find thought to have a real existence and to be therefore independent, since all thought is not invented but discovered. We find in will an original creative force, *πραξέων ἀρχή*, which does not refer itself to necessary antecedents. We find a consciousness of oughtness to

be so essential to human nature that we cannot conceive a human being who should not have some form of it. We exult in seeing love while losing itself find itself, and we say, "Here is the whole thing proved; here is death giving birth to life."

There is, then, a domain of existence which is independent of time and place; in which, therefore, death can have no part, any more than sickness or any other event requiring a material basis. Let us for convenience' sake give this domain its name; let us call it spiritual life or the life of God. Any being, then, who shared this life of God would share its prerogatives; he would partake in a life over which death would have no power.

But can a man so identify himself with God's life? We look around to see. Here is a philanthropist so wrapped up in his "cause" that he not only identifies his interests with it, but his words, thoughts, actions, loves, and hates are all absorbed into it. "Love me, love my dog," we jeeringly say of him, and the remark is philosophically accurate. Which is the real Epictetus, the lame slave who was hungry and poor and despised, or the free spirit in that deformed body, which held communion with the gods and made itself one with a portion of abstract and infinite

thought? "God buries His workmen, but carries on His work;" does the workman who can exultingly say that belong wholly to the tool-class, a thing, temporary, extraneous to the user, or does he, through his perception of dominating purpose and loving exultation in it, transcend his own finitude and become one with the purpose behind the work? When a noble, passionate love spends itself on a worthless object, is it all tragedy? Is there not a gloriously saving element in the fact that the lover not only gives himself, but gets himself back multiplied by a factor of inestimable worth? A local and temporal love has given birth to a love abstract and real. Surely the participation by man in one and another element of the life of God and his endowment thereby with qualities which are eternal, is a fact verifiable, common, and glorious.

But may not this absorption of the divine impair personality, or at least does it necessarily imply personality? Is it not absorption *into* the divine, in which process individuality, and therefore personality, ceases? Does the soul hereafter become absorbed in the soul of the universe, as the thread is absorbed in the cloth woven, or the drop in the ocean? But here again let us turn to facts and see. Do we find that as a man grows in thought, knowledge, wise purposefulness, love,

his personality decreases or increases? Is the premier of England less of a man than a tramp, or more? Is it not in so far only as he has some degree of these characteristics that he has manliness—that is, personality—at all? We were inclined to consider these as abstract qualities until we found that they are essentially personal.\* And so we may dismiss the fear that identification with the divine life will leave personality too feeble to maintain its identity. Indeed, the more closely we examine it the more we become convinced that it is the only way of preserving personality, or, to speak more accurately, of gaining it. For if participation in the life of God carries with it continuity of existence, or rather constitutes existence, it follows that those who do not share the divine life have no existence. This we can see to be the case in certain departments of certain persons. One man has no artistic sense; that whole side of his nature is dead. Another has steadily abused his kindness till it has become atrophied and left him cold, hard, cruel. We note the degeneration which takes place in a man who becomes indolent, incapable of thought, whimsical, sensual. One element after another of manly character, or, to put it otherwise, of complete personality, disappears. We say the man is running down. Where would he run to if the process

\* Cf. p. 68.

should complete itself? Take away one element of personality after another, and you finally reach zero, extinction. The man at last goes out like a candle, because there are only candle elements left in him. Where this point is at which the man becomes wholly material, and therefore ceases to exist except as matter, we cannot say. We hope, our most reasonable hopes compel us to believe, that it is not in this life. We cannot but think that there is a germ of goodness undestroyed in every man, a possibility of awakening some side of spiritual life, which in its turn shall bring its blessed fellows with it. We cannot but think that in the different conditions of life hereafter many a man will see whose eyes here have never seen, will hear whose ears have never heard. But we cannot but recognize also that there is nothing in the mere change of conditions which will of itself necessitate this, but that growth in both directions, downward and upward, must be possible, since growth is essential to life, and direction from within is essential to growth. Or, as Lotze says: "That will last forever which on account of its excellence and its spirit must be an abiding part of the universe; what lacks that preserving worth will perish. . . . We have no other principle for deciding it [the question of the immortality of the soul] beyond this general idealistic conviction: that every created thing will

continue if, and so long as, its continuance belongs to the meaning of the world; that everything will pass away which had its authorized place only in a transitory phase of the world's course.” \*

This view of life as consisting in sharing the elements of the life of God occupies a prominent place in the theology of St. Paul and St. John. “I am crucified with Christ: nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.” † “Christ in you, the hope of glory.” ‡ “We are in Him that is true, even in His Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God, and eternal life.” § “He that hath the Son hath life; and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life.” || “This is life eternal, that they might know Thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ, whom Thou hast sent.” ¶ “If we love one another, God dwelleth in us. God is love; and he that dwelleth in love dwelleth in God, and God in him.” \*\*

There is another witness whose evidence we must hear in regard to immortality. The relation of the universal to the particular has something to say to us. How is the part connected with the whole? In case of a stone, evidently in a completely

\* Lotze, “Metaphysic,” sec. 245, p. 432 (Eng. trans.).

† Gal. ii. 20. That the life of God is regarded in these passages as mediated through Christ has no effect in the use here made of them.

‡ Col. i. 27.      § 1 John v. 20.      || 1 John v. 12.

¶ St. John xvii. 3.      \*\* 1 John iv. 12, 16.

external manner. Each fragment is as truly a stone as the parent. The whole is a whole merely by aggregation. Rise to the life of a tree, and we find that the whole needs the parts and is not itself without them. A tree without leaves dies. Here the whole has become organic. But any particular leaf is not essential. Pick off one, and the tree puts out another or gets along perfectly well with those that are left. The general particular is necessary, but not the particular particular. Rise again to organic and intellectual life. What is my relation to the axioms of geometry? Is not every one of them essential to my mental sanity? Not the knowledge of them in their scientific form, for my child has never heard of the forty-seventh proposition of the first book of Euclid; but such a presence of them, dormant and undeveloped but real, as leads my boy to run confidently to meet me along two sides of a triangle instead of taking a hypotenuse through the snow. Could I get along without the particular truth that parallel lines will never meet? Could I ever cease to have in my nature the elements of proud, protecting love which my boy has taught me? Yes, I could; but then I should cease to be, in respect to these departments, a spiritual being; those sides of my nature would be dead. As long as I have any life of this kind, not merely is the general particular, love, necessary

to me, but the particular particular, parental love.

"Ah, but not this particular child," says some sad-eyed mother; "he may be taken away, and wretched life may still drag on." Yes, but the very wretchedness is a comfort, as showing that perhaps the relation has become essential; for if it is essential, it must be permanent. My child and I are not, however, as yet wholly spiritual beings, and therefore, on account of the non-spiritual elements in us, are in some respects separable. But I am related to God in wholly spiritual ways. I have become identified with part of His life. I am an essential part of it, since with a wholly spiritual being there are no parts which are not bound together by the law of essential or inherently necessary existence. But if I am now a part, I must, unless I lose my spirituality, continue always a part. For the universal must always need the general term, particular, for its existence; without it it would be, as we have said, incomplex, inorganic, a mere vague X. But the general particular is composed of particular particulars. Because I am an individual, different from every other human being who ever was or ever will be, the special element which I furnish to the universal cannot be furnished by any other individual. God, by letting me share His life, has made me a necessity to Him. It is not the case

that some one else will answer just as well. He needs not only humanity, but me. As long as I continue to be that spiritual being which part of me is, as long as I keep unbroken that bond which joins me to the life of God, I have a charter of perpetuity, for God's existence is bound up with mine.

"Ich weiss dass ohne mich Gott nicht ein Nun kann leben;  
 Werd' ich zu nicht, Er muss von Noth den Geist aufgeben.  
 Ich bin so gross als Gott; Er ist als ich so klein;  
 Er kann nicht über mir, ich unter Ihm nicht sein."\*

This law of the necessity of the particular to the universal is exhibited in case of the divine nature by the theologic doctrine of the eternal generation of the Son. It is the same truth which lay in distorted form at the foundation of the Calvinistic doctrine of the perseverance of the saints. That which belongs essentially to the life of God cannot, by any condition of circumstances in this world or any other, be torn from Him. Once His, always His. "I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of My hand."† In applying the doctrine, however, the observance of the condition was often forgotten. I am indeed endowed with the divine prerogatives, but only so far and so

\* Joh. Angelus Silesius, "Der Cherubinische Wandermann," bk. i., 8. 10.

† St. John x. 28.

long as I share the divine life. God needs the whole of Himself. As long as I embody part of Him, He needs me. If I cease to be identified with Him and exist outside Him, my link of connection with Him ceases and I cease to exist. God needs me as much as ever, but I have ceased to be I, and therefore cannot supply His need. And if any one questions how the infinite and perfect God can have an unsatisfied need, he has not yet asked himself why the world was created, nor solved the first step in the necessity for its redemption, nor analyzed the meaning of the word "love."

And so we come back with fuller conviction than before to the position we were maintaining earlier in the chapter, that the theory of corporate immortality fails because it does not preserve the individual, and therefore leaves its universal in incomplete, that is, inorganic existence, that is, in non-existence. And our fuller conviction extends also to our belief that absorption of the life of the universe does not mean loss of personality and absorption into the universe. If the individual is necessary to the universal, participation in the universal life cannot involve loss of individuality. The more elements of the universal the individual absorbs the more inseparable will be his hold on infinite personality, since these elements are simply partial aspects of God.

Teleology, evolution, ontology, and metaphysics all seem to give, then, to the question we asked of them the same answer: that there is beyond death another life, or rather a continuation of this life, which man inherits not by the mere fact of his existence, but in so far as he partakes of the nature of God. We must recognize the probative worth of this evidence. It is not demonstrative, though to many it seems sufficient. For a demonstration is that the opposite of which is absurd. Now it is conceivable consistently with mental sanity that the actual fact may be opposite to the conclusion here reached, and that there is an awful waste of man's highest powers, that the evolutionary series comes up to man and then breaks short off, that sharing the character of God does not involve sharing His nature, and that the infinite excludes rather than includes the finite. No one of these conclusions is logically inconsistent with itself. But, in the opinion of many persons, each one involves more than a logical absurdity—a disbelief in God, a disbelief in the reign of law, a disbelief in character, a disbelief in rationality. To accept these disbeliefs and trust the evidence of the senses and the logical understanding that death is the final end, is to such persons a greater strain on credence than to doubt such evidence and trust the moral, or, as they must regard it, the higher

evidence. The point of practical union possible between the believer in immortality and the earnest unbeliever is for each to throw himself into the noblest life conceivable and welcome gladly its destiny, whether that destiny involves preservation of personal identity or not.

## A BIRTHDAY.

MUST we be sad or merry on this day?  
    Oh grief in joy, to see thy vacant place!  
    Oh joy in grief, that nature framed that face,  
And sent thee forward on thine eager way!  
A soul of passion, peering joyously  
    Into each realm throughout life's wide domain,  
    Counting all gain of others thine own gain,  
Thy spirit reigned exultant, large, and free.  
In thee we first knew gladness. Thou didst fill  
    All paths of life with duty turned to ease.  
    Is there a charm in moon-lit summer trees?  
Does gracious word or action send a thrill?  
    They all are bound to thee, through thee are dear—  
    No, no, thou art not dead; thou still art here!

## CHAPTER XII.

### SUMMARY.

LET us go briefly over the ground we have been traversing in detail, and take a glimpse of it as a whole. What have we been saying about the great facts of spiritual life viewed as inherently necessary, as implications in the nature of man, the facts of the existence of God, the Trinity, the Incarnation, the Church, the redemption of man and his immortality?

We have been maintaining that the existence of God is one of the first necessities involved in the nature of thought. The elements of thought are certain fundamental conceptions—likeness, difference, number, causality. These conceptions are not peculiar to me, but they belong necessarily to every human being who ever lived or ever will live. They are universal. But just as their existence in an individual implies an individual mind, so the existence of universal thought implies a universal Mind. It is this fact, that I cannot explain myself completely without reference to something beyond myself, that I cannot regard the

ideas of number, oughtness, causality, necessity, which I have, as mine—it is this element in me, but not of me, which enables, which compels me to transcend my own finitude and to gain a glimpse of an infinite Mind, whose existence is implied in my own. When I have said one I have already said two, and when I have said one and two I have stumbled upon the organic nature of the universe and discovered the Infinite.

Then, as to the nature of this infinite Mind, we were maintaining not that it is unconditioned, because then it would be unknowable, but that it is conditioned by itself only. And since every rise in the scale of being is accompanied by a rise in complexity of organization, we are prepared to find this infinite Mind the most complexly organized existence in the universe. We believe we can discern the fact, among these necessary self-limitations, that, together with the infinite elements of which it is composed, this Mind has an essentially human side. To this self-conditioning source of being we, with others, give the name of God the Father; to this essentially human side, God the Son; and to the dynamic element which forms the meeting-ground between the human and the divine, God the Holy Ghost. And while we find our faith in the Trinity strengthened and illustrated by the Council of Nicæa and by an innumerable fellowship of believers, we rejoice to

know that it is grounded far deeper than any external authority—in the very nature of thought and being.

If there is in God an eternal need for self-expression, and if there is a human side to the divine character, this human element must embody itself, and embody itself in the highest, that is, in human, form. The embodiments will be many, partial, and incomplete; because for completeness there will be needed not only the essential characteristic of humanity, a free human will, but one in absolute union with the divine. In the fullness of time, however, it will happen that this perfect embodiment will take place; and the result will be a being who shall perfectly represent God under human conditions. We expressed our belief that this Incarnation has occurred. We find in Jesus of Nazareth both the Christ and the Son of God, the highest expression of humanity and the unique representation of the human element eternally immanent in the divine nature. Humanity raised to its highest power is seen to be one side of divinity; and this key opens the way to the deepest interpretation of the nature of both man and God.

The life of Christ also, seen from this point of view of inherent necessity, a necessity consistent with Himself and with the nature of things, becomes luminously intelligible and endowed with

increased attractiveness and cogency. His fortunes, His powers, and His miracles are seen to be necessary results of His personality. Given a being such as the Gospels describe, of absolute unity of will with God, this unity of will would endow Him with insight into the divine plans and methods and enable Him to have power over man and nature which would be as much beyond the understanding of ordinary men as beyond their possession. These superordinary powers would be all in the line of God's will, that is, of natural law ; but they would appear often as breaches of law because instances of laws yet unknown. They would therefore be wonders, miracles, which would excite at first astonishment and then attraction or repulsion in those who witnessed them, but which He Himself would regard as merely ordinary expressions of His personality. A being of such endowments and such aims—for His great aim could only be the redemption of mankind—would inevitably meet opposition ; opposition most of all from those who considered man's relations with God to be their especial province, that is, the sacerdotal class. And such opposition could only result for Him in death. And yet over such a being death could have no power. The personality that is made one with God must share the fortunes of God ; and so the resurrection of Christ is seen to have been a necessity in the nature of the case.

Turning now to man, we found that, if he is to be more than a mere machine, he must be in some respects capable of self-direction, that is, he must have some freedom of will. This implies that he will not always exert this will in the best way; and at once appears the doctrine of original sin, that is, the inevitability of falling implied in the nature of an unstable equilibrium. The means of saving men from sin will be in form numberless—legislation, punishment, inheritance, education, society; but they will all aim at awakening love and its converse, fear, and arousing the will; for no reformation can be more than superficial that does not come from within and is not led by will and love. The most powerful means, in the last resort the only means to this end, we held to be the revelation of the divine hatred of and grief for sin, together with God's pardoning love for the repentant sinner. This, exhibited in manifold ways, but most completely in the life and death of Christ, is the means for bringing man to be at one with God. And so to us the doctrine of the Atonement passes into that of the Incarnation.

The resurrection of Christ is from this point of view a crowning instance, and therefore an authoritative assurance, that death is not necessarily the end of life. This strengthens the inference, from the nature of man, that personality shares the fortunes of those spiritual forces by which it

is dominated. If it is made one with evil, then, since evil is not a positive existence, but is the negation of spiritual life, it becomes ultimately extinct. If it is made one with the life of God, it shares His prerogatives and becomes independent of time and place. Just as a masterful will and a wise mind and a passionate heart hold their dominating way in the world, superior to conditions of time and place, though it is in these very conditions that purpose and knowledge and love find their points of attachment, so the personality that has absorbed into itself eternal forces becomes by that fact eternal. If the part has once become organically connected with the whole, its connection with the universal is then a necessary one. The universal is not only necessary to the particular, but the particular is necessary to the universal.

“Gott ist mir Gott und Mensch; ich bin Ihm Mensch und Gott;  
 Ich lösche Seinen Durst, und Er hilft mir aus Noth.  
 Nicht du bist in dem Ort; der Ort, der ist in dir.  
 Wirfst du ihn aus, so steht die Ewigkeit schon hier.  
 Ein Gott-ergebner Mensch ist Gotte gleich an Ruh,  
 Und wandelt über Zeit und Ort in jedem Nu.” \*

This, then, is the point of view from which we have been regarding religion. Religion is natural, for it is a development of the nature of things,

\* Joh. Angelus Silesius, “Der Cherubinische Wandersmann,” bk. i., 224, 185; bk. ii., 119.

the nature of man and God. It is revealed, for it would be unphilosophical and impious to allow a distinction between man's discovery of truth and God's impartation of a revelation. It is certified by authority, the authority of custom and the ages, of holy men and apostles, of Jesus Christ Himself; while behind all external authority is the voice of the eternal fact, testified to by rational thought, the consensus of Christian intelligence, *quod semper, ubique, et ab omnibus*. Any custom, institution, or doctrine will rest first of all on some external authority, but ultimately upon the fact that it is as it is, its nature being discerned by that sanctified intelligence which is the voice of God in the human soul.

There are, of course, many customs, institutions, and doctrines whose existence is precious which are not immediately involved in the nature of man as man. These find their basis in the nature not so directly of the general as of the special case. Thus the existence of the Church is an inherent necessity. For the Church is the outward expression of that condition which is born of the union of man's spiritual relations. There are the spiritual relations of men to themselves, to one another, to all who have ever been or ever will be, and to God. And through the union of these there arises a real spiritual entity, differing in kind from any of its component parts,

as gunpowder is different from niter and charcoal and sulphur. This entity, the Church, is an eternal fact, a divine institution. But the forms which the Church shall take at one time or another have not an absolute, but a relative necessity. Methods of divine worship and church-government are necessary in some form, but not necessary as to this or that particular form, and are therefore matters which are to be decided by their intrinsic reasonableness. The particular form is, as Bishop Jeremy Taylor says, necessary “not to the *esse* of the Church, but to its *bene esse*.” It is this element of reasonableness discerned in any custom or institution of the Christian Church which enables us to say that it is ordained by Christ; for this we must regard as a more trustworthy test of His ordination than mere tradition or history. For this element of reasonableness, to whose tribunal all things are to be referred, is not my private opinion nor yours, but the Christian consciousness, the voice of the divine Logos, which was in the beginning with God.

It is the claim of ecclesiasticism that it develops the organic element of Christianity. Too often it has done this in material, outward ways, the result being not so much an organism as a mechanism. But the position here taken is a development of the organic element of Christianity in intellectual and spiritual directions. And such a view of the

universe reveals an organic relation of men on the side of evil, that is, depravity ; an organic relation of men on the side of good, that is, vicarious salvation ; an organic relation of men to circumstance, that is, a divine election ; an organic relation of men to one another on their religious side, with its embodiment, the Church ; an organic relation of God to humanity, manifesting itself typically and historically through the Incarnation of Christ; an organic relation of God to Himself, expressed in the doctrine of the Trinity. In a word, we must believe the universe to be an infinite organism, whose parts are so related to and conditioned upon one another that, one being given, the others necessarily follow.

How far that word "organic" leads us!

## TRAVEL.

WHERE'ER I go, my Love, thou meetest me!  
The rhythm while onward speeds the rushing train;  
The river's silence, gliding toward the sea;  
The dim, blue distance o'er the cloud-flecked plain;  
The little child, with sweet, believing eyes,  
    Trustful of all the world; the wit and thought  
That find fit words; friends' kindly courtesies;  
The grace of all things being as they ought—  
The stamp which shows the spirit's touch in each,  
    And makes all excellence akin through all,  
After its absent kindred needs must reach,  
    And for its chief exhibitors must call.  
This harmony which speaks in all to me,  
Whom could it speak of, Love, but God and thee!

## APPENDIX.

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### SOME CRITICISMS ON THE ANDOVER MOVEMENT.

[To show the principles maintained in these Studies not only in analytic order, but also in action, the following critique on one of the recent theological movements in New England is given, reprinted by permission from the *Andover Review* (February, 1890).]

WHEN a new train of thought first comes before the public, it is safe to say that the form it wears is not its permanent form; and therefore, if judgment is passed on it then, allowance must be made for incompletenesses in expression which will be filled up, exaggerations which will be dropped, distant relations which will be discerned and allowed for, a clearer discrimination between essentials and accidentals—a whole process of ripening which will take place before the thought stands complete in its identity and ready for the world's judgment. The Andover Movement was begun half a dozen years ago, and may now be fairly supposed to have had time enough to pass through this stage of childhood and to

have become its mature self. So we may question it without feeling that we are asking questions prematurely, and be confident that it is old enough to answer without embarrassment.

In regard to a movement that has behind it such learning, intellectual power, piety, and broad influence as has the Andover Movement, there are very few persons whose opinions are of any importance. Certainly I have not the slightest idea that mine are, or have in themselves any claim to be heard. But I have not the presumption to imagine that I am not typical. Many others must be feeling toward this movement in the way I feel. And therefore, if I regard myself as a type, when I formulate my own position I shall express not a particular thought, but one that will have more or less of generality.

I have had from the first a very hearty sympathy with Andover's new departure. It has, in my opinion, brought more healthy life into the religious world of New England than any other movement of the century. It has stimulated thought, deepened piety, enlarged the visible horizon of the kingdom of heaven, set a wonderful example of Christian courtesy in polemics, and saved the Congregational body from destruction at the hands of the intellectual deadness and narrow ecclesiasticism of its own High-church party. Its influence is now established. The New Theology has reached the stage where men are supposing that they have of course believed all along the views it presents; and it is preached from many a pulpit and editorial chair where it is not at all recognized as Andover theology, but is uncon-

sciously supposed to be Theology itself, the only normal and proper thing. What greater success can any scheme of thought desire than to lose its distinctive name and supersede itself? The history and present position of this movement are a promise that the intelligent thought of the next half-century in New England shall find no necessary breach between itself and Congregationalism, and therefore to some degree a promise that the thought of the whole country shall find less of a breach between itself and religion. For as it has been demonstrated that a gain in numbers to one college is not a loss to the other colleges of the country, but a gain to them also, so any real growth in one church is a gain to all the other churches.

And yet there are some, and some not only like myself, outsiders, who think they discern in this movement signs of incomplete or arrested development, signs which show that it cannot, without change in its present condition, become the redeeming force it promised. There is, perhaps, no annoyance so annoying as a friend so good that we feel he ought to be better. Andover has seen so clearly, and laid the future under so deep a debt to her, why can she not see a little more clearly and become a power for the world, and not only for Congregationalism? This question of the future of the movement has to some an intensity of interest from the fact that they are members of the Church in which the problem is being worked out, and so their own position is more or less affected by it. To others of us, who are not members of the Congregational Church, but who have toward it the kindly feelings that spring from an

ancestry, birth, and education surrounded by its influences, the matter has the interest attaching to any movement which concerns the Church universal, and which, therefore, must ultimately concern every branch of that Church. These latter persons are not affected in their ecclesiastical position, one way or the other, by any view they may take of the movement. Have they, then, have I, no right to speak concerning it? Andover, with her uniform courtesy, would be the first to welcome kindly criticism from any quarter. The criticisms I am about to make are offered solely with the desire that the weak places I seem to see in her armor may be speedily strengthened, so that she may be invincible in the battle she is aiming to fight.

In estimating character conditions of birth are important. In case of the Andover Movement they are more than usually important, for they have stamped a mark upon it that yet remains. The Movement had its origin in two practical exigencies. A candidate for a professor's chair in Andover Theological Seminary was accused of holding the belief that death is not the end of possible change in moral character, which view, it was asserted, was inconsistent with the Seminary's creed. Some of the professors came to the support of the candidate, and maintained that even if this view were held, no inconsistency would exist. They were, of course, at once charged with being guilty of similar views and inconsistencies themselves. During the discussion of the theological and legal questions involved, the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions discovered that a missionary about to be sent

back to his former station in the foreign field declined to disown the view charged upon the candidate and professors at Andover. The Board refused to allow him to return. Other intending missionaries were found to entertain similar doubts and were rejected. Theological students began to be deterred from offering themselves to the Board. Andover Seminary then came into the field as the champion of a larger missionary policy ; and, as the possibility or non-possibility of change after death was the test by which the Board insisted that the orthodoxy of its appointees should be tried, "second probation" came to be the battle-cry of the opposing parties.\* These two practical ends, then, constituted Andover's primary aim : to vindicate the qualifications for a seminary professorship, and to send missionaries into the field.

There was a great advantage in the practical character of these ends, especially of the latter. They formed an issue which everybody could understand, and in which every one was interested and took a side. Andover might have piped or mourned for a generation, and no one would have thought of dancing or weeping,

\* It should be borne in mind, however, that Andover explicitly denies that she holds the belief that after death a second opportunity will be open to all to obtain salvation. "We do not argue," say the Andover Reviewers, "for a second probation, nor for a probation indefinitely prolonged, but for a Christian probation sometime and somewhere."—"Prog. Orth.," p. 253. (The articles which at first appeared in the *Andover Review* embodying the positions of the New Theology were afterward collected in a book with the title "Progressive Orthodoxy." I refer to it rather than to them, for the sake of convenience.)

if it had not been for this readily apprehensible, practical element in the aim which she held up. It got its up-holders a hearing. It sifted the spectators into enemies and friends. It stamped Andover as the champion of missions. Even now, when there is a lull in the battle, it is still felt that the sending off of every fresh missionary somehow scores a point for Andover.

But there was a decided disadvantage, too, in all this. In fact, it was, for the permanent influence of the movement, a grave misfortune. Having her attention kept busy with practical interests, Andover had no time to be philosophical. Her positions bore the appearance of having been taken up under fire, with as much order and logic as could be commanded at the moment, but still with the smoke of battle about them. They did not seem to be the quiet, natural, inevitable developments, clearly seen and ordered, of a central thought. At all events, whether her positions were taken hastily or not, they have different characters. Some of them have the invincible basis of necessary thought beneath them, and some have as basis the fragments of one and another system dating anywhere from St. Anselm to Professor Park. The result is, of course, an incongruity, a bit of philosophy side by side with a bit of medieval scholasticism. Perhaps the most striking examples of this occur in treating those standard bug-bears of the theologian whose philosophy is less stalwart than his kindliness, the heathen and the pre-Christian Jews. These are always a test of the philosophic insight of a theological system. If when it approaches these it begins to murmur about exceptions, its charac-

ter is gone. For to allow exceptions in a philosophical system or in the multiplication table is to betray ignorance of the nature of the thought on which philosophy and mathematics are based. The boy who should put in as plea for the wrong answer to his problem that he knew two and two were four in most cases, but this was an instance where they were not, would probably be marked down in spite of his ingenuity. Exceptions naturally bore a prominent place in the older theological systems, because, as their God was a more or less modified Oriental potentate, the divine will was always more or less an arbitrary one. The thought of the divine will as a divine necessity, and of law as an eternal fact, an aspect of God's character unvarying except in point of view—this was impossible to an unscientific age. But to-day every theologian must reckon with these data. In scientific theology there can be no exceptions. A systematic principle must be found large enough to embrace them.

And one would expect not to miss such intrepidity in Andover, which has never been charged with hesitancy to apply logic. And yet the writers of the *Review* can say:

"To these questions we must reply, as we replied before, that the knowledge of God granted to the Jews was different in kind from the knowledge attainable by others, and that we therefore are not justified in arguing from the Jews to the Gentiles. The Jews occupied an exceptional position."\* "As to Abraham and his descendants, the instance is clearly exceptional. . . .

\* "Prog. Orth.," p. 246.

While their salvation proves that knowledge of the historic Christ is not absolutely necessary, still they were recipients of that which was preparatory of the gospel and directly predictive of it. And besides, it has always been believed that for the completeness of their redemption they had clearer knowledge after death of God's love revealed in Christ.”\*

What is this necessity that is not absolutely necessary? We are familiar with such from the lips of weak parents; but even as children we were bright enough to see that this meant no necessity at all. And it is because this inconvenient case will not come within the system that a little annex must be built on for it, as in the sentence last quoted. The fact is that all the objections to Andover’s position in regard to probation hereafter would have vanished, or been transferred to other grounds, if she had but thought out and settled the fate of these ancient Jews. It was the apparent anomalies in the orbit of the planet Uranus that enabled Le Verrier to calculate just where the hitherto unknown planet should be that would explain them and give unity to the solar system. Well do the Reviewers say in another connection: “We question the advantage or the right of modifying the natural and reasonable conditions of Christianity under the stress of exceptional cases.”†

Now if that view of the universe is correct which regards it as a self-consistent whole—and this is what we mean by philosophy—every part will be what it is by necessity of this self-consistency. Any fact which cannot show the nature of the case as the ground of its

\* “*Prog. Orth.*,” p. 85.

† *Ibid.*, p. 135.

being must be content to pass into the realm of conventionalities, things which may be decided this way or that way by agreement. The existence of God and of the multiplication-table we believe to be absolute truths. Forms of divine worship and church-government we believe, most of us—those of us who do not mistake the “Tracts for the Times” for the Ten Commandments—to be relative truths, necessary, indeed, in some form, but not necessary as to this or that particular form. Any truth, then, which cannot show as its basis the nature of things cannot demand universal acceptance. Here is the opportunity for the great work of constructive theology the next generation may contribute: to show the same necessary basis which we recognize in mathematics in case also of the existence and attributes of God, of revelation, sin, redemption, the Incarnation, the Church, a future life—in short, in case of all the main doctrines of the Christian religion.

Now Andover had—or may the present tense still be used?—a unique chance to serve as the prophet of this new dispensation; unique, because the spirit of the age is longing for just such constructive guidance on an absolute basis; because, having been so fortunate as to create a disturbance and gather a crowd about her, a word from her would at once find an audience; and because she had herself appreciated in part this very gospel of inevitability. For example:

“Christian thought, having established itself on the intrinsic, absolute right and on the inexorableness of law so firmly that these may be accepted as postulates in all the inquiry, . . . is going forward now to learn

if any ethical ends are secured by the revelation of God in Christ.”\* “There is a movement of thought which has gone beneath or has gone back of the thinking which at one time was satisfied to rest in the sovereignty of God. All commands, penalties, favors, blessings, issue, it was once thought, out of the will of God. . . . But the conviction is now clear that the will of God is directed by the reason of God; that instead of saying it is right because God wills it, we should rather say, God wills it because it is right. Right and wrong, goodness and badness, holiness and sin, have their own intrinsic qualities according to what they are. . . . What we are now emphasizing is the marked tendency of thought to recognize the intrinsic, necessary character of law and right, and the inevitableness of the results of conduct.”†

This is excellent. There could be no better recognition of the inherent nature of things as the basis of the doctrines of the Incarnation, the Atonement, and the character of God. But then, just as in swimming we sometimes pass suddenly from comparatively warm water into a streak of much lower temperature, why must we here meet a cold streak like this?—

“God does not become propitious because man repents and amends, for that is beyond man’s power. He becomes propitious because Christ, laying down His life, makes the race, to its worst individual, capable of repenting, obeying, trusting; and He does this in such a way that God’s abhorrence to sin is realized, the majesty of law honored, the sinner and the uni-

\* “*Prog. Orth.*,” p. 51.

† *Ibid.*, p. 47.

verse convinced of the righteousness of the divine judgments.”\*

Here are the regular forensic phrases, still in their melodramatic and medieval dress. No one who knows the difficulties of expressing abstract thought will quarrel with a theologian for using any algebraic signs he pleases. But we may rightly demand of him either to translate them into the language of the day, or to see, at least, whether they are capable of such translation or are anything but counsel-darkeners. It is the scholastic habit of regarding relations as entities apart from the wholes in connection with which alone they can be understood, that gives rise to this forensic method, neither truly historical nor real, of treating eternal processes.

This failure to apply the test of philosophy to its words as well as to its thought has led to a lack of definition of fundamental terms. Surely the series of articles in “Progressive Orthodoxy” should have been saved from this, at least, by the presence of one of its *dramatis personæ*, Socrates, that much-enduring man, who is apt in theological discussions to bear the part of the awful example in a temperance lecture. One would suppose that, if nowhere else, yet in the discussion of eschatology, a definition would have been given, or would have been privately arrived at, of salvation. But in the chapter on this subject one looks in vain not only for such a definition, but for any clear conception of it. There seems to be still the old misty idea of some beatific state to be entered upon only after death.

\* “Prog. Orth.,” p. 58.

Of salvation as always salvation from sin, not only the pages, but the thought behind them, shows little trace.

The same confusion hides in other phrases covering fundamental needs of thought. "The gospel," "accepting Christ," "faith," "nature"—it is assumed that these have no need of definition. And as two meanings are possible in each of these cases, confusion is inevitable, especially since the real root of the difficulty is that Andover is dissatisfied with one meaning, and has abandoned it in feeling while still holding to it in thought. She has jumped off the boat without having reached the wharf. For example, in regard to the relations of the human and the divine, either of two opposing views may be held. The one is that human and divine are mutually exclusive terms, so that whatever is divine is *ipso facto* not human, and *vice versa*; the other that the infinite does not exclude the finite, but that every attribute essential to perfect humanity belongs necessarily to divinity also; and of this it holds the Incarnation to be the revelation and complete, crowning instance.

Now it would seem at first sight as if there need be no question which of these positions is held by the Andover Reviewers. They have felt that tendency of our time, which, indeed, has been the primary motive power of this whole movement, which identifies all that is best in humanity with divinity. They say:

"We add a single remark upon the general philosophical conception of God and His relation to the universe which underlies these essays. It is a modifi-

cation of a prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation (in accordance with the highest thought of the Greek fathers) of the divine immanence. Such a doctrine of God, we believe, is more and more approving itself in the best philosophy of our time, and the fact of the Incarnation commends it to the acceptance of the Christian theologian.”\*

If this conception had been consistently followed out, there might have been a much greater Andover controversy, but the present one, never.

Other passages show that the Reviewers have apprehended this truth in its relation to the Incarnation, the truth that the human spirit is not different in kind from the divine nor alien to it, but that humanity raised to its highest power is divinity.† In treating the doctrine of revelation also, the inward revelation which

\* “*Prog. Orth.*,” p. 16.

† “It [the human nature of Christ] is finite, and the Word who created it is infinite. But we do not move in our thinking, if we think correctly on this subject, merely on this plane of contrasts. We may not forget them, but they are only parts of the truth. The divine and human natures in Christ are essentially related to each other. The human nature is the divine nature humanly expressed and realized. The one should be as closely connected with the other in our conception as a word with the thought it utters. The relation is as intimate as this, but it is of a higher kind. . . . The human nature of Christ is in finite form the personal word of that eternal Word. It is not a foreign nature. . . . The new and fundamental thought in modern Christology is the essential relation of the two natures, so that either can know and realize itself in the other.”—“*Prog. Orth.*,” pp. 28, 29.

comes through the highest exercise of man's powers is claimed as truly divine.\*

Now these positions are corollaries to the proposition that God not only transcends the world and human nature, but is immanent in them. They are logically tenable on no other ground. And it would certainly seem from the above quotations that it is upon this position that the Reviewers desire to take their stand. But we soon come across phrases whose uniform wakes grave suspicion that they belong to the opposite party. We hear of "the light of reason and science without any revelation whatever";† of "the light of the unaided reason."‡ They tell us that repentance and amendment are "beyond man's power";§ and they antithesize "personal attainments in character" and "personal appropriation of the righteousness of Christ."|| These and many similar expressions can know no other ancestry than the former of the opposing views just mentioned, and compel us to think that the Reviewers would draw a distinction between the human reason acting by itself and the divine reason imparting a revelation, between the impulse that leads men to turn to God and the promptings of the Holy Spirit, between "Christ in you" and "Christ the hope of glory."

One cannot read "Progressive Orthodoxy" without

\* "Now if it should please God to produce a book of oracles by sheer and stark miracle, or to dictate the contents of one to a scribe or number of scribes, the teaching would not come more directly from Him than when a soul in vital connection with Him freely utters, under the leading of His spirit, the truth which is the element in which it lives."—"Prog. Orth.," p. 203.

† *Ibid.*, p. 247.

‡ *Ibid.*, p. 108.

§ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

|| *Ibid.*, p. 134, note

a growing conviction that the authors have never seen the unity of the two last-mentioned terms. Many of the results of the doctrine that God is immanent in the world and in man they have apprehended. Of the results of the corollary, that Christ is also thus immanent, they have apprehended but few. Now one cannot study the New Testament without discovering in it a growth in the conception of Christ. To the Synoptists He is Jesus of Nazareth, the historic being whom they or their friends had seen and walked with in Galilee and Judæa, and whose words and deeds they were chronicling. Their conception of personality is that of a unit incased in a body and exclusive of other similar units. When, however, we come to the Apostle who had received the best theological education the time afforded, we find a somewhat different conception. St. Paul had little interest in the historic events of the life of Jesus, apart from the final ones. In the résumé of his teaching—that summary which, with a touching sense of proprietorship, he calls “my gospel” (*1 Cor. xv. 1*)—he mentions only Jesus’ death, burial, and resurrection, and interviews with many afterward. Why he limits his vision to these, since parts, at least, of the previous life of Jesus were known to him,\* it would take us here too far to inquire. Now his pages are

\* The only events previous to the Last Supper to which he refers are the Davidic descent of Jesus (*Rom. i. 3; ix. 5; xv. 12; Acts xiii. 23; 2 Tim. ii. 8*), the preparatory ministry of John (*Acts xiii. 24, 25*), the lowly condition and poverty of Jesus (*Phil. ii. 7; 2 Cor. viii. 9*), His unselfishness (*Rom. xv. 3*), a remark of His not elsewhere preserved (*Acts xx. 35*), and possibly a part of the first charge to the twelve apostles (cf. *1 Cor. ix. 14* with *St. Matt. x. 10*).

studded with the name "Christ"; it flashes upon us, directly or indirectly, from almost every thought. But it has passed with him from a title of Jesus of Nazareth to a designation of the ideal man, the embodiment of all that is best in humanity, the expression of the possibilities of the soul of the individual and of the race. "Christ" stands with him for the human side of God, and therefore for the divine side of humanity. Turn to his Epistles almost at random, and the thought meets us. "The fact, which was but vaguely seen by previous generations, that God was leading you Gentiles to salvation," he says to the Colossians (Col. i. 25-27), "is now plain. And this rich, glorious process that has been going on is Christ in you, the hope of glory." St. Paul never stops to define, but a description from him is sometimes a definition. "God's dear Son," he says (Col. i. 15), "who is the image of the invisible God, the first-born of every creature." Remembering the Hebrew usage (Gen. xlix. 3), by which the first-born is regarded as the highest type of its kind, perhaps we shall find no better modern equivalent for this phrase than that which we gave above: "the human side of God, the divine side of humanity." The Apostle longs to attain the resurrection of the dead (Phil. iii. 11), which, he says, he has not already attained, a remark which would be superfluous if resurrection meant to him a reendowment of life in a future state. But he will attain this, or, as he more fully defines it, he will become perfect, if he may know Christ; not merely the facts of His sufferings, death, and resurrection, which he already knew, but the power of His resurrection and

the fellowship of His sufferings and the likeness of His death. If these same processes take place in him—and of course he thinks of himself only as a type of every man—they will constitute in him the ideal for the sake of which God seeks him. He will apprehend that for which he is apprehended. He will then be in Christ.

These passages set forth with sufficient plainness St. Paul's conception of Christ as the spiritual expression of humanity. It must not, however, be supposed that in saying that Christ was with him a spiritual being it is implied that He was not also to him a historic being. Passages constantly occur in which the word "Christ" has a direct reference to the historic life of Jesus. Now one and now another of the great conceptions which go to make up his idea of Christ is prominent and gives accent to the special thought in hand. Now it is Christ as the Logos, the operative side of God; now as the side in common with man, the human side; now it is that Jesus who was the complete embodiment of God under human conditions; now it is the spiritual processes in himself, in every man, which produce and constitute the lofty ideal of humanity; now Christ is external to the soul, the giver of all its true life; now He is within the soul, the soul's very life and essence. From one to another of these great conceptions his expression hurries, as it is now this, now that aspect that he has mainly in view, though he never quite forgets any one of them. They tangle his thought into inextricable sentences. They reveal to us conceptions which are likely to be new—those ordinary-seeming

phrases, “in Christ,” “to whom coming,” “Christ in you”—conceptions as to the inclusiveness of personality. The mystery of the mingling of human and divine in the soul and in the race so overcomes him that he bursts out into poetry and a torrent of prepositions: “For of Him, and through Him, and to Him, are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen.”

The endeavor which we see so prominent in the apostolic age, to demonstrate that Jesus was the Christ, was but a form of the necessity which the thoughtful world is to-day more than ever feeling—the necessity of discovering an essential link between historical and spiritual religion. It was the conviction that this necessary link had been found that made St. John exclaim with passionate eagerness, “Who is a liar but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ ?” We cannot stop to show how this thought of Christ as the presence of God in the soul permeates St. John’s writings. In order not to see it there, one must translate in terms of time and place the expressions which refer to the union of Christ with those who are His, and thus vacate them of value.

Now in the scheme of the Andover Reviewers this mode of regarding Christ as immanent is conspicuous by its absence. To them the gospel, the knowledge of which is to save the world, is as follows:

“The gospel is an earthly, historical religion, wrought out in the deeds and sacrifices of the man Christ Jesus, who lived under the conditions of a human earthly life, who dwelt in the cities and villages of Judæa, who

walked in the valleys and on the mountains of Galilee, and who died on a hillside of this earth.”\*

In their doctrine of the Atonement, God, Christ, and man are three beings, each external to the others, trying to come to an agreement:

“ Man, left to himself, cannot have a repentance which sets him free from sin and death. . . . If man unaided could become truly repentant, he would become holy and be the child of God. . . . It is not true that repentance without Christ is availling for redemption, for man of himself cannot repent; but, on the other hand, it is not true that Christ’s Atonement has value without repentance. Christ’s sacrifice avails with God because it is adapted to bring men to repentance. He is one, in with the race, who has the power of bringing it into sympathy with his own feeling toward God and toward sin; and so God looks on the race as having this power in Christ.”†

But it is when they come to the special question at issue, to eschatology, that this non-recognition of Christ as potentially immanent in the soul becomes most apparent. They have been driven to the position they have adopted by this argument: The knowledge of Christ is essential to salvation. The history of Jesus is essential to the knowledge of Christ. That every human being should have a chance to pass upon the claims of

\* “ Prog. Orth.,” p. 76.

† *Ibid.*, p. 55. The omissions in quotation are made solely for the sake of brevity, not with the attempt to force any difference of shading from that which presumably the authors intended.

Jesus Christ is essential to the justice of God. Since many men do not have such chance in this life, they must have it hereafter.\*

Now here is a plentiful lack of definitions. Apart from those we have mentioned—What is meant by Christ? and What is meant by salvation?—here are others: What constitutes a sufficient “knowledge of Christ”? What determines whether the opportunity for getting that knowledge was sufficient? What is “passing upon the claims of Christ”? Or, to put these in concrete form: suppose I am one of the Masai of the Soudan; the *Andover Review* would work out my personal equation—we trust we are not misconceiving its decision—that I have indisputably never passed upon the claims of Christ because I have never had the

\* “Whoever will not believe on Christ is incorrigibly and hopelessly impenitent. . . . Wherever the gospel is proclaimed, Christ is already testing men.”—“Prog. Orth.,” p. 74.

“The gospel is an earthly, historical religion, wrought out in the deeds and sacrifices of the man Christ Jesus.”—*Ibid.*, p. 76.

“The personal appropriation of Christ in His life and death constitutes a sinner a Christian.”—*Ibid.*, p. 143.

“A natural inference from these premisses is that every one will know God as He is revealed in the love and sacrifice of Jesus Christ. If Christ was given for the whole world, and if no one can be saved except by faith in Christ, we are almost driven to the conclusion that Christ will be made known to every individual of the human race in all the generations, past, present, and future, and that everlasting destiny is determined for every person by his acceptance or rejection of Christ. . . . We frankly admit that it seems to us probable that those who in this life have no knowledge of Christ will not be denied that knowledge, with its corresponding opportunity, after death.”—*Ibid.*, p. 242.

knowledge of Him, and, never having had a sufficient opportunity for getting that knowledge here, I shall therefore have these matters presented to me for my decision hereafter. Now suppose, again, I am a street Arab in New York. I am, alas ! but too familiar with the name of Jesus; I have been once or twice to a Mission Sunday-school, and heard that Christ lived and died centuries ago. Have I knowledge enough to pass upon the claims of Christ ? Is my chance hereafter to be taken away because I have already had my opportunity of hearing the gospel ? How unfortunate that I let myself be enticed into that Mission-school ! Or, again, suppose I am one of that not small number of men who scorn a lie, and value honor as life, and are generous, even lavishly generous, in helping a fellow-man who is in need, but one whose parents have taught him that religion—meaning thereby the system of which the various churches are the exponents—is an anachronism ; who regards the Bible with esteem, like the *Odyssey*, and the history of Jesus, with which he is perfectly familiar, as having somewhat more value for a modern student than that of Julius Cæsar. What is to be done with this most inconvenient person ?

Of course the readiest way of getting rid of him is to leave him to what the Reviewers call, with a proper touch of sarcasm in condemning this proceeding in others, “the ambiguity of the uncovenanted mercies” of God.\* But they would not themselves be guilty of such indolent agnosticism. They would recognize the obligation of their system to provide a place for such a

\* “ Prog. Orth.,” p. 92.

one hereafter; and yet what that place would be it is a little difficult to discover. He knows of the life of Jesus, and yet he—whatever the Reviewers might be kind enough to do for him—would not call himself a Christian. On the other hand, if lofty character is the aim of religion for man, our friend has many elements of the loftiest moral, nay, more, Christian, character. Is he, with such traits, to be lost? Some of us would be as reluctant to consent to this as are the Reviewers to consent to the loss of the African savage who has never had his opportunity of “passing upon the claims of Christ.” And yet it would seem as if they were only deterred from saying “Yes” to the appeal for condemnation through a feeling that it would not be quite courteous; for they say in rejecting a similar case:

“This is more like salvation by merit or moral character, a kind of salvation perfectly plain and intelligible, but not, as we had supposed, a kind accepted and advocated by the rest of the Church. The church-doctrine of salvation we had assumed to be that of justification by faith. Paul and Luther evidently did not rely upon personal attainments in character, but upon the personal appropriation of the righteousness of Christ.”\*

Certainly the Reviewers should know that any system which holds that the attainment of lofty moral character here is no warrant for salvation hereafter has committed suicide. Certainly they should have read their time carefully enough to be aware that there are thousands of men who have drifted away from religion because its terms in regard to the next life are unreal

\* “*Prog. Orth.*,” p. 134, note.

when transferred to this—men who are saying to the churches: “If your salvation that you talk about is other than the perfection of personal character, keep it; we want nothing to do with it. Salvation by character is, as you say, a kind of salvation perfectly plain and intelligible, and it is good enough for us.” Certainly the Reviewers should have theological insight enough to see that in this men are but clamoring for that very doctrine of the Incarnation which they themselves profess to hold, which makes all religion center in Christ, and Christ to be the ideal of perfected humanity. And yet the only answer the Reviewers have for cases like this is:

“But were there not pious Jews before the time of Christ who were saved, and who at death entered immediately into blessedness? . . . The Jews occupied an exceptional position.”\*

The Andover theology most emphatically and truly says: “The decisive fact for every man is his relation to Christ.”† This is his “judgment,” his *κρίσις*. What needs explanation is whether it regards this relation as one of the intellect to certain opinions and historic facts, or as one of man’s spirit, his will and affections, to the spirit of Christ. The questions, What were the facts of the life of Jesus? What was the metaphysical nature of the being they show, and what His relations to God and man?—these are questions of deep importance. But they are questions which demand a high degree of intelligence and trained judgment to answer, and they are not, therefore, for each man the questions of first

\* “Prog. Orth.,” p. 245.

† *Ibid.*, p. 241.

importance. Those questions are : What is the attitude of my spirit to the spirit of God ? Do I love what He loves and hate what He hates ? It is these questions that decide moral character. Of course to the majority of men these questions never come in conscious form. Unquestionably it is of great advantage that they should come in conscious form and should receive a deliberate answer ; but unquestionably it is not essential to their receiving a right answer. Is the man, that is, the character, in conformity with God, so far as man can be, that is, with the human side of God, with Christ ? It is this that, making no exceptions, decides the moral character of infant and adult, Jew and Christian, heathen and ecclesiastic. Here, as in so many cases, the Reviewers take back with one hand what they give with the other. They would maintain that men are saved through Christ vicariously. But what is vicarious salvation ? It is that salvation from sin which comes not through intelligent perception and choice of Christ, but through such a portion of Christ's spirit as has filtered into the individual through inheritance, society, custom, law. The community having been moulded in these respects by those who have a conscious knowledge of Christ, His saving power is thus mediately transferred to thousands in whose case conscious contact is wanting. It is only in this sense that men are saved by the merits of Christ. For if by this phrase is meant Christ's merits in relation to God, a forensic substitutionalism results, which is degrading to both God and man. But Christ's merits in relation to the religious community are a source of vicarious salvation wide as the community's

influence, for they may permeate every man within that influence, be appropriated by him, and therefore imputed to him. And yet the Andover theology does not recognize this as salvation, partial or complete, nor make use of it in solving its eschatological problem. "Progressive Orthodoxy" would perhaps demur to its right to be called salvation at all. But while the opposing sides are wrangling as to whether such spiritual motion is possible, "*Solvitur ambulando*," we may exclaim, and, following the example of our Lord, take a little child and set him in the midst of them. Surely even an ardent Paysonian, if such could now be found, would hardly maintain that the salvation of this little being was contingent on its apprehension of the intellectual aspects of religion and its conscious choice of Christ as Christ.\* That there is here a salvation, that is, deliverance from sin, is plain. How it comes, is a question which has made many a theory of the Atonement totter, and puzzled many a theologian whose heart was more imperative than his logic. According to the Reviewers, infants and heathen are shut up together in the pen of invincible ignorance, and are only let out

\* "From the first development of his moral powers, his mind was more or less affected by his condition and prospects as a sinner. It is among the accredited traditions of his family that he was often known to weep under the preaching of the gospel when he was only three years old. That these were not mere transient impressions seems probable from the fact that in subsequent years his mother was inclined to the belief that he was converted in childhood. The evidences of his piety, however, were at this period far from being conclusive."—CUMMINGS, "Memoir of Edward Payson, D.D.," vol. i., p. 18.

one by one, in this world or the next, through the gate of intellectual apprehension and conscious choice.\*

To repeat again for clearness' sake: The test of salvation, we must believe, is whether the man, the character, the soul, is like that of Christ. This harmony with Christ may be clearly apprehended by its possessor in its relation on the one hand to Jesus, the incarnate Son of God, and on the other to himself, through understanding and choice; or it may be unrecognized and unnamed; but in either form it may be genuine. And that in its latter form it can be efficacious is demonstrable from those many cases where there is to a great degree deliverance from sin and likeness to Christ and yet no clear apprehension of a scheme of salvation. It is this latter, we suppose, which has been called harmony with the essential or spiritual Christ.

The objections which the Reviewers apparently have to this term, and to what it seems to them to involve, have blinded them to what it aims to express. Their main objections, in the somewhat curt allusions which they make to it, are that it takes away the personality of the Holy Spirit and the significance of historic Christianity,† and that it is "perilously akin in its postulates to the Deism of the last century."‡ Now the cause of the failure of Deism was not that it identified the human reason with the divine, but precisely

\* "We think it more reverent, as it is certainly more reasonable, to believe of infants and heathen alike that according to the development of moral agency they are brought into conscious relations to Christ, and that according to their needs they are enabled to personally appropriate His redemption."—"Prog. Orth.," p. 135.      † *Ibid.*, p. 124.      ‡ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

that it did not. It, as well as the Apologists, took for granted that human and divine were different and opposed. The alternative then arose, Is religion divine or human—which? supernatural or natural? The Apologists said the former, the Deists the latter. The thought of the time was not yet ripe for any one to say, "Both." It is a matter for thankfulness that the Church, as a whole, sided with the Apologists; for if either horn of the harmful dilemma were to be chosen to the exclusion of the other, the former was far more potent and beneficent for its day, and offered more of spiritual promise for the future. But we and the Andover Reviewers believe we have arrived at "a modification of the prevailing Latin conception of the divine transcendence by a clearer and fuller appreciation of the divine immanence";\* and this enables us to see the Deistic dilemma shaking its horns at us without feeling obliged to impale ourselves on either of them. The thought of our day need not be frightened out of its path by any such creature.

It is perhaps no wonder that a recognition of a likeness to Christ in the spirit of men as in very truth the presence of Christ Himself should seem to the Reviewers to take away the significance of historic Christianity. For here again the two lines of Christian thought have persistently tended to get themselves into a dilemma, and to challenge oncomers with a *which*. "Which do you hold to, the Christ without or the Christ within? If the former, you are a Jesuit or an Evangelical, worshiping the memory of a historic being,

\* "Prog. Orth.," p. 16.

and reducing eternal processes to *opera operata*. If the latter, you are a Mystic, a Quaker, who have no use for the first century, and are given over to the tyranny of individual fancies. Now which ? ”

This venerable dilemma has so far succeeded in imposing the belief that there is a necessary opposition between historical allegiance to the Christ of the Gospels and ethical allegiance to the claims of spiritual life, that, as has been previously said, one of the most serious questions of our day, pressing upon the intelligent mind, is to settle the relations between historical and ethical religion ; and it is largely this motive that is impelling those many intelligent men and women, earnestly devoted to the cause of right and truth, who are turning away from the churches, because they seem to them to be hopelessly wedded to the worship of ceremony and history. It is, then, perhaps no wonder that the Andover Reviewers should suppose, with others, that a recognition of what has been called the essential Christ must take away the significance of historic Christianity.

Now the position of the Incarnation in the divine plan of revelation is well stated by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews : “ God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by a Son ” (Heb. i. 1, 2). Thus the Incarnation is not the sole act of revelation, but is its climax, characterized above all other acts, as the author goes on to say, by the unique nature of its attractiveness and definiteness. Historic Christianity, then, has as its province not to create spiritual life in the race *de novo*,

but to be its inspirer, its guide, the revealer to it of heights hitherto unknown. If to-morrow the Gospels were discovered to be false, the spiritual life of man would remain, but it would be infinitely poorer—weaker in motive power, narrower in range, with fewer questions answered, with fewer questions which it cared to ask. And this we find to be in general the condition of those who have little or no hold on historic Christianity. Their spiritual life may be real, but it is thin, saving them from much of evil, but feeble and with a narrow horizon, not calling upon the strongest of the directive powers, a clear purpose intelligently and consciously held. The value of historic Christianity, then, is not diminished by the Pauline doctrine of the immanence of Christ, for by it this historic element is held necessary to the completeness of the spiritual life of the race. Of course the more the spiritual life of the individual holds in it, absorbed from the community, elements which are the direct inheritance of historic Christianity, the more will it approximate to that completeness which is possible only to those who know in whom they have trusted. But that one who has an eager love for whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honest, just, pure, lovely—that he has, *ipso facto*, salvation, cannot be denied by any one who holds salvation to be deliverance from sin. And if he is so saved, it must be either that he is saved without having knowledge of Christ, or that in these very things he has the knowledge of Christ. For ourselves, we prefer the latter alternative.

This objection, however, runs deeper. There is a

feeling that to allow devotion to that which is true, honest, just, to be essentially the same as devotion to Christ would be subversive of His personality. And it is a form of this objection which "Progressive Orthodoxy" expresses in saying that this view takes away the personality of the Holy Spirit. Love for a person is concrete, we are apt to say; devotion to a principle is abstract. Earnestness for truth, justice, goodness, is indeed desirable, but it is not the same as love for Jesus. To ascribe to one person, say the Reviewers, what belongs to another is an infringement of personal rights, at least a confusion of personality. Now this is true, if our idea of personality is still dominated by the thought of separate embodiments. We ordinarily think of personality as necessarily exclusive, mine of yours and his and every one's. But in order to understand man's relation to God, and all the higher human mutual relations, we must recognize that personality is inclusive. The more truly it is personality the more does it comprehend all true persons: "I in them, and Thou in Me." This conception is needed to explain the participation by man in the life of God, the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, the presence of Christ in the Church, all true friendship and marriage, the mutual life of the living with the dead. Any one who has exclaimed triumphantly in the face of separation by distance or death,

"We are wed,  
For we shall carry each the pressure deep  
Of the other's soul," \*

\* George Eliot, "The Spanish Gipsy," bk. v.

will feel it intrusive emptiness to be told that the power that ministers spiritual comfort to him is not the presence of Christ with him, because it is the presence of the Holy Spirit. If our Lord could declare, "All Mine are Thine, and Thine are Mine"; if He could say of one and the same event, "The Father shall give you another Comforter, even the spirit of truth. I will not leave you comfortless: I will come to you"; we are compelled to believe that this was no "confusion of personality," no mere agreement of mutual courtesies on the part of the different members of the Trinity, but that it was because our Lord dwelt in a region where the difference between mine and thine had vanished, where the words had ceased to have distinctive meaning.

Let us sum up, then, the objections to the Andover system we have been endeavoring to express. The conviction forces itself upon us that the system, as at present developed, can never be a permanent power in the world, nor meet the great opportunity before it. It has no universal philosophic basis for its thought. It has not freed itself from the old opposition of finite to infinite, nor from the method of regarding revelation as consisting of facts superimposed on the human mind from without. Its belief in the immanence of God has not been absorbed into its teachings, while of the immanence of Christ it has hardly a conception. It has glimpses of the truths corrective of all these defects, but it has never seen them systematically. Owing to its materialistic view of the finding of Christ by the soul, it is compelled to assert for each soul an occasion when it shall settle its eternal destiny by consciously

passing upon the claims of Christ ; and owing to its desire to save the justice of God, it is compelled to posit such an occasion in the next life for those to whom it has not come in this. This assumption of a future opportunity of the kind it postulates we cannot but think to have not the slightest warrant in the nature of things, nor in Scripture, because neither reason nor Scripture asserts that such an opportunity is in this life the gate of salvation ; and to maintain that the conditions of salvation hereafter are other than they are here would be contrary to our belief in the continuity of life and law, and therefore suicidal. Its Christology vacillates between the old forensic view of Christ's work, caused by the attempt to drag a historic event bodily into the domain of the spiritual and make it do duty as part of an eternal process, and a perception of St. Paul's use of the term "Christ," as not only the title of Jesus, but the elucidative name of those eternal processes which were taking place in his soul, and in the soul of humanity, of which the historic Jesus of Nazareth was the climactic and complete revelation. The exigencies attending the birth of the Andover Movement have unfortunately prevented it from developing itself calmly and harmoniously, and have given its utterances a tone now apologetic and adaptive, now aggressively polemic. The reader of "Progressive Orthodoxy" cannot fail to see that it is largely local difficulties that the scheme is designed to meet, cannot fail to hear an exculpatory tone, and almost to feel embarrassment at finding himself present at the family quarrel of some well-bred household. One may both be proud and may smile

to note that some of its chapters could not have been written outside of New England. This gives the book a certain provincial air. Local polemics there must be, but Andover's time for this ought now to be past. She ought to have produced not an *Apologia*, but an *Institutio*.

Philosophy and science are to-day making to theology a contribution of preëminent value, and this contribution is a question. Theology has had no such precious opportunity for being questioned for three and a half centuries. The question is, Does the infinite exclude or include the finite? The answer which any school of thought gives to this is the test of its depth and the prophecy as to its permanent existence and influence. We may arrange side by side the two opposing hypotheses with their corollaries, so that a glance will show us the genealogy of ideas. If the infinite excludes the finite, all knowledge is relative, real knowledge of God impossible, and the union of divine and human in Christ becomes a mechanical, uninstructive one. Certain conceptions become opposites; for example, supernatural and natural, grace and nature, revealed and natural religion, will and law, conversion and education, the Church and the world, the priest and the man, faith and reason, the claims of the next life and those of this. If, on the other hand, the infinite necessarily includes the finite, real knowledge is possible; knowledge of God is absolute, though not complete; the union of divine and human in Christ is essential and typical; the opposites just mentioned become different aspects of a common unity. According as we hold the one position

or the other, revelation is a process outside the mind of man or within it; faith is a body of opinions or an attitude of spirit; the Atonement is satisfaction to God or harmony with Him; the Incarnation was an exhibition of humiliation or of life in its highest development, full and glorious.

On which of these two sides is Andover to take her stand? At present she stands on neither.\*

\* Since the above was written the *Andover Review* has seemed to indicate, by many of its utterances, its wish to be regarded as holding in each case to the latter of the alternatives above mentioned.

### A HYMN OF PRAISE.

LORD, how shall I rejoice this day?  
The fields their greenest tribute pay;  
This clear, bright sky, the sparkling sea,  
Send forth their song of praise to Thee.

The birds sing praises in the trees.  
I would be tuneful, Lord, as these;  
Yet words of thankfulness or prayers  
My mouth no more can frame than theirs.

Thou that hast made the winds to blow,  
And knowest how they come and go,  
Thou surely, too, the Author art  
Of this dumb joy within my heart.

I can but lift my eyes to Thine,  
And seek Thy loving hand with mine,  
Thankful at heart, on this Thy day,  
Thou knowest what that heart would say.





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